Bush administration

Well, Glenn Kessler's rundown on what's happeing in Phuket is rich with blog-worthy goodness: 

The war of words between North Korea and the United States escalated Thursday, with North Korea's Foreign Ministry lashing out at Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in unusually personal terms for "vulgar remarks" that it said demonstrated "she is by no means intelligent."

Clinton, who earlier this week likened North Korea to an unruly child, has rallied international isolation of North Korea at a 27-member regional security forum here. She met with her Russian, Chinese, South Korean and Japanese counterparts -- the other key partners in suspended six-nation disarmament talks--and won strong statements of support from many delegations....

The Foreign Ministry statement attacking Clinton also amply demonstrated the North Korean mood. "We cannot but regard Mrs. Clinton as a funny lady as she likes to utter such rhetoric, unaware of the elementary etiquette in the international community," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said, according to North Korean media. "Sometimes she looks like a primary schoolgirl and sometimes a pensioner going shopping."

The fit of pique was apparently inspired by an interview Clinton gave ABC News while visiting New Delhi.

"What we've seen is this constant demand for attention [from North Korea]," Clinton said. "And maybe it's the mother in me or the experience that I've had with small children and unruly teenagers and people who are demanding attention -- don't give it to them, they don't deserve it, they are acting out."  (emphases added)

Some random thoughts:

1.  If I'm Chelsea Clinton, I'd be pretty cheesed off right now.  I never thought of her as particularly "unruly," but what other teenagers has Hillary spent time with?  [Cough, cough!!--ed.  Oh... right.]

2.  You have to give the North Koreans major chutzpah points for accusing other countries of being "unaware of the elementary etiquette in the international community."  [UPDATE:  As Rob Farley puts it, "the Nork rhetoric vaguely reminds me of Daily Kos threads from the early days of the 2008 Democratic primary."] 

3.  It's worth pointing out that we're now in a place where the Bush administration look positively dovish on North Korea compared to the Obama administration.  Here's another way of looking at it:  Both Dick Cheney and John Bolton are more comfortable with the Obama administration's Nort Korea policy than Bush administration's.  Think about that for a second. 

4.  A related point -- remember how the Bush administration got pilloried for refusing to talk with Iran, arguing that doing so would confer a reward on the regime?  Kessler quotes Clinton as saying, with regard to the Six-Party Talks:  "We are open to talks with North Korea. But we are not interested in half measures.  We do not intend to reward the North just for returning to the table."   Now there is a difference between this position and that of the Bush administration vis-à-vis Iran -- but it's not nearly as big a difference as Obama defenders are likely to claim. 

5.  What's the end game in all of this?  I think maybe, just maybe, the international community has found a status quo that makes the North Koreans less comfortable than everyone else.  Assuming that the interdiction and sanctions regime works well -- which is a robust but not entirely unreasonable assumption -- then North Korea gets nothing for thumbing its nose at the world except some more weapons-grade fissile material. 

That's not nothing, but it's not all that much either.  Pyongyang already has a deterrent to prevent invasion.  It can't threaten nuclear blackmail all that persuasively, because it's a pretty hollow threat on their part.  And if they can't sell their technology to other countries, then there's no profit in it for them either.  Which means they're stuck, wallowing in their own barren dirt, feeling very, very lonely. 

Am I missing anything? 

I've been playing catch-up this evening by reading Obama's speech on homeland security and then Cheney's speech on homeland security in succession.  Some quick thoughts: 

