Monday, May 9, 2011 - 4:44 PM
Paul Krugman's column today has been getting a lot of love from the left side of the blogosphere, but I'm not sure how grounded it is in reality.
Krugman's argument is that the messes of the developed world are the fault of elites and not the mass public:
The fact is that what we’re experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. The policies that got us into this mess weren’t responses to public demand. They were, with few exceptions, policies championed by small groups of influential people — in many cases, the same people now lecturing the rest of us on the need to get serious....
President George W. Bush cut taxes in the service of his party’s ideology, not in response to a groundswell of popular demand — and the bulk of the cuts went to a small, affluent minority.
Similarly, Mr. Bush chose to invade Iraq because that was something he and his advisers wanted to do, not because Americans were clamoring for war against a regime that had nothing to do with 9/11. In fact, it took a highly deceptive sales campaign to get Americans to support the invasion, and even so, voters were never as solidly behind the war as America’s political and pundit elite.
Finally, the Great Recession was brought on by a runaway financial sector, empowered by reckless deregulation. And who was responsible for that deregulation? Powerful people in Washington with close ties to the financial industry, that’s who. Let me give a particular shout-out to Alan Greenspan, who played a crucial role both in financial deregulation and in the passage of the Bush tax cuts — and who is now, of course, among those hectoring us about the deficit.
So it was the bad judgment of the elite, not the greediness of the common man, that caused America’s deficit.
Hey, you know what would help assess this hypothesis? Some actual data.
First, let's consider the tax cut question. Take a gander at this chart from Gallup:
Gee, as it turns out, the public did seem to think a tax cut was a swell idea around about 2001. Indeed, the problem the American public had was that they were skeptical the tax cuts would actually come to pass:
Although the public has not been asked specifically about the Gramm/Zeller bill, a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted January 5-7, 2001, showed that over half -- 52% -- of Americans favor Bush's tax plan, based on what they have read or heard. However, the public is generally pessimistic about the new administration's ability to actually pass the tax cut -- only 38% of Americans think Bush will be able to pass such legislation (50% do not and 12% have no opinion on the matter).
Now, to be fair, the Gallup data also suggests that tax cuts were not the #1 priority of Americans in 2001. Based on that chart, however, it seems pretty clear that there was a fair degree of enthusiasm for tax cuts.
Similarly, on Iraq, again, the Gallup poll data shows that a majority of Americans supported "invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power." The numbers between June 2002 and March 2003 fluctuate between a low of 53% and a high of 64%, but every poll demonstrated majority support for the policy option.
Krugman may or may not be correct on the financial deregulation question, though I suspect the best answer on that issue is that the public was rationally ignorant about the issue. And for the record I think he is right on the Europe side of the equation.
The point of this post is not to let American policy elites off the hook. The point is that Krugman's notion of a passive, innocent American public doesn't wash either. Political leaders only implement the kinds of Big Policies like the Bush tax cuts and Iraq invasion if there's an American public that's copacetic with these policies. The majority of the American public supported the key policy decisions that led to the current macroeconomic situation, and suggesting otherwise is tendentious.
Am I missing anything?
UPDATE: Kevin Drum thinks I am missing something: public support for tax cuts/invading Iraq were constants, and it took the Bush administration to execute these policies:
Despite this broad support, nobody was crying out for either huge tax cuts or invading Iraq until George Bush and the rest of the GOP started talking them up. Without that, the public would have continued to vaguely think that taxes were too high and Saddam Hussein was a bad guy before switching the TV to Monday Night Football and forgetting about it.
It's true that public support was probably necessary in order to pass the Bush tax cuts and invade Iraq. But the polling evidence is pretty clear that it was far from sufficient. Nothing about public opinion changed in 2001. The only thing that changed was the occupant of the Oval Office. The public isn't blameless in all this, but the polling evidence makes it pretty clear that it was a minor player.
I completely agree with Drum about the "necessary but not sufficient" quality of American public opinion. I'm not sure "minor player" is correct, however. First, bear in mind that George W. Bush was re-elected rather handily after implementing both of these policy choices, so it's not like the public was experiencing buyer's remorse in 2000.
Second, in my recollection, politicians in democracies have a strong incentive to translate majority public sentiments into concrete policies that favor their particular political coalition. George W. Bush took a popular sentiment for tax cuts and ran with it; Barack Obama took a popular sentiment to address health care and ran with it. Neither outcome was quite in line with the public sentiment that animated it, but that's public policy for you.
To reiterate, I'm not disagreeing with Krugman that policy elites must shoulder the burden for their mistakes; I'm just pushing back against his implied argument that the American public is blameless -- hence the "unindicted co-conspirator" language.
