Your humble blogger is near the capital of Waterworld Pennsylvania at the moment and all conferenced out. Regular blogging will resume after some sleep.

In the meanwhile, however, please check out FP's latest Deep Dive on the future of currencies. I have a contribution on the dollar's future as the world's reserve currency. It's depressing to note that the thing I like best about it is it's title -- which, of course, someone else at FP created.

Enjoy!

I'm at the point in my life when there are only three occasions that prompt the watching of cable news:

1) An election night;

2) A real-time breaking news event in which video has a comparative advantage over the web;

3) Being on the treadmill on a slow sports day with nothing good on basic cable.

So yesterday was no. 3, and I caught a report on Fox News about "pre-summit brinkmanship" on the part Hu Jintao. The headline was accurate: "China's President Hu Jintao: Dollar-Based System 'Thing of the Past.'" And I should stress that Fox News was hardly the only news outlet to jump on this turn of phrase.

That said, some perspective might be in order. The statement came from a series of answers that a committee of propaganda writers with the stylistic panache of Andrei Gromyko Hu provided to the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post.

Let's reprint the question and answer in full, shall we?

Q: What do you think will be the US dollar's future role in the world? How do you see the issue of making the RMB an international currency? Some think that RMB appreciation may curb China's inflation, what's your view on that?

HU: The current international currency system is the product of the past. As a major reserve currency, the US dollar is used in considerable amount of global trade in commodities as well as in most of the investment and financial transactions. The monetary policy of the United States has a major impact on global liquidity and capital flows and therefore, the liquidity of the US dollar should be kept at a reasonable and stable level.

It takes a long time for a country's currency to be widely accepted in the world. China has made important contribution to the world economy in terms of total economic output and trade, and the RMB has played a role in the world economic development. But making the RMB an international currency will be a fairly long process. The on-going pilot programs for RMB settlement of cross-border trade and investment transactions are a concrete step that China has taken to respond to the international financial crisis, with the purpose of promoting trade and investment facilitation. They fit in well with market demand as evidenced by the rapidly expanding scale of these transactions.

China has adopted a package plan to curb inflation, including interest rate adjustment. We have adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies. Changes in exchange rate are a result of multiple factors, including the balance of international payment and market supply and demand. In this sense, inflation can hardly be the main factor in determining the exchange rate policy (emphases added).

Meh. First of all, Hu isn't saying anything here that hasn't been said by other Chinese officials since early 2009.

Second of all, Hu didn't say that the RMB was going to be supplanting the dollar anytime soon. In fact, he pretty much said the opposite of that. China wants a multiple-reserve currency regime, and they're moving veeeerrrrrry slowly to bring their currency into the conversation. And minus the RMB, as I've said before, there ain't much in the way of viable alternatives right now.

If you read the rest of the answers, there's a lot of CCP boilerplate "stiffly worded answers" mixed in with "a positive note on bilateral ties," as Richard MacGregor of the Financial Times notes. What I don't see is any brinkmanship.

Substantively, however, what about the future? Will a multiple currency reserve system work? It's a vision shared by Barry Eichengreen, Nicolas Sarkozy, and.... well, I'm not sure who else. I have my doubts, but I can't quite convey them in a single blog post.

What do you think?

At APSA today I attended a panel on what political scientists can offer to political journalists.  Mark Schmitt, Marc Ambinder, Matt Yglesias, Mark Blumenthal, and Ezra Klein all offered interesting advice.   Two messages that came through loud and clear: 

1)  Be willing to advertise one's research wares; and

2)  Mr. Gorbachev, tear down these paywalls Make the research accessible to people without a JSTOR account. 

So, in that spirit, let me announce that I have an article in the latest issue of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific entitled "Will Currency Follow The Flag?" It's on the future of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency.  The abstract: 

The 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath have triggered uncertainty about the future of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. China and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region have voiced support for a new global monetary regime. There are both economic and geopolitical motivations at the root of these challenges. Going forward, what will the future hold for the international monetary system? Crudely put, will currency follow the flag?