• My hypocrisy detector went off with both speeches.  For all of Obama's eloquence, there's simply no way to square his position on releasing torture photos with the other aspects of his speech.  Cheney, on the other hand, kept blasting Democratics for using "euphemisms" -- and yet, when describing what happened to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Cheney fell back on "enhanced interrogations." 
• I agree with Christian Brose that it's odd to read these two speeches in light of Jack Goldsmith's TNR essay comparing the Obama and Bush approaches.  Well, actually, it was mostly odd to read Cheney's speech.  The guts of Obama's critique of the prior administration's approach to these issues was nearly identical to Goldsmith's -- a failure to construct a proper legal edifice, a failure to respect checks and balances, etc.  Given that Jack is a rock-ribbed conservative, this is a point for Obama.  I'm pretty sure, however, that Goldsmith agrees with Cheney on the negative effects of the NYT revealing the Terrorist Surveillance Program. 
• I also agree with Joshua Keating that Obama's speech by and large anticipated many of Cheney's arguments.  Obama's rebuttal on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United States was particularly effective.
• Politically, Obama has inherited George W. Bush's greatest political gift -- having adversaries more boneheaded than himself.  While Will Inboden, Philip Zelikow, and Peter Feaver all had some good responses to my lament last week about the state of the GOP on foreign policy and national security, Dick "18% approval rating" Cheney has now cemented his grip on being the party spokesman on this issue in the eyes of the media and the American public.  That's great for Obama and not so good for the GOP.  Beyond the 18% who like Cheney, does anyone think that his speech will persuade others to change their minds? 

What did you think?

Please do check out Foreign Policy's Book Club discussion of Tom Ricks' The Gamble, his excellent and contrarian follow-up to Fiasco.  Here's a link to Marc Lynch's take, and that is followed by Christian Brose.

My take just went up.  The point I want to stress: 

[T]he ways in which the architects of the surge got their way seems like an exact replay of how the architects of the invasion and initial occupation got their way -- operating through bureaucratic backchannels and endruns, ideologically simpatico think tanks, and -- of course -- Dick Cheney's office. For those of us who want the policymaking process to work, this looks like another fiasco. Petraeus's decision to co-opt the Sunni insurgents, for example, was made without consulting the president. Doesn't that echo J. Paul Bremer's disastrous decision to disband the Iraqi military without consultation? Petraeus, Odierno, and Jack Keane might have been right on the merits, but to get their way they bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CENTCOM commander, the State Department, and the NSC interagency process. The Gamble argues that these actors were impediments to the right strategy. All well and good, but what is to stop another cluster of bureaucratic "insurgents" from bypassing the chain of command and telling political leaders what they want to hear on, say, Afghanistan, North Korea or Iran? Is there a need for another, more ambitious version of Goldwater-Nichols?

Go check it out -- and Ricks will respond to all of these comments at the end of the week. 

Let me be the first FP blogger to welcome Shadow Government into the fold. As the Democrats take over the executive branch, it will be good to have some critical voices around to push and prod their foreign policies.

That said, I'd also love it if Shadow Government could also provide some evaluation on any criticism provided by other former Bush officials as the changeover commences. Do these criticisms have validity, or are they merely tactical justifications given the GOP's minority status?

For example, consider today's New York Times op-ed by John Bolton and John Yoo:

The Constitution’s Treaty Clause has long been seen, rightly, as a bulwark against presidential inclinations to lock the United States into unwise foreign commitments. The clause will likely be tested by Barack Obama’s administration, as the new president and Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton, led by the legal academics in whose circles they have long traveled, contemplate binding down American power and interests in a dense web of treaties and international bureaucracies.

Like past presidents, Mr. Obama will likely be tempted to avoid the requirement that treaties must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. The usual methods around this constitutional constraint are executive agreements or a majority vote in the House and Senate to pass a treaty as a simple law (known as a Congressional-executive agreement).

Executive agreements have an acknowledged but limited place in our foreign affairs. Congressional-executive agreements are far more troubling.

Now, on the one hand, one could interpret this advice as a warning about the dangers of implementing international agreements without the broad support of Congress and the American people.

One could also, however, interpret this advice as awfully strange, as it emanates from officials who have, heretofore, been mostly concerned with the augmentation of the executive branch's power at all costs (and implemented plenty of congressional-executive agreements while in office).

It is terribly convenient, now that they are out of power, to be suddenly concerned with Obama running roughshod over the legislative branch. The domestic parallel would be if Bush officials who embraced No Child Left Behind and intervened in the case of Terry Schiavo suddenly developed a Strange New Respect for federalism.

So, Shadow Government, should one take Bolton and Yoo at face value?

UPDATE:  Drezner gets results from Shadow Government.  [Has the ten-year old in you has always wanted to type that sentence?--ed.  Yes.  Yes, he has.]