international relations

Your humble blogger's all-time favorite historian, Mary Elise Sarotte, has just published her magnum opus, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe, about the fall of the Brelin Wall and the year of diplomacy that led to a renunified Germany ensconced within NATO and the European Union. 

In the Washington Post yesterday, Sarotte recounts the precise manner in which the Berlin Wall fell.  Turns out that a botched press conference played a rather significant role:   

That night at 6, Guenter Schabowski, a member of the East German Politburo who served as its spokesman, was scheduled to hold a news conference. Shortly before it began, he received a piece of paper with an update on the regulations and a suggestion that he mention them publicly. He had not been involved in discussions about the rules and did not have time to read the document carefully before starting.

His hour-long news conference was so tedious that Tom Brokaw, who was there, remembered being "bored." But in the final minutes, an Italian journalist's question about travel spurred Schabowski's memory. He tried to summarize the new regulations but became confused, and his sentences trailed off. "Anyway, today, as far as I know, a decision has been made," he said. "It is a recommendation of the Politburo that has been taken up, that one should from the draft of a travel law, take out a passage. . ."

Among the long-winded clauses, some snippets leapt out: "exit via border crossings" and "possible for every citizen."

Suddenly, every journalist in the room had questions. "When does that go into force?" shouted one. "Immediately?" shouted another. Rattled and mumbling to himself, Schabowski flipped through his papers until he uttered the phrase: "Immediately, right away."

It felt as if "a signal had come from outer space and electrified the room," Brokaw recalled. Some wire journalists rushed out to file reports, but the questions kept coming, among them: "What will happen to the Berlin Wall now?"

Alarmed about what was unfolding, Schabowski concluded with more muddled responses: "The question of travel, of the permeability therefore of the wall from our side, does not yet answer, exclusively, the question of the meaning, of this, let me say it this way, fortified border." Furthermore, "the debate over these questions could be positively influenced if the Federal Republic [of West Germany] and if NATO would commit themselves to and carry out disarmament."

As NATO was unlikely to disarm itself by breakfast, Schabowski clearly did not expect much to happen that night. But it was too late -- by 7:03 p.m., the wires were reporting that the Berlin Wall was open.

Read the rest of the article to find out what happened at Checkpoint Charlie and other guardposts across the Wall that evening.  And buy Sarotte's book to discover the rest of the story of German reunification. 

Going against all past blog experiences, I though it might be worth posting about Israel and Palestine today.  Reading the tea leaves, the situation there is clearly getting more dire, and I'm not sure if there is a politically viable option for U.S. diplomats. 

The domestic politics within Israel favor the continuation of the status quo -- that is to say, no freeze on the housing settlements and a sustain crackdown on Palestinians in Jerusalem.  It doesn't take an NSF grant to know that politicians do not reverse course on policies that generate massive domestic support.  The Obama administration, after talking tough in the spring, seems unready or unwilling to apply greater levers of pressure against Netanyahu.  So, we have status quo ante. 

Meanwhile, the Palestinian frustration with this status quo has translated into greater support for Hamas, rumblings about a third intifada, and Abu Mazen threatening to quit. 

Neither side seems remotely ready or willing to negotiate. So, here's my question -- if you're Barack Obama, what do you do at this juncture?   Is this one of those moments when all sides might be better off staring into the abyss of abject noncooperation? 

I don't know, I really don't.  I do know that sometimes agreements cannot be reached unless adversaries get a better appreciation of the counterfactual of no agreement.  It might cause both the Israelis and the Palestinians to recognize that they are stuck with each other. 

On the other hand, this is also one of those moments when diplomatic fatigue can cause actors to throw up their hands in frustration and assume that things couldn't possible get any worse.  Except, of course, they could.  And there are ways in which a renewed uprising would be to the Middle East as the collapse of Lehman Brothers was to the global financial system. 

So, my question to readers:  is this a moment for the U.S. to double down in efforts to restart an Israel/Palestinian dialogue, or is this a moment for stepping back? 

