democracy

According to the Associated Press, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev wants to get outside of the DC beltway in his next trip to the USA: 

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says he would like to meet with "dissidents" when he visits the U.S. next week.

Russian news agencies quote him as telling a group of visiting foreign experts that "I believe there are dissidents in the United States."

ITAR-Tass quotes him as saying: "Let them tell me what problems the United States has. That won't be bad, considering the Soviet experience."

I think that this is a fantastic idea, when one considers the potential pool of dissidents.  Fortunately, Andy Heil has come up with a list of possibile dissidents at RFERL's Transmissions blog.  His list:

1. Noam Chomsky
2. Rush Limbaugh
3. Michael Moore
4. Kanye West
5. Sarah Palin
6. Jeremiah Wright
7. Gus Hall
8. Sean Penn
9. Chirstopher Hitchens
10. Eric Cartman

This is an excellent start, but I think we can add a few names to the old dissident list.  Let me think.... who else is railing against the System these days?

1. Glenn Beck
2. U.S. Representative Ron Paul
3. Glenn Greenwald
4. Dick Cheney
5. Serena Williams
6. U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich
7. Jimmy Carter
8. U.S. Representative Joe Wilson
9. Terrell Owens
10. Beyonce (OK, technically, she's not railing against the system -- but as much of a jackass as he might have been, Kanye was right:  this is the most awesome video ever.  She was robbed, and I blame The Man). 

I'm just trying to imagine Medvedev meeting this crew. 

Commenters are encouraged to suggest additional names in the comments.

This bit from the Los Angeles Times' account of today's Tehran protests is veeeeeeeeerrrrrry interesting. 

At times the two camps appeared to be shouting directly at each other, exposing the still-festering election rift within Iranian society and the political establishment underneath both at the Friday prayer enclosure on the university campus and on the streets outside.

As Mousavi supporters chanted "Death to the dictator," against Ahmadinejad, his supporters chanted "Death to opponents" of Khamenei.

As hard-liners repeated their signature cries of "Death to America" and "Death to Israel," riled-up Mousavi supporters overpowered them with chants of "Death to Russia" and "Death to China," the Islamic Republic's powerful United Nations Security Council protectors.

This little exchange underscores the fact that the United States is not the only great power with a stake in the outcome of what happens in Iran. 

That said, one wonders if Russia and China will respond by doubling down on the current regime -- i.e., aiding and abetting Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and the Revolutionary Guards in order to ensure a friendly Iran. 

If this happens, 2009 could be a bizarro-world replay of 1953, when the United States backed a coup in Tehran order to ensure a U.S.-friendly regime.  That move gave the United States 25 years of a friendly Iranian government,  immediately followed by thirty years of a hostile Iranian government. 

Readers, does this analogy hold up? 

The following is not rocket science, but rather International Relations 101. Still, I hadn't seen it anywhere else, so here goes:

The parallels between ongoing events in Honduras and Iran are surprisingly strong, and it's worth thinking about them for a spell.

In both countries, conservative elements of the established regime conducted what was, essentially, a coup d'etat. In both cases, the coup-plotters used both legal and extralegal means to cement their hold on power. These actions have triggered mass demonstrations in the streets of Tehran and Tegucigalpa. Both governments are rather paranoid about external influence on their regime. And, in some domestic politics version of the security dilemma (I hereby label this the "sovereignty dilemma"), that paranoia about external meddling is merely fuelling greater international attention to their domestic affairs of state.

Now, what are the differences? They boil down to a few important distinctions:

• Iran is much, much more powerful than Honduras.
• Honduras possesses much less strategic significance than Iran.

What does this mean? It means that realist and liberal logics will work together in Honduras and against each other in Iran. The Organization of American States could never reverse a regime change in, say, Brazil -- but multilateral coordination will have an effect on Honduras. Indeed, the fact that Honduras is relatively small is what makes it easy for the OAS to muster some consnsus on the issue. Furthermore, in contrast to larger countries, the effect of multilateral sanctions on Honduras would be pretty significant.

In Iran, on the other hand, conflicting strategic interests prevent any kind of great power concert that could push for domestic change. It's also far from clear whether anything short of a gasoline embargo would really have an appreciable impact on the regime in Tehran.

So, holding everything else constant, the odds are that the coup in Honduras are more likely to be reversed than the coup in Iran.

Bear in mind, however, that life never holds everything else constant.

Continuing the Iran discussion, I see John Boonstra at UN Dispatch takes issue (respectfully) with my recent prognostications.  John's rejoinder:

[A] Rubicon may indeed have been crossed, with no going back to "the way things were" in Iran. That certainly seems to be the consensus. But I also wonder if it might be a bit of wishful thinking. There's a tendency to imbue events as-they're-happening as more important than they may turn out to be. To take just the color revolutions to which it has been so trendy to compare the situation in Iran: Ukraine's "Orange" and Georgia's "Rose" (not to mention Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip") were certainly major events, but the hype that they generated at the time far surpasses the attention that those countries, modestly different though their governments might be, attract today.

