There's a lot that's happened over the past week with respect to Chen Guangcheng's status, and your humble blogger could write a 5,000 word essay on it if someone wanted to pay me gobs and gobs of cash because I'm remodeling my home I had the time.  I don't however, so I have one big thought on the matter.

Before I begin, given the rapid real-time developments in the Chen case, I'm operating on the assumption that China's last Foreign Ministry statement suggests the denouement:  Chen and his family will be able to go to the United States to study, and he then may or may not be allowed back into the country.   

My Big Thought:  contrary to just about every headline I've seen in the past three days, I think Chen's case demonstrates the surprising resilience of the Sino-American relationship.  Recall what I wrote earlier in the week: 

The fact that both Beijing and Washington have kept their mouths shut on Chen is a pretty surprising but positive sign about the overall stability/resilience of Sino-American relations. Bear in mind that according to the latest reports, much of the leadership in Beijing takesan increasingly conspiratorial view of the United States. As for the mood in Washington, well, let's just call it unfriendly towards China. Both sides are in the middle of big leadership decisions, making the incentive to cater to nationalist domestic interests even stronger than normal. With the rest of the Pacific Rim trying to latch themselves onto the U.S. security umbrella, this could have been the perfect match to set off a G-2 powderkeg.

Despite all of these incentives for escalating the dispute, however, it hasn't happened. Kurt Campbell was dispatched to Beijing, talks are ongoing, and neither side appears to be interested in ramping up domestic audience costs. That escalation hasn't happened despite massive political incentives on both sides to let it happen suggests that, contrary to press fears about Chen blowing up the bilateral relationship, there are powerful pressures in Washington and Beijing to find a solution that saves as much face as humanly possible for both sides.

Now, in the three days since I wrote that post, Chen has been released, calling every Chinese dissident, U.S. congressman and international reporter with a phone/recording device/Twitter account and is loudly and frantically describing the intimidation he and his family have experienced.  The man has asked to be flown out on Hillary Clinton's plane as she departs from the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.  In other words, everything that has transpired in the past three days has given a black eye to both the Chinese and American governments' handling of this case. 

Despite the near-overwhelming incentive to ramp up bilateral tensions, however, it really hasn't happened.  China's Foreign Mnistry has issued a couple of garden-variety press statements demanding a U.S. apology that won't be forthcoming.  There have been no leaks or anonymous criticisms of the United States otherwise, despite the fact that this entire case is a burr in China's saddle at veery awkward moment.  None of the U.S. State Department statements or press leaks have been terribly critical of the Chinese side either.  Indeed, as the Washington Post observes:

Neither Clinton nor her Chinese counterparts mentioned Chen in their formal remarks at the end of their two-day meeting, saying instead that U.S.-Sino differences on human rights issues must not disrupt the broader relationship between the two world powers.

State Councilor Dai Bingguo, China’s top foreign policy expert, said his country and the United States still have “fundamental differences” on human rights issues. “Human rights should not be a disturbance in state-to-state relations,” Dai said. “It should not be used to interfere in another country’s internal affairs.”

Clinton promised to “continue engaging with the Chinese government at the highest levels” on the “human rights and aspirations” of all people.

This is pretty extraordinary.  Even more extraordinary is the possiblity that despite Chen's outspokenness, he actually could be able to leave the country with his family. 

Now, as the Post shrewdly observes, "China’s Foreign Ministry said the self-taught lawyer would have to apply 'through normal channels ... like any other Chinese citizen' — which would mean returning home to the village where he has been confined and beaten, in order to obtain a passport."  Still, if the rhetoric between the U.S. and China on this boils down to Clinton asking the Chinese government to "expeditiously process" Chen's visa application, then this is a really big dog that didn't bark.   

For other big thoughts on the matter, read these posts by Sam Crane, as well as this assessment by Walter Russell Mead.

What do you think?