This article addresses this question by considering the economic opportunity and geopolitical willingness of actors in the Pacific Rim to shift away from the current international monetary system – with a special emphasis on China as the most powerful actor in the region. While the dollar has shifted from being a top currency to a negotiated one, neither the opportunity nor the willingness to shift away from the dollar is particularly strong. The current window of opportunity for actors in the region to coordinate a shift in the monetary system is small and constrained. The geopolitical willingness to subordinate monetary politics to security concerns is muted.

The entire article is free for anyone to download and read.  So read the whole thing, political journalists!! 

In his New York Times column today, Paul Krugman writes about the problem of macroeconomic imbalances between China and the United States.  Which is fine, except he wrote the exact same column last month.  Just like last month's column, this one makes some good points and fails to mention some important dynamics.  Beyond the inclusion of a useful footnote, however, there's nothing new here. 

As part of an ongoing public service to busy readers of Foreignpolicy.com, the hard-working staff here at the blog is ready to help you bypass the chore of having to read the same Krugman column time and again with this handy-dandy crib sheet.  My guess is that the next six months' worth of Krugman columns will boil down to the following assertions:

1. The root of macroeconomic imbalances is the Chinese (undervalued) peg to the dollar;
2. Obama and Geithner should be "tough" on China's dollar policy;
3. Concerns about incipient U.S. inflation are... er... inflated;
4. That goes double for long-term concerns about rising debt levels;
5. The February 2009 stimulus was too small;
6. The Republicans are blinkered;
7. The Obama administration should act in a more partisan and progressive manner. 

Now, let me stress that I agree with 1, 3, and 6 at this point, and I'm agnostic on 4 and 5, so it's not like Krugman is wrong in what he's saying.  It's just that he's saying the same damn thing over and over again. 

Over at Politico, Eamon Javers notes an odd trend in the Drudge Report: 

On Tuesday, Matt Drudge ran a headline about the weakening U.S. dollar on his website, Drudgereport.com. In and of itself, that would be unremarkable, except that it was the 18th time Drudge had posted a link to a story about the weak dollar this month.

And October was only 20 days old.

Clearly, Matt Drudge has developed a fascination with the declining U.S. dollar.

“He’s fixated on it,” said Tom Rosenstiel, director of the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism. “There’s no question that Drudge can alter what people are paying attention to.”

Market watchers say it’s unlikely that Drudge is actually moving the currency markets with his relentless attention.

“I don’t think that anyone who seriously trades currencies reads The Drudge Report before making important buy or sell decisions,” said Chris Roush, a professor of business journalism at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (emphasis added... because that's a priceless quote)

Drudge isn't the only one obsessed about the dollar.  Last week, James Pethokoukis blogged the following for Reuters: 

The aftershocks of the global financial crisis may now be propelling the dollar back to the political forefront. The greenback’s continuing slide makes it a handy metric that neatly encapsulates America’s current economic troubles and possible long-term decline. House Republicans for instance, have been using the weaker dollar as a weapon in their attacks on the Bernanke-led Federal Reserve.

For more evidence of the dollar’s return to political salience, look no further than the Facebook page of Sarah Palin. The 2008 GOP vice presidential nominee — and possible 2012 presidential candidate — has shown a knack for identifying hot-button political issues, such as the purported “death panels” she claims to have found in Democratic healthcare reform plans. In a recent Facebook posting, Palin expressed deep concern over the dollar’s “continued viability as an international reserve currency” in light of huge U.S. budget deficits.

She might be onto something here, politically and economically. A recent Rasmussen poll, for instance, found that 88 percent of Americans say the dollar should remain the dominant global currency. Now, the average voter may not fully understand the subtleties of international finance nor appreciate exactly how a dominant dollar has benefited the U.S economy. But they sure think a weaker dollar is a sign of a weaker America.

OK, let's be as plain as possible about this - as a reserve currency, the dollar is not going anywhere.  Really. 