I think more useful comparisons would be Tianenmen or, better, the monks' uprising in Burma in late 2007. What these examples -- or even, as I suggested before, those of Kenya or Zimbabwe -- show us is the possibility of an outcome distinct from Drezner's either-or (or both) model. At the time, many thought that Burma's junta couldn't possibly survive such a brutal onslaught against the country's most venerable institution. But...it survived. In Iran, the possibilities are simply too many to predict: Khamenei may retrench, and allow Ahmadinejad to take the fall; or, the two of them may make some sort of minor concession to the protestors; or again, they could simply wait until the crowds peter out. Revolution is not inevitable. In such an interesting situation, nothing is.

As someone leery of historical analogies and fond of nuance, I would like to agree with what John is saying.  Except that I don't. 

First, I think it's pretty clear Khamenei is not going to retrench.  The moment he said that Ahmadinejad's victory was a "divine victory," he sealed his position on the matter.  He can't back down now.    I'm pretty sure supreme leaders in Iran don't change political tack because of mass protests -- it undercuts their claim to be, you know, supreme leaders.  In his latest sermon, Khamenei is doubling down on his bet with Ahmadinejad. 

Is there any other way this ends without one camp or the other abjectly losing?  I don't think so.  Minor concessions will not mollify the protestors.  A "compact"-like solution doesn't work terribly well here, since the factions don't trust each other enough to believe that force won't be used down the road.  A re-run of the election won't work, because Khamenei's been digging in his heels and can't back down now.  A straight-out Revolutionary Guards-style coup is possible, but that's going to come with a lot of bloodshed. 

Second, I think Boonstra is slightly misreading my post.  I'm not sure that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei will be out of power soon.  What I am pretty sure of is that the only way they're going to stay in power from hereon in is through a display of brute force on a Tiananmen-like scale. 

Third, Boonstra raises a valid question, which is whether a genuine regime transition would really mean all that much.  Color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan have not necessarily amounted to all that much.  Similarly, I see that Steve Walt has reverted to "regime type is irrelevant" arguments with regard to Iranian foreign policy. 

Hmmm....... nope, not persuaded.  There are two big differences in the case of Iran.  The first is that, unlike all the other color revolution countries, Iran is a regional heavyweight.  Every other color revolution government had to worry about a more powerful neighbor who liked the old regime better staring them down.  Iran is a more powerful and less divided country.  This does not mean that realipolitik pressures will not apply -- but it does mean that they are less binding than in the case of, say, Ukraine.  And because of Iran's material power, a possible Green Revolution matters more in more strategic areas, like the Persian Gulf. 

On the nuclear question, I take Walt's points, but I'm not sure how relevant they are after the past week.  Post-regime transition governments have been quite willing to give up nuclear programs in the past -- Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, to name a few.  Steve cites polls that show strong Iranian support for the nuclear program -- but those same polls also show strong opposition to creating nuclear weapons. 

Iran's security interests will remain paramount to any new government, of course.  But I do wonder just how much of Iran's insecurity has been a product of the current regime's own making.  Would a Mousavi/Rafsanjani regime be as insecure about its staus in the region? 

If, on the other hand, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad manage to keep their grip on power, I can't see them ever giving up their grip on their nuclear program, no matter what is on the table in negotiations. 

I'll leave this as an open question to readers -- to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program? 

I don't have too many complaints with Barack Obama's foreign policy to date.  But I'm beginning to wonder about his effect on America's foreign policy bloggers. 

Today, I see that Josh Marshall recommends Juan Cole's blog as the place to check for updates on Iranian elections.  I don't always agree with Cole, but Iran is right in his wheelhouse, so off I click.

His top post, entitled, "Iran Awaits Ballot Results; Obama Effect Expected," contains this paragraph: 

Howard LaFranchi at CSM asks what the 'Obama Effect' will be on the Iranian revolution. Although it was not decisive, scientific polling in Lebanon suggests that Obama did have an effect in the defeat of the Hezbollah coalition, "March 8", in Lebanon, even if it was a slight one.

Hmmm.... there was scientific polling done on this?  Really?  Rats.  Earlier this week I expressed my skepticism about the Obama effect in Lebanon's election.  Ready to concede that I might have been wrong, I clicked through Cole's link to find the following: 

Neither [Lebanon nor Iran] has any accurate, independent or publicly available political polling, and no poll has attempted to substantively gauge the effect of Obama's presidency or his recent Cairo outreach speech to Muslims on either country.

One recent poll done on behalf of two U.S.-based public-interest groups found that few Iranians — only 29 percent — said they have favorable opinions of the United States, and that the view had changed little since Obama's election.

Both of Cole's links have quotes from experts claiming that there might have been a mild Obama effect.  There ain't no scientific polling, however. 

Let's everyone slowly walk away from the Obama hyperbole, shall we? 

UPDATE:  Cole has corrected his post. 