Monday, October 18, 2010 - 1:30 PM
Tom Brokaw has acquired sufficient gravitas such that, when he clears his throat in a meaningful way, he gets his own New York Times op-ed essay.
This morning, Brokaw cleared his throat about why the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan in Iraq aren't being talked about during this election campaign season.
[W]hy aren’t the wars and their human and economic consequences front and center in this campaign, right up there with jobs and taxes?
The answer is very likely that the vast majority of Americans wake up every day worrying, with good reason, about their economic security, but they can opt out of the call to arms. Unless they are enlisted in the armed services -- or have a family member who has stepped forward -- nothing much is asked of them in the war effort.
The all-volunteer uniformed services now represent less than 1 percent of the American population, but they’re carrying 100 percent of the battle…
No decision is more important than committing a nation to war. It is, as politicians like to say, about our blood and treasure. Surely blood and treasure are worthy of more attention than they’ve been getting in this campaign.
It's true that Iraq was a much bigger issue during the 2002 and 2006 midterms. Is Brokaw right that the lack of a draft is deflecting the issue? Sort of.
Brokaw has half a point in saying that the all-volunteer force blunts the incentive to have a public debate on this Very Important Topic. There's a better reason to explain the silence, however: There's not much daylight between the two parties on this issue.
In 2008, the Bush administration began the drawdown phase in Iraq. In 2009, the Obama administration anted up for 30,000 more troops in Afghanistan. Neither war is popular with the U.S. electorate.
Given these political facts, why would either party bring up these conflicts? Democrats can't rail against wars being prosecuted by a Democratic president. Not even nutjob ultra-conservative hacks can credibly claim that Obama has been a "Kenyan anti-colonialist" on the military front. Democrats can't really run on a "see, we told you that Obama isn't a war wimp!" message either. The GOP has little incentive to call for doubling down in these conflicts and can't really pivot towards a "pro-peace" position either. [I suspect the Islamophobia issue is cropping up on the GOP campaign trail because it's a stalking horse for "getting tough" with the United States' enemies. Even here, however, it's not like Democrats have created all that much daylight between them and the party of opposition.]
If neither party has an incentive to bring up these wars during the campaign, the only way it becomes an issue is if a powerful interest group and/or social movement raises it. Here's here the all-volunteer force comes into play. Perhaps some returning veterans want to bring up the war as an issue for policy debate -- but the returning veterans do not appear to be alienated en masse. There is also no U.S. equivalent of the Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia -- not that the Russian version was all that effective. All one finds on this terrain are the Cindy Sheehans of the world, and her credibility has been eroding as of late.
Brokaw is right that matters of blood and treasure should be debated. But a debate requires politicians to have divergent views to debate about -- and right now, that doesn't exist between the major parties.
Wednesday, February 10, 2010 - 1:50 PM

Steve Walt effectively vivisects Adam Lawther's op-ed yesterday on the alleged positive externalities that an Iranian nuclear bomb would have on the Middle East and American foreign policy. Rather than dogpile on, I'm going to go meta again.
I'm intrigued by what op-ed editor David Shipley is trying to do on the Iran debate. Lawther's op-ed is hardly the first strange op-ed on Iran to appear in the past few months. We've also had Alan Kuperman's analysis for why bombing Iran is such a good idea, and the Leverett's pay-no-attention-to-the-protestors-behind-the-curtain argument for enhanced engagement with the current Iranian leadership.
As the links above suggest, I'm not a fan of any of these arguments. That said, I am a fan of having these arguments inserted into the public discussion over Iran. Ever since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a common lament has been that was no public debate about the wisdom of different policy options. Both foreign policy mooseheads and scholars have highlighted this pre-invasion consensus. These analyses might be somewhat exaggerated, but I think it would be difficult to deny that in the opinion pages of the major newspapers, the deck was somewhat stacked in favor of military action.
My hunch is that Shipley is thinking: "Won't Get Fooled Again" He wants as heterogeneous an array of views as possible as the Iran situation develops.
There is something laudable about this if it's true -- it's exactly what the Times op-ed page should be doing as a foreign policy crisis unfolds. My only concern is the caliber of reasoning in these op-eds. They are, as Walt put it, "silly arguments." On the other hand, if these ideas are vetted and then shot down, maybe the foreign policy community actually knows what it's talking about this time around.
Mario Tama/Getty Images
Monday, January 4, 2010 - 10:05 PM
Megan McArdle and I have a diavlog up at Bloggingheads.tv that is so 2009... mostly because we taped it on the last day or last year. We discuss the big stuff of the decade -- 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, the financial crisis -- and reflect on what, if anything, we learned.
One additional point that I failed to mention in the diavlog itself. While this was a bad decade for America, it was actually a pretty great decade for large swathes of the globe. China, Russia, India, Brazil, and much of sub-Saharan Africa recorded sustained levels of economic growth., for example.