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

After last night's stunningly useless set of speeches, I'd put the odds of the U.S. not raising the debt ceiling by August 2nd at 1 in 2. Like many other observers, I'm finding it increasingly difficult to envision a deal that would get through the Senate while attracting a majority of House Republicans [You meant a majority of the House of Representatives, right?--ed. No, I meant a majority of House Republicans. I'm pretty sure that Boehner and the rest of the House GOP leadership will refuse to pass any debt ceiling plan that relies too much on House Democrats.]

So, it's gonna be a fun few weeks for those of us who study the global political economy. Let's start by thinking the unthinkable -- what will happen if there is a default?

I've expressed my feelings on the matter already, and I'm hardly the only one. That said, I've also hedged my bets been flummoxed by the lack of market reaction to the DC stalemate. The lack of market reaction to date has emboldened House GOP members to stand fast. Could they be right?

Tom Oatley, who pooh-poohed my fears of the debtpocalypse last week, makes an interesting point about the composition of U.S. debt-holders:

By these figures, about 63% of US government debt is owned by central banks (foreign and domestic) and/sovereign wealth funds. Most of these entities are American friends and allies. Another 4% is owned by US state and local governments. That leaves 33%--about $4.8 trillion--in private hands. Of this, the financial institutions with the most restrictive regulations regarding asset ownership (depository institutions) own only 2% of the total ($290 billion). Mutual Funds, who may or may not have to dump downgraded debt, hold another 9% ($1.35 trillion).

What's the point? The discussion about the impact of US default revolves around the market response to default. Useful to recognize that most of the US government debt is held by public-sector agents who are much less sensitive to balance sheet pressures and regulatory constraints. These public sector agents are also substantially more sensitive to "moral suasion" and direct appeal than private financial institutions. The structure of ownership of US debt might dampen the negative impact of any default that does occur.

This is pretty interesting. Oatley focuses on "moral suasion," but there's also a national-interest motive for many U.S. debtholders. Most of the official holders of U.S. debt have a strong incentive for a) the value of their holdings not to plummet; and b) the United States economy to continue to snap up other their exports. If China, for example, is buying up U.S. debt to sustain its own growth, then neither a technical default nor a ratings downgrade should deter China or other export engines from continuing to buy U.S. debt even if there's a spot of trouble.

So it appears that complex interdependence will force America's rivals to continue to hold U.S. debt even after the debtpocalypse!! The United States in the clear, right?

Not so fast. Here are five "known unknowns" I can think of that might complicate Oatley's analysis:

1) What if the creditors form a cartel? In my 2009 paper, this was the one scenario that gave me the heebie-jeebies, because it's the one scenario under which creditors can wring geopolitical gains from debtor states. Any kind of default can act as a focal point moment in which U.S. creditors decide it's time to apply a haircut to American power and influence.

I don't think this is going to happen, because the national interests of American debtholders remain divergent. That said, if U.S. allies interpret default as a signal of U.S. unreliability in times of crisis, then all bets are off.

2) What about the economic nationalism of China? China is the largest foreign debtholder, which gives it a certain agenda-setting power in moments of crisis. There are a lot of compelling reasons why China would decide to try to minimize the economic disruptions . On the other hand, there's a lot of resentment on Chinese Internet boards already about the Chinese purchases of U.S. debt. During a period in which the CCP is already concerned about domestic instability, one could envision a scenario whereby they try to mollify nationalists at home by acting out against the United States.

3) What would be the effect of a mild market reaction on the House of Representatives? The less the markets react, the less that the House GOP will feel a need to do anything. There will come a point, therefore, when official debtholders might need to signal to the House that, in IPE lingo, "s**t needs to get done." That signal would in and of itself roil markets, not to mention the effects the current uncertainty is already having on the real economy.

4) What is the fiscal shock from a default? There are two causal mechanisms through which a default could affect the global economy. The first is through panic and uncertainty roiling financial markets. The second, however, is from a dramatic fiscal contraction due to limited government spending. Given the lackluster state of the current recovery, it wouldn't take much to tip the United States back into recession.