Seth Robinson has a interesting essay over at The New Republic that explains why Russia is loathe to sanction Iran over nuclear issues.  The key part: 

How does Russia benefit from its nuclear cooperation with Iran? Simple economics provides a compelling first answer: The Russian economy has not only reaped the benefits of the Bushehr deal, but it has also been bolstered by the sale of fuel and the potential sale of additional reactors. What's more, the nuclear project is only one of many economic agreements between the two countries. Total bilateral trade hovers around $2 billion, as Russia supplies Iran with consumer goods, oil and gas equipment, and military technology. Russia also enjoys privileged access (along with China) to Iran's Southern Pars gas fields.... Second, Iran is still a powerbroker in the Caspian oil trade; its position on the Caspian Sea, which is estimated to hold more than 10 billion tons of oil reserves, makes it an important and influential partner for Russia. Tehran has been extensively involved in coordinating transnational oil and gas deals, arranging transportation of exports with a number of regional states. Russia is in a position to use its good relations with Iran to challenge Washington's efforts to create new pipelines and foreign direct investment in the Caspian region. Iran has already proven an effective regional ally for Russia--in addition to cooperating on energy deals, Tehran has pointedly refrained from criticizing Moscow's Chechnya policy and has held strategic meetings with Moscow on the Taliban.  Finally, Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran provides the Kremlin with leverage over the United States. Moscow remains guarded against Western advances into its "near abroad," and has fought to keep neighboring states from being brought into the NATO fold. By dangling the Iranian nuclear issue in front of the United States, Moscow may believe it has a means to maintain regional dominance. Russian leaders have already extracted concessions from Washington, as the United States recently altered plans for missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. Yielding on the Iran issue would strip Moscow of the ability to coerce the United States and damage its own ability to reassert local influence.  

The first reason is both sufficient and compelling; I'm not entirely sure I buy the latter two.  Iran's nuclear program gave the United States just cause to insert missile programs into Eastern Europe in the first place -- so Iran's nuclear ambitions have caused as many problems for Russia's near abroad as they have ameliorated.  As for the Caspian argument, it's not clear how a Russian-Iranian axis challenges U.S. energy diplomacy in the region.  If anything, that axis probably incentivizes the smaller energy producers to find a viable pipeline alternative that flows outside of Moscow and Tehran's orbit. 

That said, the economic interest argument is pretty powerful.  So, does this mean sanctions would be fruitless?  Not necessarily.  The paradox about economic sanctions is that although allies are more reluctant to coerce each other, they are also more successful once they make the decision to coerce.  At the same time, successful sanction efforts almost always end at the threat stage.  So if Russia ever signaled that it would seriously contemplate a cut-off in bilateral exchange, the Iranians would be likely to concede before implementation. 

This is the outcome the Russians would prefer the most -- a mild threat from the P5 + 1 prods Tehran into taking just enough action to avoid further isolation, and any further implementation of sanctions.   

But I could be wrong.  Persuade me in the comments. 

Jad Mouawad and Andrew Revkin report in the New York Times on just the most darling Saudi proposal for how to help solve the global warming problem: 

Saudi Arabia is trying to enlist other oil-producing countries to support a provocative idea: if wealthy countries reduce their oil consumption to combat global warming, they should pay compensation to oil producers....

The chief Saudi negotiator, Mohammad al-Sabban, described the position as a “make or break” provision for the Saudis, as nations stake out their stance before the global climate summit scheduled for the end of the year.

“Assisting us as oil-exporting countries in achieving economic diversification is very crucial for us through foreign direct investments, technology transfer, insurance and funding,” Mr. Sabban said in an e-mail message....

A recent study by the International Energy Agency, which advises industrialized nations, found that the cumulative revenue of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries would drop by 16 percent from 2008 to 2030 if the world agreed to slash emissions, as opposed to the projection if there were no treaty.

But with oil projected to average $100 a barrel, the energy agency estimated that OPEC members would still earn $23 trillion over that period.

If Saudi Arabia was serious about diversifying its economy, it would open up its spigots and let the price of oil fall to the point where there were market incentives for economic diversification.  Somehow, I don't see that happening.   

So, this isn't really going to go anywhere -- but what I do find particularly amusing is that if one thought about compensating dirty energy producers for the costs of climate change mitigation, then oil producers would be close to the back of the line.  Coal-producing economies -- like China and the United States -- would be justified in demanding much greater levels of compensation, since coal is a much dirtier energy source.  Oil would be in front of natural gas producers, and that's about it. 

Readers are encouraged to proffer their own proposals in the comments that would seem more outlandish than the Saudi one.  Creativity counts!!

[T]he "global community" didn't honor the American President; five Norwegians did.

Glenn Greenwald, "Accusing Obama critics of 'standing with the terrorists,'" October 10, 2009

It's not clear to me (the committee) speaks for the world. It speaks for five Norwegians.