I know that's little comfort to the unemployed in Ohio. My point is that the "good riddance" aspect to the end-of-the-naughts is hardly a global phenomenon.
Tuesday, August 4, 2009 - 12:49 PM
At Inside Higher Ed today, Scott Jaschik follows up on my FP colleague Marc Lynch's excellent post regarding the expected influx of Iraq and Afghan veterans into Middle East Studies.
The obvious benefit of this migration of talent is the local knowledge about Iraq or Afghanistan that such veterans would bring to the table. Thinking about academia more generally, however, there's another massive benefit that's overlooked.
To put it bluntly, most top political scientists don't have a lot of experience beyond being political scientists. That is to say, the top Ph.D. students often enter graduate school straight from undergraduate programs. They might have interesting summer internships, but otherwise have limited hands-on experience with politics or international relations.
Now, this isn't always a bad thing. I'm guessing most patients would prefer a doctor who is single-mindedly focused on medicine rather than a doctor who has taken "time out" to travel the globe. I know plenty of IR scholars who have produced outstanding work without, say, ever serving a day in government.
The problem comes when everyone in a profession pursues the identical career track -- to the point where those who deviate from the career track are thought of as strange or different. At that point, the profession loses something ineffable.
So, former members of the military should be ecouraged to enter Ph.D. programs -- as should those who worked on the ground for NGOs and civil affairs branches of the government. I can't guarantee that it will lead to better scholarship. At a minimum, however, it improves the quality of the teaching and the conversations that take place between colleagues. And I'm pretty confident that that leads to better research.
Saturday, February 28, 2009 - 3:48 PM
As the book club on Tom Ricks' The Gamble comes to a close, Barack Obama announced his future plans for Iraq.
What's fascinating is the effect of the surge on the political reaction to Obama's proposal to scale down the U.S. presence to 55,000 troops by August 2010. It has received bipartisan support in the United States. Iraqi officials have by and large endorsed it (though see here and scroll down). Obama has even earned the always-crucial Foreign Policy blogger vote.
Think about this for a second. If I had told you two years ago that there would be a broad domestic and international consensus on U.S. strategy in Iraq, you would have laughed me off the Foreign Policy web site.
Ricks argues that the surge has not led to political achievements in Iraq, and he may very well be right. What it has accomplished, however, is changing the political optics in three crucial ways. First, it has given Republicans cover for supporting a withdrawal, arguing that it is being done from a position of strength rather than weakness. Second, it has blunted the Democrats' zeal for immediate withdrawal. So long as things in Iraq are going relatively well, the political pressure to DO SOMETHING NOW! has abated. Finally, the surge has given the Iraqi government the confidence to believe that a significant U.S. drawdown will not lead them back to the abyss.
I don't know whether the withdrawal will actually prove to be good policy -- but the fact that we've reached a political consensus that it is good policy is nothing short of astounding.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009 - 5:49 PM
Please do check out Foreign Policy's Book Club discussion of Tom Ricks' The Gamble, his excellent and contrarian follow-up to Fiasco. Here's a link to Marc Lynch's take, and that is followed by Christian Brose.
My take just went up. The point I want to stress:
[T]he ways in which the architects of the surge got their way seems like an exact replay of how the architects of the invasion and initial occupation got their way -- operating through bureaucratic backchannels and endruns, ideologically simpatico think tanks, and -- of course -- Dick Cheney's office. For those of us who want the policymaking process to work, this looks like another fiasco. Petraeus's decision to co-opt the Sunni insurgents, for example, was made without consulting the president. Doesn't that echo J. Paul Bremer's disastrous decision to disband the Iraqi military without consultation? Petraeus, Odierno, and Jack Keane might have been right on the merits, but to get their way they bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CENTCOM commander, the State Department, and the NSC interagency process. The Gamble argues that these actors were impediments to the right strategy. All well and good, but what is to stop another cluster of bureaucratic "insurgents" from bypassing the chain of command and telling political leaders what they want to hear on, say, Afghanistan, North Korea or Iran? Is there a need for another, more ambitious version of Goldwater-Nichols?
Go check it out -- and Ricks will respond to all of these comments at the end of the week.