The dollar's slide in value has been predictable, as the need for a financial safe haven has abated.  By and large, a depreciating dollar helps the U.S. trade balance (though it would help much more if the Chinese renminbi got in on the appreciation).   

Even the Chinese, who have spoken like they want an alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency, are in point of fact not doing much to alter the status quo.  Why?  To paraphrase Winston Churchill, the dollar is a lousy, rotten reserve currency - until one contemplates the alternatives. 

Because all of the alternatives have serious problems.  The euro, the only truly viable substitute for the dollar, is not located in the region responsible for the largest surge of growth.  It would be unlikely for the ASEAN +3 countries to agree to switch from the dollar to a new currency over which regional actors have no influence (the Europeans wouldn't be thrilled either, as it would lead to an even greater appreciation of the currency).  Oh, and the European Union has no consolidated sovereign debt market.  The euro is worth watching, but it's not going to replace the dollar anytime soon.  

The other alternatives are even less attractive.  Most other national currencies beyond the euro - the yen, pound, Swiss franc, Australian dollar - are based in markets too small to sustain the inflows that would come from reserve currency status.  The renminbi remains inconvertible.  A return to the gold standard in this day and age would be infeasible - the liquidity constraints and vagaries of supply would be too powerful.  There's the using-the-Special-Drawing-Right-as-a-template-for-a-super-sovereign currency idea, but this is an implausible solution.  As it currently stands, the SDR is not a currency so much as a unit of account.  Even after the recent IMF authorizations, there are less than $400 billion SDR-denominated assets in the world, which is far too small for a proper reserve currency. 

So, what's really going on here with the dollar obsession?  I suspect that with the Dow Jones going back over 10,000, Republicans are looking for some other Very Simple Metric that shows Obama Stinks.  The dollar looks like it's going to be declining for a while, so why not that?  Never mind that the dollar was even weaker during the George W. Bush era -- they want people to focus on the here and now. 

The thing is, I'm not sure this gambit is going to work.  People who already think Obama is a socialist will go for it, sure, but that's only rallying the base.  I'm not sure how much fence-sitters care about a strong dollar, however.  If anything, populist movements tend to favor a debasing of the currency rather than a strengthening of it. 

Still, I'm just a political scientist -- I'm sure that, "theories on political behavior are best left to CNN, pollsters, pundits, historians, candidates, political parties, and the voters." 

So, have at it, readers!  Will the falling dollar be a source of populist outrage if Drudge links to it enough? 

UPDATE:  contrasting takes from Kevin Drum and Megan McArdle. 

The Financial Times' Peter Garnham reports that China is getting serious about internationalizing the use of the renminbi:

China has kick-started a major plan to internationalise the renminbi and the process is likely to be faster than many expect, according to HSBC....

“China is beginning an ambitious scheme to raise the role of the renminbi in international trade and finance and to reduce reliance on the US dollar,” said Qu Hongbin, China chief economist at HSBC.

“This will likely be a multi-year and gradual process. Yet, we believe the pace is likely to be faster than many expect.”

HSBC said the internationalisation of the renminbi was long overdue, given China’s rising economic power relative to the limited use of the renminbi overseas.

If you read the whole story, you discover that the FT's evidence for this assertion rests entirely on assertions by HSBC officials.  Which leads one to wonder whether maybe, just maybe, the FT should have checked to see whether HSBC has any financial stake in globalizing the use of the renminbi. Crazy talk, I know...

Loyal readers are surely aware that this is not the first time the Financial Times has hyperventilated over Chinese moves that don't necessarily amount to all that. 

Now before anyone accuses me of going all Brad DeLong on the FT, I think a lot of their China coverage (particularly by Jamil Anderlini and Geoff Dyer) has been very informative.  That said, this kind of thinly sourced story does lead one to wonder just how much of the coverage of China's financial moves is hype from financial players with a vested interest in feeding the China bubble. 

Readers -- am I underreacting to this? 

The New York Times runs two op-eds today on the future of the dollar's status as the world's reserve currency, particularly with regard to China. 

