Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

Your humble blogger is taking a short vacation, because so much friggin' stuff has happened in the past half-year.  Indeed, in 2011 to date, the planet has lived up to FP's motto:  the world is not a boring place.  Wars, revolutions, natural disasters, non-natural disasters, the possibility of sovereign defaults -- for a world politics junkie, it's been very exciting

Does exciting mean the coming of end-times, however?  I ask because the New York Times' Azam Ahmed observes the latest trendy investment --  Armageddon funds:

Since the financial crisis, many investors have prospered from a rebound in the markets. But recent events have led some to brace for the worst.

“Clients are suddenly realizing the world isn’t as rosy as it’s been,” said Ahmed Fattouh, a hedge fund executive. “It makes a lot of sense to have these tail protections on.”

That is, protections against what Wall Street calls “tail risk” — a disaster that is estimated to have less than half a percent chance of happening....

So how do such Armageddon funds work? Take a situation like the collapse of China’s economy, an event considered highly unlikely. While most American investors do not own Chinese stocks, real estate or currency, the fear is that a shock to China would spread to the rest of the world. As the stock markets fell, a tail risk or black swan fund would profit because it owned the options to sell shares in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index at far higher levels. The more the index dropped, the more valuable those options would become.

On a related note, Jay Ulfelder looks at the release of the 2011 Failed States Index and Admiral Mike Mullen's worries about a possible increase in the number of failed states.  Ulfelder is more sanguine than Mullen:

So, is the world falling apart, or is it settling down? I’m cautiously confident that the optimists have this one right. To my mind, the trends Alan Taylor identifies are the start of the big development story of the 21st century. After a century in which the global political economy was primarily characterized by the yawning gap in wealth and power between the so-called First and Third Worlds, that gap is finally narrowing. Economic growth is accelerating in countries long mired in a “poverty trap,” and the economic and political benefits of that trend are extending to more and more of the world’s human population. Hundreds of millions of people still live in abject poverty, under authoritarian rule, or both, but the share of the global population living in deep poverty is notably lower than it was just a couple of decades ago (see the chart below, from the World Bank), and the economic takeoffs occurring in many long-poor countries suggest that trend is only broadening....

If things are generally looking up, why are people like Adm. Mullen (if I haven’t misunderstood his remarks) still so worried about the coming anarchy? In a bit of armchair psychology, I wonder if the admiral’s gloomy prognosis is partly a result of confusing uncertainty with risk. The encouraging development trends mentioned above are reordering politics at the international and national levels to a degree not seen in several generations, and no one knows when this turbulent period will end and what its results will be. People are inherently uncomfortable with uncertainty, and it seems like that discomfort often inflates our sense of the risk that worst-case scenarios will come to pass. In other words, our fear of dire outcomes seems to cause us to overestimate the probability that they will occur. In this particular case, I sure hope that’s right.

As pessimistic as I am about the ability of great powers to handle end times, I have to side with Ulfelder here.  Nicholas Taleb made a lot of coin by pointing out the ways in which tail risk events happened far more frequently than expected, but I do wonder if expectations of these events are now biased in the opposite direction.  There is a lot of uncertainty in the world -- but uncertainty and catastrophic outcomes are not the same thing. 

That said, there is another possibility to consider.  From 1945 onewards, one could argue that the chief sources of uncertainty were located in the developing world.  The developing world is becoming more developed, and the developed world is becoming more politically sclerotic.  It's possible that, moving forward, the OECD economies become the primary source of uncertainty -- but this uncertainty doesn't faze developing markets all that much. 

What do you think? 

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

I see that after seeing 2012, Blake Hounshell as assigned me with a blog task

What is the proper forum for secret doomsday planning? The G-20? The U.N. Security Council? The P5+1 or the EU3 +3? Every country for itself? Mssrs. Drezner and Walt, I'm counting on you to chime in here.

I certainly can't speak for Steve, but it's worth pointing out here how big the mismatch is between how movies think end-of-the-world global governance looks like as compared to what would happen in the real world. 

When the movies do it -- and here I'm thinking about Deep Impact, The Core, Children of Men, etc. -- there's usually a coterie of Really Smart People, or a Council of Elders, or some other expert-driven body that devises a risky but brilliant plan to solve the problem. 

In the real world... well, I suspect the following would be true:

  • There would be initial and profound disagreement among experts over what precisely to do;
  • After a scientific consensus began to emerge, dissenters would go back to their home governments to lobby for political support 
  • There would be rampant suspicion of any multilateral effort by those asked to make an outsized contribution;
  • The cost overruns... oh, the cost overruns;
  • Conspiracy theories would pop up all over the friggin' place
  • The plan wouldn't work.

That said, I suspect the answer to Blake's question is "none of the above."  Unless the End of the World matched perfectly onto a pre-existing international organization, my hunch is that the great powers would start up something de novo

Of course, if I actually knew the answer and was one of those Really Smart Persons tapped to solve the problem... well, then you'e all royally screwed. 

UPDATE:  Given my pessimism about the global governance of the End of Days, what can you do to prepare?  Click here to find out.  My favorite quote:  "Make a list of friends and family who live nearby, then decide who you want with you."

Though they have slightly different logics, it appears that Paul Krugman and William Kristol are equally skeptical of the bailout plan.   I'm now going to curl up in a fetal position and hum to myself.  Someone let me know if the world ends.  UPDATE:  In response to commenters, I've been asked to post what I think about the proposed bailout.  Here's what I think: 
  1. I think Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke are pretty smart guys, but that said...
  2. Last I checked, the government does not give $700 billion to anyone without any oversight whatsoever.  No one.  The Fed has oversight, the Pentagon has oversight, everyone had oversight.  So that's a non-starter.
  3. This is such an obvious non-starter that I have to wonder if that was the point -- i.e., by getting Congress and the media focused on oversight/transparency issues, it diverts attention from other possible means to deal with the crisis.
  4. The fundamental problem is that no one knows what the market value of the "toxic debt" really is.  It's somewhere between, say, "seventy cents on the dollar" to "I'll trade you this Apple IIe that I use as a doorstop for $1 million in CDOs."  The government's first job is to get the markets to properly value that debt.
  5. One way to do this is for the government to act as the monopsonist and buy it all -- but I know it's not the only way, and I'm pretty sure it's not the best way. 
  6. I would love it if either of the major party candidates said, "you know what?  There's a lot of complex s*** going down very quickly, so before I blame anyone for the crisis, let's all take a deep breath and figure this out."  It won't happen, but I can dream.
  7. It's weeks like these when I think about calling up some security scholars who like to say that "IPE is a dying field" and say, "so what do you think today, smart guy?" 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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