Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

So, an explanation for that quick zombie survey

The two questions were designed to test whether people have consistent attitudes about risk.  Risk-averse decision-makers prefer the safe option over a lottery with more risk, even if the expected value of the lottery is somewhat higher.  Risk-neutral decision-makers are indifferent between a sure bet and a lottery whose expected value is equivalent to that safe bet.  Risk-loving decision-makers prefer the risky option, even if the expected value of the safe bet is higher.  Risk averse decision-makers aren't necessarily better or worse than risk-neutral or risk-loving decision-makers, but most political scientists assume that individual attitudes about risk are consistent from choice to choice. 

The funny thing is, however, that many people aren't consistent from choice to choice.  Prospect theory observes that people will be risk-averse when they believe that they are gaining relative to the status quo, and risk-loving when they believe that they are losing relative to the status quo.  This means that the exact same choice can lead to different preferences when framed as a gain or a loss. 

For a concrete example, consider my two survey questions.  One question:

You are in a fight for your life with zombies. You have acquired enough resources to launch an attack on the living dead. You can launch this attack in one of two ways. Which strategy do you prefer?

A.  An attack that leads to the certain destruction of 500 zombies;

B.  An attack that has a 50 percent chance of destroying 1000 zombies and a 50 percent chance of destroying only 100 zombies. 

1,238 people responded to this survey question, and 61.3% preferred option A -- even though the expected value of option B was (.5*100 + .5*1000 =) 550 zombies killed.  When operating in a world of gains, a majority preferred the risk-averse option. 

All well and good, but consider the other question in the survey: 

You are in a fight for your life with zombies. Your resources are dwindling, and you must choose between some unattractive escape options. Which option do you prefer?

A.  A retreat that leads to a certain increase of 500 zombies

B.  A retreat that has a 50 percent chance of creating only 100 new zombies and a 50 percent chance of creating 1000 zombies.

Now, both options are bad ones, but option A is the less bad one:  only 500 more zombies versus an expected value of .5*100 + .5*1000 = 550 more zombies created.  Nevertheless, 57.5% of the 1238 respondents preferred option B.  When operating in a world of losses against the living dead, a healthy majority of the respondents was willing to take a risk they weren't willing to take when they were operating in a world of gains.

Normally, these preferences are revealed through questions about money -- would you prefer a sure gain of $500 vs. a lottery, etc.  My survey findings suggests that prospect theory also applies to counter-zombie policies as well.  And yes, the findings are going into the book

Question to readers:  which current foreign policies do you think can be explained by a prospect theory perspective? 

Your humble blogger has long been a believer that, in matters of American foreign policy, the process can matter just as much as the outcome.  Sure, sometimes fortuitous foreign policies emerge from bad decison-making structures, and sometimes bad foreign policies have been thoroughly vetted.  On the whole, however, good decision-making processes should lead to good decision-making outcomes. 

What makes for a good foreign policy decision-making process?  That question comes to mind after reading David Sanger and Peter Baker's NYT story on the Nuclear Posture Review that's going to be unfurled today: 

The strategy to be released on Tuesday is months late, partly because Mr. Obama had to adjudicate among advisers who feared he was not changing American policy significantly enough, and those who feared that anything too precipitous could embolden potential adversaries. One senior official said that the new strategy was the product of 150 meetings, including 30 convened by the White House National Security Council, and that even then Mr. Obama had to step in to order rewrites.

That's a lot of meetings for a document of questionable utility

This also backs up the themese from last week's excellent  Financial Times story by Daniel Dombey and Edward Luce on the Obama administration's foreign policy decision-making process that's gotten a lot of play.  Over at Shadow Government, Peter Feaver provides some useful cautions about reading too much into stories like this.  For the purposes of this blog post, however, I'm just gonna throw those cautions right out the window.  Because after reading Dombeyand Luce, I'm both horrified and impressed by what the Obama administration is doing. 

Let's start with the good.  It's clear that this White House has centralized foreign policy decision-making in a way that we haven't seen since the Bush/Scowcroft years.  Presidents have to claim ownership of their foreign policies, so this is cheering news.   

There's also a lot of praise in the story for the revival of the NSC interagency process -- particularly the way Tom Donilon is running the deputies' committee:

Also the organiser of Mr Obama's 9.30am national security briefing, Mr Donilon reinstated the paper trails needed to prevent intra-governmental anarchy, using the model de-vised by Brent Scowcroft, national se-curity adviser to George Bush senior and Gerald Ford. Vice-president Joe Biden's team was also incorporated to prevent the kind of "parallel process" Dick Cheney used to circumvent the bureaucracy under George W. Bush.