Victor Zhikai Gao's essay doesn't actually say a whole lot on the matter, except for this excerpt: 

Beijing recently called for a greater role in international trade for the special drawing rights currency of the International Monetary Fund. But China is also fully aware that the United States can veto an I.M.F. decision. China’s call was more meant to sound an alarm to the United States.

Many Chinese people increasingly fear the rapid erosion of the American dollar. The United States may want to consider offering inflation-protection measures for China’s existing investments in America, and offer additional security or collateral for its continued investments. America should also provide its largest creditor with greater transparency and information.

As Brad Setser points out, it's a bit rich for the Chinese to fret about U.S. inflation, since if the renminbi started appreciating, many of the macro imbalances currently plaguing the international monetary system might be lessened.  Of course, talking about "currency appreciation" puts the onus on Beijing, while talking about inflation conveniently puts the onus on the United States.  

The other op-ed is by Nouriel Roubini -- a.k.a., Dr. Doom.  It's a good primer on the benefits that accrue to the United States from having the dollar as the world's reserve currency.  That said, this part confused me: 

We have reaped significant financial benefits from having the dollar as the reserve currency. In particular, the strong market for the dollar allows Americans to borrow at better rates. We have thus been able to finance larger deficits for longer and at lower interest rates, as foreign demand has kept Treasury yields low. We have been able to issue debt in our own currency rather than a foreign one, thus shifting the losses of a fall in the value of the dollar to our creditors. Having commodities priced in dollars has also meant that a fall in the dollar’s value doesn’t lead to a rise in the price of imports (emphasis added).

The other parts of that paragraph make sense, but that last sentence mystifies me.  Wasn't part of the reason that oil and other commodity prices spiked last year was the declining value of the dollar? 

In general, both op-eds urge the U.S. to get its financial house in order.  I certainly don't disagree with that recommendation.  Still, it's a bit disingenuous to suggest that the U.S. is the only country at fault for the current overhang of dollar reserves.  Beijing needs to take a good hard look in the mirror on this issue. 

Apparently the foreign exchange markets got taken for a ride earlier today in response to Tim Geithner's chat at the Council on Foreign Relations.  This makes me wonder if anyone working in forex markets actually listened to the words that came out of Geithner's mouth. 

Here's Kathy Lien at FX360 explaining what Geithner said that caused markets to go into a tizzy: 

In a blink of an eye, the U.S. dollar has collapsed against the Euro, Japanese Yen and other major currencies. The trigger was comments from Tim Geithner who said that the U.S. is "quite open" to China's suggestion of moving towards a Special Drawing Right (SDR) linked currency system. If the world adopts the SDR, which was created by the IMF as an international reserve asset, it would mean that countries around the world would need to hold less U.S. dollars. (emphasis added)

Except that this is not what Geithner actually said.  To be more specific, he did say "quite open," but that's not all he said in his first response.  This is from the CFR transcript:   

[A]s I understand his proposal, it's a proposal designed to increase the use of the IMF's special drawing rights.  And we're actually quite open to that suggestion.  But you should think of it as rather evolutionary, building on the current architectures, than -- rather than -- rather than moving us to global monetary union.

Here was my contemporaneous read of what Geithner said: 

Geithner is asked about China (not my question) and the IMF's new proposals for expanded lending.  He responds by praising Zhou Xiaochuan, China's central bank governor, but claims that he hasn't read his proposal in detail.  Geithner makes it clear that he is quite open to expanding the IMF's Special Drawing Rights for less developed countries.  Still, he wants it to evolve and be integrated within the current international monetary system -- as opposed to the de novo creation of a new global currency. 

I've read the report (Tim, it's not that long, take a look!) and Zhou is not proposing anything so radical so soon, so this is a bit of a red herring.  Still, Geithner's statement here carries the same kind of firm pushback that Obama gave yesterday about any move ending the dollar as the global reserve currency. 

SDRs are intended for least developed countries, so expanding that program would not profoundly affect the distribution of currency reserves among the world's principal players.