Friday, February 13, 2009 - 5:04 AM
The latest Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey of international relations scholars has been released (I've blogged about a prior TRIP survey here). The part that jumped out at me:
On the policy side, we see several important changes from previous surveys. In 2008, for instance, we see fewer than half as many scholars (23 percent of respondents in 2008 compared to 48 percent in 2006) describing terrorism as one of the three most significant current foreign policy challenges facing the United States. Most surprisingly, while 50 percent of U.S. scholars in 2006 said that terrorism was one of the most important foreign policy issues the United States would face over the subsequent decade, in 2008 only 1 percent of respondents agreed. American faculty members are becoming more sanguine about the war in Iraq, as well: in 2006 76 percent said that the Iraq conflict was one of the three most important issues facing the country, but in 2008 only 35 percent of U.S. respondents concurred. Concern over several other foreign policy issues is also declining markedly: when asked about the most important problems facing the country over the next ten years 18 percent fewer respondents chose WMD proliferation, 12 percent fewer said armed conflict in the Middle East, and 13 percent fewer indicated failed states. At the same time, 17 percent more respondents in 2008 than in 2006 believed that climate change will pose a serious challenge, 6 percent more worried about global poverty, and 4 percent more said that resource scarcity is one of the most significant foreign policy challenges.
Basically, my colleagues have mellowed a bit on the standard threats everyone has fretted about for the past eight years. Now they're more worried about threats emerging from the global political economy.
Which puts them in line with the Director of National Intelligence:
The new director of national intelligence told Congress on Thursday that global economic turmoil and the instability it could ignite had outpaced terrorism as the most urgent threat facing the United States.
The assessment underscored concern inside America’s intelligence agencies not only about the fallout from the economic crisis around the globe, but also about long-term harm to America’s reputation. The crisis that began in American markets has already “increased questioning of U.S. stewardship of the global economy,” the intelligence chief, Dennis C. Blair, said in prepared testimony.
Mr. Blair’s comments were particularly striking because they were delivered as part of a threat assessment to Congress that has customarily focused on issues like terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Mr. Blair singled out the economic downturn as “the primary near-term security concern” for the country, and he warned that if it continued to spread and deepen, it would contribute to unrest and imperil some governments.
“The longer it takes for the recovery to begin, the greater the likelihood of serious damage to U.S. strategic interests,” he said.
It's great to get this kind of attention, but I fear that part of it is faddish. All it will take is one conventional interstate war or one spark across the Taiewan Straits, and the focus will shift back towards more conventional security threats.
Friday, December 19, 2008 - 4:49 PM
QUESTION: Do you regret your role in the Iraq war? SECRETARY RICE: I absolutely am so proud that we liberated Iraq. QUESTION: Really? SECRETARY RICE: Absolutely. And I’m especially, as a political scientist, not as Secretary of State, not as National Security Advisor, but as somebody who knows that structurally it matters that a geostrategically important country like Iraq is not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, that this different Iraq under democratic leadership (emphasis added).Both Matt and Ryan make the argument that since most political scientists opposed the war in Iraq -- and they did -- Rice is out of bounds here. The CAP boys have half a point, but let's not go overboard. First, their half-a-point --I agree with Matt and Ryan that Iraq was not a geostrategic threat. It is worth remembering, however, that Iraq was causing some major strategic headaches at the time of the invasion. That said, I also think Matt and Ryan are misreading Rice a little here. In the follow-up to the excerpted portion above, Rice says, "we are at a place now where because of difficult decisions that the President took we have an Iraq that is well on its way to being a multiethnic, multiconfessional democracy." So what Rice is talking about is the potential benefits of having a democracy spanning the Tigris and Euphrates. And on this point, Rice is correct to assert that there were/are political science-y reasons for thinking that a stable, democratic Iraq was a Good Thing for the United States and the rest of the world. Don't just take my word on this -- let's go to Shadi Hamid:
Middle Eastern states, almost all of them dictatorships, constantly bicker amongst themselves and enter into relatively childish diplomatic rows over perceived and personal slights. There is no common Arab policy to any regional or international problem, because there seem to be little structural incentives to induce Arab leaders to make an effort to agree on big issues. Part of the problem is when foreign policy is largely determined by either one person, or a very small coterie of elites around the royal court, then foreign policy initiatives have less force of legitimacy and are less sustainable because they can always be reversed fairly easily. One could posit - as I will right now - that if Middle Eastern countries were relative democracies, they would be much more willing to cooperate with each other, and would be more willing to play strong, confident leadership roles in tacking difficult regional issues. Turkey, of course, is a good example of how this might look in practice.Now, let me stress that the political science consensus on this point is hardly uniform. Most realists would dismiss the notion that regime type matters all that much. And even some democratic peace proponents would point out that while consolidated democracies are just peachy, consolidating democracies are often more trouble than they are worth. That said, however, based on these comments Condi Rice does not need to turn in her APSA card anytime soon.
Monday, November 17, 2008 - 3:27 PM
This is good for the Iraqis, who really do need the U.S. presence for a little while longer; good for George Bush, who's getting a slightly longer timetable than Barack Obama would have negotiated; and good for Obama, since this essentially makes his decision to withdraw into a bipartisan agreement.
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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