5) What if there's another AAA bubble? FT Alphaville's Tracy Alloway provided another interesting chart earlier this month on the distribution of AAA securities:

A very scary chart

As Alloway warns:

[W]atch what starts happening from 2008 and 2009.

The AAA bubble re-inflates and suddenly sovereign debt becomes the major force driving the world’s triple-A supply. The turmoil of 2008 shunted some investors from ABS into safer sovereign debt, it’s true. But you also had a plethora of incoming bank regulation to purposefully herd investors towards holding more government bonds, plus a glut of central bank liquidity facilities accepting government IOUs as collateral. Where ABS dissipated, sovereign debt stood in to fill the gap. And more.

It’s one reason why the sovereign crisis is well and truly painful.

It’s a global repricing of risk, again, but one that has the potential for a much largerpop, so to speak.

We know that a downgrade of U.S. Treasuries would likely lead to a downgrade of state and municipal bond ratings as well. We also know that the ripple effects from the collapse of asset-backed securities were much larger than anticipated before the 2008 crisis. This is why the possible knock-on effects of downgrade so many AAA asserts makes me itchy. Even if banks and other financial institutions have minimal exposure to U.S. Treasuries, I don't think it's possible for them to have minimal exposure to all U.S.-based AAA sovereign debt.

These are just the five known unknowns that I could think of in the past hour -- there are probably many, many more. Readers are strongly encouraged to add them in the comments.

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

To date, your humble blogger has never meet a free-trade agreement (FTA) he didn't like.  Sure, in a perfect world I'd like to see the multilateral trade rounds have priority.  The perfect is often the enemy of the good, however, and FTAs often carry with them significant non-economic benefits.  Signatories to U.S. FTA's, for example, often see an improvement in their human rights record

I have to admit, however, that the FTA Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement being talked about in this NYT article by Jonathan Adams gives me some serious pause: 

As negotiations move ahead on a Taiwan-China trade deal that could lower tariffs on handmade shoes and hundreds of other products from the mainland, fears are mounting that the island’s traditional industries — like shoemaking — may suffer, even as high-tech, financial services and other sectors gain from freer access to the giant market across the strait.

The government, however, contends that the benefits would far outweigh the costs, and Taiwan’s president, Ma-Ying-jeou, hopes to use the agreement to fully normalize economic relations with Beijing while expanding the island’s access to other markets.

“We can handle diplomatic isolation,” Mr. Ma said last month, “but economic isolation is fatal.”

The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, the Ma administration says, would be a prelude to similar deals with Malaysia, Singapore and, eventually, Japan or the United States. “Once E.C.F.A. is signed, we want to sign other free trade agreements and try to use mainland China to link with international markets,” a trade official involved in the negotiations, Hsu Chun-fang, said....

The economies of Taiwan and China are already connected. Taiwan has invested $150 billion in China since the early 1990s, according to a Taiwan government estimate. About 40 percent of Taiwan’s exports already go to China, where they face average tariffs of 9 percent. Half of those exports are semifinished goods that are shipped to factories for assembly and other value-added services and then re-exported, according to Mr. Ma.

I get the economic logic behind this E.C.F.A. -- it would unambiguously benefit Taiwan's economy to have something like duty-free access to the mainland. 

The security ramifications are troubling, however.  While China's economic leverage over the United States is limited, this kind of agreement would ratchet up the asymmetric dependence of Taiwan on the Chinese economy.   Maybe Taiwan has already crossed the point of no return with regard to interdependence with the mainland -- but this agreement would surely guarantee  crossing that threshhold. 

What would China do with this leverage?  I don't know, I really don't.  If Beijing plays the long game, they would allow for the build-up of political interest groups in Taiwan with a powerful incentive to appease the People's Republic in order to keep the economic relationship unruffled.  The thing is, China has often been clumsy in its initial attempts to translate economic power into political influence, and I could easily see such a misstep occurring a few years from now. 