William Kristol, Fox News Sunday, October 11, 2009. 

I'm not sure what scares me more:  Kristol and Greenwald agreeing with each other... or me agreeing with both of them at the same time. 

If you're wondering why it took me a few hours before choosing to blog about Barack Obama's Nobel Peace Price award.... well, it took me that long to stop laughing. 

Honestly, I'm not laughing at Obama.  I'm laughing at the morons on the Norwegian Nobel Committee who made this decision to cheapen an already devalued prize.

Seriously, let's imagine the deliberations that led to this decision:

CHAIR:  Guys?  Guys!!  It's 2 AM and we've got an award to give later today!  What are we gonna do?    We can't use Jimmy Carter again -- he was our emergency winner the last time we were stumped!  If we don't do this right, we'll have less credibility than the Grammys!!

MEMBER A (clearly drunk):  Hey, why not Neil Patrick Harris?  For bringing peace to.... umm.....  Hollywood awards shows?! 

MEMBER B:  Remember when Time's Man of the Year was... you?  Why can't we do something like that?  You know, say that the Peace Prize goes to all peace-loving people. 

CHAIR:  No f%$&ing way.  What do you want me to do, hold up a mirror to the cameras when I say who won?  And you know how many idiots would ask for their take of the prize money? 

MEMBER A:  Seriously, Neil Patrick Harris is awesome.  Any of you checked out Dr. Horrible's Sing Along Blog? 

MEMBER B:  Hey, how about that Iranian guy who won the election but got screwed by the mullahs?  He seemed pretty peaceful.

CHAIR:  Sorry, no dice.  We used up our Iranian quota this decade with Shirin Ebadi.   

MEMBER B:  That Zimbabwean guy?   

CHAIR:  If you can't remember his name, then he's not getting the award. 

MEMBER C:  Did you read how the Oscars will have, like, 10 nominees for Best Picture this year?  Why not give this to all 20 members of the G-20? 

CHAIR:  Doesn't the G-20 actually have more than 20 members?  Can anyone name them all?

Silence....

MEMBER A:  And How I Met Your Mother is definitely underrated as a sitcom.  NPH owns that show.   

MEMBER C:  Hugh Jackman was People's Sexiest Man Alive this year.  Why not double up on him, like we did with Al Gore? 

MEMBER A:  Get serious, man.  Wolverine sucked!!

MEMBER B:  Hey, here's a crazy thought... why not Barack Obama? 

General laughter and merriment.

CHAIR:  How exactly are we going to justify the award?  Jesus, even Jimmy Carter had done some actual peacemaking when we gave it to him.  What are we going to say?  "Barack Obama has succeeded brilliantly in not acting like George W. Bush in His First Term?"

MEMBER B:  C'mon... the guy just lost the Olympics bid even after flying all the way to Copenhagen. 

MEMBER A:  Hey, how about Taylor Swift?  We could guarantee Kanye wasn't in the audience. 

MEMBER B:  Look, maybe it will give Obama a boost.  With the massive prestige that the Nobel Peace Prize now carries in the United States because of our brilliant recent selections, maybe this will help get health care reform passed.  This award would so put conservatives on the defensive!

[General nodding around the table.]

MEMBER A:  Fine, no one else likes Neil Patrick Harris at this table, I get that.  What about Roman Polanski?  That would make a statement.   

CHAIR (looks at watch):  Fine, whatever, we're way past deadline.  (Points at MEMBER B).  Write up the explanation.  (Points at MEMBER A).  Contact Neil Patrick Harris and put him on "standby" in case Obama can't make it for the acceptance speech. 

MEMBER B (scribbling furiously):  Hmmm....how's this?  "Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play. Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts. The vision of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations. Thanks to Obama's initiative, the USA is now playing a more constructive role in meeting the great climatic challenges the world is confronting. Democracy and human rights are to be strengthened."

CHAIR:  Hmmm.... no actual achievements other than Not Being George W. Bush in His First Term, but it sure sounds good!  OK, we're adjourned 

MEMBER C (looking through nomination letters):  I can't believe that professor from Tufts nominated Salma Hayek again.  Doesn't he know that this is a serious award?!   

In semi-seriousness -- Bono got robbed, man.

UPDATE:  I do think Obama's response was to the hubbub was pretty good.  Again, I'm really not laughing at him -- I'm laughing at the Nobel Committee's decision-making.  At this point in time, there were a lot of other, more deserving candidates. 

