Monday, November 7, 2011 - 1:06 PM
Hey, remember my last bloggingheads, when I went to the 1930s analogy to describe the current problems in the global political economy? Well, that was a few days ago, and my, how things have changed -- to make that 1930's analogy even more powerful. The eurogoggles metahor may be coming to an end -- because the situation is so dire that even the cheeriest summit won't alter perceptions in financial markets.
After a week of gyrating europolitics on the Greek bailout and meaningless G-20 summitry, markets and media will be focused on Italy this week. This matters -- for both Europe and the world, Greece is a diverting sideshow compared to a major financial collaspse in Italy. The pressure on Italian PM Sylvio Berlusconi to resign have gotten so loud that he had to take to his Facebook page to say, "The rumors of my resignation are groundless." New rule of thumb: any time a politician follows Sarah Palin's lead, there's going to be a problem.
The Daily Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard explains the eurofarce that is currently playing out:
As of late Friday, the yield spread on Italian 10-year bonds over German Bunds was a post-EMU record of 458 basis points. This is dangerously close to the point where cascade-selling begins and matters spiral out of control.
The European Central Bank has so far bought time by holding a series of retreating lines but either it has reached its intervention limits after accumulating nearly €80bn of Italian debt, or it is holding fire to force Silvio Berlusconi to resign – if so, a foolish game.
The ECB’s hands are tied. A German veto and EU treaty constraints stop it intervening with overwhelming force as a genuine lender of last resort. The bank is itself at risk of massive over-extension without an EU treasury and single sovereign entity to back it up.
This lack of a back-stop guarantor is an unforgivable failing in the institutional structure of monetary union....
The spreads on EFSF 5-year bonds have already tripled to 151 above German debt, leaving Japan and other early buyers nursing a big loss. The fund suffered a failed auction last week, cutting the issue from €5bn to €3bn on lack of demand.
Gary Jenkins from Evolution Securities said the “frightening” development is that the EFSF is itself being shut out of the capital markets. “If it continues to perform like that then the bailout fund might need a bail out,” he said.
Europe’s attempt to widen the creditor net by drawing in the world’s reserve states evoked near universal scorn in Cannes and a damning put-down by Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff. “I have not the slightest intention of contributing directly to the EFSF; if they are not willing to do it, why should I?”
Europe is resorting to such antics because its richer states – above all Germany -- still refuse to face up to the shattering implications of a currency that they themselves created, and ran destructively by flooding the vulnerable half of monetary union with cheap capital.
Simon Johnson is, er.... less than optimistic about these developments:
MIT Sloan School of Management professor Simon Johnson didn’t equivocate on the perils of the current global economic environment. “We have built a dangerous financial system in the United States and Europe,” said the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. “We must step back and reform the system.”
Professor Johnson cited alarming parallels with October 1931, when “people thought the worst was behind them, but the smart people were wrong and instead the crisis just broadened.” (emphasis added)
I've said it before and I'll say it again: any time the global economy is counting on Sylvio Berlusconi to do the right thing is not a good time.
Developing....
Friday, August 12, 2011 - 2:11 PM
[WARNING: THE FOLLOWING IS AN OPTIMISTIC GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY POST]
Note: in my last blog post, I might have sounded juuuuust a wee bit pessimistic about the state of the global political economy. That was my intent, but it wasn't necessarily how I actually felt. My aim was to assemble as negative a brief as possible about the state of the global political economy. The aim of this post is to argue that, despite all the recent bad news, the fundamentals of the global political economy are surprisingly sound. I'm not actually as optimistic as the rest of this post suggests, either -- but I do lean more in this direction. The fact that I'm blogging this from a zombie-proof vacation redoubt should in no way affect your evaluation of the following few paragraphs.
So, when we last left off this debate, things were looking grim. My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie echoes of the Great Depression. Let's assume that the global economy persists in sputtering for a while, because that's what happens after major financial shocks. Why won't these other bad things happen? Why isn't it 1931?
Let's start with the obvious -- it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931 played out. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying the Great Depression. I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes.
The legacy of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide much stronger cement for the current system. In terms of publuc attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll about which economic system is best. I'll just reproduce the key charts below:
The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S. support for the global economy, but a few other things stand out. U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very high level. In contrast, support for free markets has increased in other major powers, such as Germany and China. On the whole, despite the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, public attitudes have not changed all that much. While there might be populist demands to "do something," that something is not a return to autarky or anything so drastc.
Another big difference is that multilateral economic institutions are much more robust now than they were in 1931. On trade matters, even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of the World Trade Organization's corpus of trade-liberalizing measures are still working quite well. Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-trade agreements but the surfeit of them. The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan to strengthen capital requirements for banks. True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the status quo.