"If you look for the 2002 or 2003 meeting where the decision to go to war in Iraq was taken, you cannot find it," says the senior official. "By getting the process right, we are improving the quality of decisions."....

The refurbished machinery was perhaps most in evidence during the build-up to Mr Obama's decision in December to send another 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan - a journey that took four months and involved him in 40 hours of Oval Office meetings.

Now, the bad -- and there's more of it than I would like to see. 

First, while the White House appears to be running the foreign policy machine, the parts of the White House that are involved should provoke serious consternation.  The National Security Advisor, James Jones, is characterized as disengaged.  As a result, we get this anecdote: 

The lack of a strong national security adviser has created recurring difficulties. Perhaps the best example is the Arab-Israeli peace process, which Mr Obama launched on his second day in office when he appointed George Mitchell as his envoy. Three months later, Mr Obama insisted Benjamin Netanyahu freeze all settlements activity in order to boost Arab confidence in the talks.

In a heated showdown in the Oval Office last May, in which Mr Netanyahu refused to accede to Mr Obama's demand, the only officials present were Mr Emanuel and David Axelrod, senior adviser to Mr Obama in office and during the campaign. Gen Jones was not there. The fallout put the talks in abeyance and damped high Arab hopes for Mr Obama.

"The question is, which bright spark advised the president to demand a settlements freeze without working out what the next step should be when Netanyahu inevitably said 'No'?" says Leslie Gelb, an official in the Carter administration and former head of the Council on Foreign Relations. "Why wasn't George Mitchell in the room? Where was Jones?"

Um... what Gelb said.  Seriously, having only Axelrod and Emanuel in the room is doubly disturbing.  First, they're not foreign policy experts.  Second, having political operatives in the room sends the signal to Netanyahu that the U.S. Israel relationship really is all about domestic politics for Obama.  I don't think that's true, but if Netanyahu thinks that it's true, then it could explain a lot of his recent behavior. 

Now we get to Obama himself.  The implicit message in the story is that he's his own NSC advisor: 

Only briefly acquainted with Mr Obama beforehand, General Jones, a retired four-star marine corps general, shows little interest in running the "inter-agency" process - a key part of the job. Somewhat unconventionally, Gen Jones travels frequently and is thus often out of town. Unusually, it is Mr Obama himself who usually chairs the weekly national security council, known as the "principals meeting", not Gen Jones.

Yeah, this is very unusual.  Sure, you might think, "hey, this is great, POTUS is really involved!!"  Except that when the boss is in the room, the staff will often have a tendency to bite their tongues and refrain from airing discordant views.  This will be true even with someone like Obama, who use to lead seminars for a living and by all reports likes having provocative discussions. 

There's more in the article, including what looks like growing resentment among the principals for Denis McDonough (though for compensating good quotes, check out this Ana Marie Cox blog post). 

Dombey and Luce note in the end that, "Mr Obama has a sharp learning curve, which means his administration continues to evolve."  I hope so, because if the article is accurate (and it seems to jibe with prior stories) then there are definite areas for improvement. 

My provisional grade:  a straight B. 

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

I read with great interest the Wall Street Journal story entitled "A President as Micromanager" about Barack Obama's decision-making style -- and had the exact same reaction as Noam Scheiber

The big problem is that the piece conflates two very different things: One is micromanaging, which involves making decisions that are well below your pay-grade. The other is wanting detailed information on which to base decisions that are at precisely your pay grade. The Journal story presents lots of evidence for the latter; zero evidence for the former....

If I had to guess, I'd say what happened is that the Journal found itself with a nice story about the way Obama makes decisions, but that it seemed too positive. As the piece itself notes: "Unavoidably, the accounts all come from people who admire Mr. Obama, not from his critics, who aren't privy to such sessions." The "micromanager" frame was presumably added somewhere along the way to correct for this problem and make the piece seem more even-handed.

Indeed.  For all the puff pieces on Obama's management style, this article suffers from the reverse problem -- it tries to paint a negative frame and doesn't succeed because of the lack of evidence.  Instead, the Obama in the WSJ story is someone who is intellectually curious, eager for data (which, as Scheiber points out, is distinct from micromanaging) and naturally contrarian. 

In other words, pretty much the opposite of the last person to occupy the Oval Office.  Which is fine with me. 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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