Giving the award to Obama is kind of like giving that junior professor the Teacher of the Year award -- it dooms their chances for tenure. 

Over at the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman looks back at the G-20 Pittsburgh summit and thinks that Europe will take over the G-20 process: 

The realisation that the G20 is Europe’s Trojan horse struck me at the G20’s last summit in Pittsburgh a couple of weeks ago. The surroundings and atmosphere were strangely familiar. And then I understood; I was back in Brussels, and this was just a global version of a European Union summit.

It was the same drill and format. The leaders’ dinner the night before the summit; a day spent negotiating an impenetrable, jargon-stuffed communiqué; the setting-up of obscure working groups; the national briefing rooms for the post-summit press conferences.

All of these procedures are deeply familiar to European leaders – but rather new to the Asian and American leaders whom the Europeans are carefully entangling in this new structure. Watching an Indonesian delegate wandering, apparently carefree, through the conference centre in Pittsburgh, I felt a stab of pity. “You don’t know what you are getting into,” I thought. “You are going to waste the rest of your life talking about fish quotas.” (Or, this being the G20, carbon-emission quotas.)

The Europeans did not just set the tone at the G20 – they also dominate proceedings, since they are grossly over-represented. Huge countries such as Brazil, China, India and the US are represented by one leader each. The Europeans managed to secure eight slots around the conference table for Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the president of the European Commission and the president of the European Council. Most of the key international civil servants present were also Europeans: Dominique Strauss-Kahn, head of the International Monetary Fund; Pascal Lamy of the World Trade Organisation; Mario Draghi of the Financial Stability Board.

As a result, the Europeans seemed much more tuned into what was going on than some of the other delegations. Puzzling over the new powers given to the IMF to monitor national economic policies in the Pittsburgh conclusions, I was interrupted by an old friend from the European Commission, who recognised the language immediately. “Ah yes,” she said, “the open method of co-ordination.”

Hmmm..... no, I'm not buying this.  Or, to put it another way, if the G-20 is a European plot, then it would be the worst plot since.... insert your least favorite M. Night Shyalaman film here.

Sure, the Europeans are overrepresented at the G-20.  But compare that to the G-8, where (when you factor in the EU), they occupied more than half of the chairs around the table.  The G-20 doesn't augment the power of Europe -- it dilutes it. 

This interpretation fits with what I heard from some of the G-20 participants as well.  There was a surprising degree of common cause between the BRIC economies and the United States in the run-up to Pittsburgh.  Given the outcome, there is an obvious explanation for the BRIC economies' behavior. 

Why did the U.S. go along?  Washington maintains stronger bilateral ties with each of the other G-20 members than most do with each other.  If one thinks of the United States as the central node in a more networked governance arrangement, then one can see how the reforms made to date do not weaken American influence.  The primary loser, then, is Europe.

Maybe Gideon will be proven correct -- it's certainly true that the Europeans might have a comparative advantage in this kind of diplomatic death-by-detail approach.  On the other hand, the Americans and Russians aren't exactly newbies at this.  The Chinese and Indians have been moving down the learning curve pretty fast.  And the Brazilians already have a reputation for being diplomats who punch above their weight. 

Developing....

Your humble blogger has a rather long essay in the Fall 2009 issue of International Security.  What's a lowly IPE scholar doing publishing in a high and mighty security journal?  Assessing whether China's massive holdings of dollar-denominated assets is a big deal or not.  The title may or may not give away my argument:  "Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics."

Here's the abstract: 

Commentators and policymakers have articulated growing concerns about U.S. dependence on China and other authoritarian capitalist states as a source of credit to fund the United States' trade and budget deficits. What are the security implications of China's creditor status? If Beijing or another sovereign creditor were to flex its financial muscles, would Washington buckle? The answer can be drawn from the existing literature on economic statecraft. An appraisal of the ability of creditor states to convert their financial power into political power suggests that the power of credit has been moderately exaggerated in policy circles. To use the argot of security studies, China's financial power increases its deterrent capabilities, but it has little effect on its compellence capabilities. China can use its financial power to resist U.S. entreaties, but it cannot coerce the United States into changing its policies. Financial power works best when a concert of creditors (or debtors) can be maintained. Two case studies—the contestation over regulating sovereign wealth funds and the protection of Chinese financial investments in the United States—demonstrate the constraints on China's financial power.

Read it and weep.