As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems. That is setting the bar rather high, however. One could argue that the G-20's most useful function is reassurance. Even if there are disagreements, communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse.
Finally, a note about the possibility of riots and other general social unrest. The working paper cited in my previous post noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances. However, that paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19:
[I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget cuts is generally lower. Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant. As we limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines. For full democracies with a complete range of civil rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant.
This is good news!! The world has a hell of a lot more democratic governments now than it did in 1931. What happened in London, in other words, might prove to be the exception more than the rule.
So yes, the recent economic news might seem grim. Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the 1930's. And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen.
Monday, November 15, 2010 - 9:32 AM
In yesterday's Boston Globe, James Verini trotted out the latest historical analogy for Barack Obama, arguing that the president he's really like is George H.W. Bush. If you read the article, however, you'll see that Verini's argument is primarily based on how the events are similar, rather than the men:
In the first year of Bush's term, he was beset by three unforeseen calamities that are eerily resonant. First was the savings & loan crisis…
Then, in the spring of 1989, student-led protestors began assembling in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, and in June Chinese police and soldiers took to beating and murdering them. Like Obama, Bush came into office with higher than average respect from foreign leaders, but he had to shelve plans to improve American-Chinese relations, a blow to his larger ambitions to redefine American engagement with the Communist world…
That didn't turn as many people against him as what was, until this year, the worst man-made natural disaster in American history. In March of 1989 the Exxon Valdez spilled hundreds of thousands of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound… Bush, a former oilman, bore only somewhat less blame than Exxon.
Jump to 2009-10: The Troubled Asset Relief Program and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, otherwise known as the stimulus, are seen by many Americans as bailouts, not legitimate attempts to stave off economic catastrophe. (TARP was created by the George W. Bush administration, but according to recent polls two-thirds of Americans attribute it to Obama.) Obama, who has arrived in office with the hopes of foreign leaders and populations riding high, wants to redefine relations with, most of all, the Muslim world, but before he has the chance there are protests, and then violent crackdowns, in Tehran. (Unlike the crisis Carter faced in 1979, this was not a revolution, and the Iranian government was in no danger of crumbling.) He is criticized for not expressing enough support for the protestors, criticism that pales in comparison to that of his handling of the BP oil spill.
George H. W. Bush came into office facing what many economists called the worst economic downturn since the Depression, accompanied by a collapse in the real estate market and a Wall Street racked by scandal and stock market decline. He succeeded a president, Ronald Reagan, who staked his reputation on limited government while expanding it in certain costly areas, particularly the military, leaving record deficits…
Twenty years later, Obama followed on the heels of a self-proclaimed Reagan Republican whose tenure ended in straits like those Reagan's had…
I really don't think this holds up terribly well for a number of reasons. I
don't know which economists called the 1989 "downturn" the worst
since the Great Depression, but I'm sure they were smoking something not
looking at all of the data. That downturn wasn't even the worst one of the
1980's -- the 1982 recession was far more severe in its effects. Plus,
beginning with the fall of 1989 the Bush administration started reaping
unparalleled foreign policy developments -- the collapse of Eastern European
communism, the release of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, the cresting of the
third wave of democratization, yada, yada, yada.
Still, Verini's essay points to the ways in which humans can't help but search for historical analogies to try to explain the present day. We're hard-wired to look for patterns like this, even if they are exaggerated. Indeed, I've just spent a week of conferencing about the future of the global political economy in which various historical analogies were deployed to explain the current moment. It's possible that I contributed to this analogy-fest just as much as I consumed others.
I'll get to those historical analogies in a later post, but for now, I'll leave it to readers -- which past U.S. president do you think Barack Obama evokes?
Thursday, April 2, 2009 - 4:15 PM
The final G-20 communique -- get it while it's hot! -- contains the following strong statement: "We will not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras."
This is likely true, though one should never underestimate the ability of governments to devise new and unforseen ways to commit new mistakes about protectionism in the current era.*
How could that happen? Check out my latest column in The National Interest online to see how a world of considerably less trade is possible, even within the confines of the World Trade Organization.
The essay is a thought experiment -- I'd put my money on it not happening. But I can't completely dismiss this scenario out of hand.
* Indeed, The FT's Alan Beattie and Jean Eaglesham have the best single sentence on this point of the G-20 statement: "The commitments on protectionism in the G20 communiqué, although longer than their equivalents after November’s Group of 20 meeting, are, if anything, shorter on concrete promises."
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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