From a U.S. perspective, Lebanon's election went very well: 

An American-backed alliance has retained control of the Lebanese Parliament after a hotly contested election billed as a showdown between Tehran and Washington for influence in the Middle East....

The alliance, known as the March 14 coalition, won the majority in the 128-member parliament with 71 seats, compared with to 57 for the Hezbollah-led coalition, according to official results announced Monday by the government. The results represent a significant and unexpected defeat for Hezbollah and its allies, Iran and Syria. Most polls had showed a tight race, but one in which the Hezbollah-led group would win.

Just to pre-empt the question that will inevitably be asked in the United States -- "this was because of President Obama's Cairo speech, right?" -- I would refer everyone to this New York Times story from six weeks ago by Robert Worth: 

[P]arliamentary elections here in June are shaping up to be among the most expensive ever held anywhere, with hundreds of millions of dollars streaming into this small country from around the globe.

Lebanon has long been seen as a battleground for regional influence, and now, with no more foreign armies on the ground, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region are arming their allies here with campaign money in place of weapons. The result is a race that is widely seen as the freest and most competitive to be held here in decades, with a record number of candidates taking part. But it may also be the most corrupt....

[E]ven a narrow win by Hezbollah and its allies, now in the parliamentary opposition, would be seen as a victory for Iran — which has financed Hezbollah for decades — and a blow to American allies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. So the money flows.

“We are putting a lot into this,” said one adviser to the Saudi government, who added that the Saudi contribution was likely to reach hundreds of millions of dollars in a country of only four million people. “We’re supporting candidates running against Hezbollah, and we’re going to make Iran feel the pressure.”

Given that the March 14 coalition outperformed the polling, it's entirely possible that factors other than money played a role in the outcome -- Nate Silver needs to go global in his analysis.  Still, unless Mark Lynch tells me otherwise, methinks this result is clearly not just about the power of rhetoric. 

As I said recently, uncertain times in the global political economy is good for (my) business.  So I've been getting a lot of questions recently about the uncertain future of democratic capitalism [I thought it was free-market democracy--ed.  If you're skeptical about it, then it's democratic capitalism; if you're optimistic, it's free-market democracy.  And you?--ed.  I'm an academic -- I'll rotate the terms.]  Based on this week's articles, The New Republic seems to be making the case that free-market democracy has hit its limit.  I'll have some deeper thoughts about this soon, but consider this an open thread to readers -- is this merely a moment of retrenchment for the West's favorite model of political economy, or is there something deeper going on? 

Clifford Levy writes about the rise in Russian tourism in the New York Times, and does a good job of bringing the stats:   

The number of Russian tourists visiting countries outside the former Soviet Union grew to 7.1 million in 2006, the last year statistics were available, from 2.6 million in 1995, according to the Russian government. A record 2.5 million Russians visited Turkey in 2007, up 33 percent from 2006, Turkish officials said. Only Germany, that paragon of European wealth, sends more tourists to Turkey. (By contrast, in 1988, a few years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of 22,000 Soviet citizens visited Turkey.) The Russian tourism boom is happening as new low-cost airlines in Europe have spurred a sharp increase in tourism across the Continent. But for the Russians, the chance to travel is especially prized. For the first time in Russian history, wide swaths of the citizenry are being exposed to life in far-off lands, helping to ease a kind of insularity and parochialism that built up in the Soviet era. Back then, the public was not only prevented from going abroad; it was also inculcated with propaganda that the Soviet Union was unquestionably the world’s best country, so there was no need to leave anyway. People who desired foreign travel in Soviet times typically had to receive official approval, and if it was granted, they were closely chaperoned once they crossed the border. Even before they left, they often were sent to classes to be indoctrinated in how to behave and avoid the perils of foreign influence. Those who were not in good standing with the party had little chance of going.

Many of the states that the United States thinks of as authoritarian -- Russia, China, Saudi Arabia -- are actually pretty open about letting their citizens live, travel and study abroad.  This stands in sharp contrast to the totalitarian regimes of the former Warsaw Pact or Myanmar and North Korea today).  Ibring this up because it highlights how unusual those communist regimes really were.  Citizens trapped in both authoritarian and totalitarian societies face mortal risks in exercising voice as a means of political protest.  Citizens trapped in totalitarian societies, however, can use exit -- migration -- as an additional means of registering discontent.   In sufficient numbers, migration can be just as powerful as protest in promoting regime change.  One of the triggers behind the collapse of East Germany was the creation of a quasi-legal escape route through Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the late summer of 1989.  Over the next month, more than 1% of East Germany’s total population fled the country –putting tremendous pressure on the East German regime to change its ways.  Zimbabwe is near collapse now in part because of the same problem. Clearly, what we currently label as authoritarian states are a different animal.  People can leave -- indeed, in some cases I suspect these governments are happy to have political dissidents depart their shores.  What's interesting is that many people -- not just those personally invested in these regimes -- leave and come back.  This is new, and as a political scientist, I find it pretty interesting.  As a foreign policy analyst, it suggests that the lessons drawn from how the Soviet model do not travel into the here and now all that well.