Perhaps I'm being paranoid about this.  The one thing I'm certain about, however, is that the most likely flashpoint for a great power confrontation between the United States and China is anything involving Taiwan.  So I get veeeeeeerrrrrrry nervous about anything that upsets that particular apple cart. 

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

For those three readers not transfixed by today's Healthcareapalooza:  your humble blogger is in Washington, DC today to talk China-watchers down off the ledge testify before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review CommissionI'll post a link to the actual testimony once it's online.  UPDATE:  here's a link to everyone's testimony

As is standard in these settings, I'm pretty sure I'm the least qualified person on the expert list. 

 

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

So, you might have heard that Google is having a spot of trouble in China -- and is threatening to pull out of the Middle Kingdom altogether. 

Both FP's Evgeny Morozov and Jack Shafer suggest that Google isn't just doing this out of the goodness of their heart -- they have to be doing it because their market share is eroding to Baidu and this is the way to deflect with dignity.  Today's stock market suggests that they might have a point. 

The thing is, a 33% share (and possibly rising) in that market is not a trivial amount of dollars.  An estimated $600 million in cabbage is not easy to walk away from.  A true cynic would have predicted that Google would have kept its mouth shut, taken its lumps, and still tried to outcompete Baidu.  Google didn't.

The New York Times's Keith Bradsher and David Barboza make a more intriguing argument -- the Chinese government is making life increasingly miserable for Western multinationals:

Google is far from alone among Western companies in its growing unhappiness with Chinese government policies, although it is highly unusual in threatening to pull out of the country entirely in protest.

Western companies contend that they face a lengthening list of obstacles to doing business in China, from “buy Chinese” government procurement policies and growing restrictions on foreign investments to widespread counterfeiting.

These barriers generally fall into two broad categories. Some relate to China’s desire to maintain control over internal dissent. Others involve its efforts to become internationally competitive in as many industries as possible.

Then there's this from the Wall Street Journal's Ian Johnson and Jason Dean:

The Google syndrome caps growing complaints by foreign businesses over a deteriorating business environment. Both the European Chamber and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in China have issued reports sharply critical of China's business environment. During the 1980s and '90s, foreign businesses were assiduously courted by China's leaders and responded by bringing to China technology, training and international best practices.

In recent years, however, foreign businesses have complained that the official line has shifted. Younger bureaucrats are more nationalistic and skeptical of the value of letting in foreign companies, [head of the European Chamber of Commerce in China Jörg ] Wuttke says. Last year, for example, foreign executives said bidding practices for wind energy were rigged to exclude foreign companies.

"There's a general attitude in the foreign business community that it's getting tougher to do business here," said James McGregor, a senior counselor at APCO Worldwide and author of a book on doing business in China. "This could be a bellwether."

Not all Western multinationals feel this way.  Still, this raises a question I find most interesting -- how much of what China is doing is intentional and how much of it is a PR cluster f**k? 

I can see it going either way.  China is definitely more powerful than it used to be, and maybe they've been drinking the Robert Fogel kool-aid.   Greater power usually leads to greater nationalist pride, so I can kinda sorta see this being a conscious strategy by Beijing to throw its weight around.

The thing is, it's a remarkably clumsy effort.  Consider James Fallows on this point:

In a strange and striking way there is an inversion of recent Chinese and U.S. roles. In the switch from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, the U.S. went from a president much of the world saw as deliberately antagonizing them to a president whose Nobel Prize reflected (perhaps desperate) gratitude at his efforts at conciliation. China, by contrast, seems to be entering its Bush-Cheney era.

China could be throwing its weight around -- or it's bureaucrats could be much less cohesive than outside observers believe. 

Developing....

UPDATE:  John Gapper and David Pilling are worth reading on these points as well. 

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

My latest commentary for Marketplace looks at Russia, Georgia, and the Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention.  The title says, "Trade may not deter Russia from war," which is technically what I said, though I think my point was more like, "Trade may deter Russia from future war."  Anyway, go check it out -- especially Brits who know how to pronounce Angell's name.  Did I get it right? 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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