And yet, after Geithner reaffirms this point later in the talk, Lien interprets it as follows:

A few minutes after saying the U.S. is open to an SDR linked currency, Geithner clarified his comments by saying that there is "no change in dollar as world's reserve currency and likely to remain so for long time." In our alert, we said that the dollar would rebound if he attempts to clarify his comments. These contradictory statements are clearly the act of an amateur Treasury Secretary that has been thrust onto the public forum and is struggling with the need to be very particular in his choice of words.

Okaaaaaay..... except there was no contradiction between his statements, and anyone who's been following this stuff for the past week should have understood Geithner's point the first time.

Question to readers:  shouldn't the forex markets have interpreted these statements better than your humble blogger?  What does this say about the wisdom of crowds? 

UPDATE:  The Financial Times' Krishna Guha, Tom Braithwaite and Peter Garnham provide more precise reporting on this point: 

The dollar fell 1.3 per cent against the euro as headlines saying “Geithner open to SDR currency” flashed across traders’ screens. With the currency falling, Mr Geithner’s interviewer – Roger Altman, a deputy Treasury secretary in the Clinton administration – gave Mr Geithner the chance to clarify.

The Treasury secretary said: “I think the dollar remains the world’s dominant reserve currency.” The dollar subsequently recovered much of its losses.

One fuzzy headline, and you get majoy gyrations in the forex markets. 

James Carville once said, "I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody."  I want to be reincarnated as a headline editor. 

Hate: 

China should seek guarantees that its $682 billion holdings of U.S. government debt won’t be eroded by “reckless policies,” said Yu Yongding, a former adviser to the central bank.

The U.S. “should make the Chinese feel confident that the value of the assets at least will not be eroded in a significant way,” Yu, who now heads the World Economics and Politics Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said in response to e-mailed questions yesterday from Beijing.

Love, mixed with a lot of hate: 

China will continue to buy US Treasury bonds even though it knows the dollar will depreciate because such investments remain its “only option” in a perilous world, a senior Chinese banking regulator said on Wednesday....

Luo Ping, a director-general at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, said after a speech in New York on Wednesday that China would continue to buy Treasuries in spite of its misgivings about US finances.

“Except for US Treasuries, what can you hold?” he asked. “Gold? You don’t hold Japanese government bonds or UK bonds. US Treasuries are the safe haven. For everyone, including China, it is the only option.”

Mr Luo, whose English tends toward the colloquial, added: “We hate you guys. Once you start issuing $1 trillion-$2 trillion [$1,000bn-$2,000bn] . . .we know the dollar is going to depreciate, so we hate you guys but there is nothing much we can do.” (emphasis added)

Economies are like battleships -- they can't make immediate U-turns.  As Martin Wolf observed yesterday, the unwinding of serious macroeconomic imbalances has to start now -- but it can't be done immediately and efforts to do so would be very problematic.

So I started hyperventilating a little bit when I read Keith Bradsher's NYT front-pager: 

China has bought more than $1 trillion of American debt, but as the global downturn has intensified, Beijing is starting to keep more of its money at home, a move that could have painful effects for American borrowers.

The declining Chinese appetite for United States debt, apparent in a series of hints from Chinese policy makers over the last two weeks, with official statistics due for release in the next few days, comes at an inconvenient time.

If this was true and persisted for a while, then those trillion-dollar budget deficits would become much more expensive to finance -- plus there would be knock-on effects on the balance of trade.  In the short term, declining Chinese demand for the dollar would blunt the effects of a fiscal stimulus.

Fortunately, my first impulse whenever I read this kind of article is to go check what Brad Setser thinks.  And, his reaction to the Bradsher article is as reassuring as one can be in the curent economic climate:  "the available data from US suggests that China has yet to lose its appetite for either dollars or Treasuries, despite all the talk coming out of China."  Rather, it appears that the Chinese government, like its sovereign wealth fund, is shifting its composition of dollar assets from riskier to safer holdings. 

So China isn't going on a dollar fast -- they're just switching from one fad diet to another.