Middle East

Going against all past blog experiences, I though it might be worth posting about Israel and Palestine today.  Reading the tea leaves, the situation there is clearly getting more dire, and I'm not sure if there is a politically viable option for U.S. diplomats. 

The domestic politics within Israel favor the continuation of the status quo -- that is to say, no freeze on the housing settlements and a sustain crackdown on Palestinians in Jerusalem.  It doesn't take an NSF grant to know that politicians do not reverse course on policies that generate massive domestic support.  The Obama administration, after talking tough in the spring, seems unready or unwilling to apply greater levers of pressure against Netanyahu.  So, we have status quo ante. 

Meanwhile, the Palestinian frustration with this status quo has translated into greater support for Hamas, rumblings about a third intifada, and Abu Mazen threatening to quit. 

Neither side seems remotely ready or willing to negotiate. So, here's my question -- if you're Barack Obama, what do you do at this juncture?   Is this one of those moments when all sides might be better off staring into the abyss of abject noncooperation? 

I don't know, I really don't.  I do know that sometimes agreements cannot be reached unless adversaries get a better appreciation of the counterfactual of no agreement.  It might cause both the Israelis and the Palestinians to recognize that they are stuck with each other. 

On the other hand, this is also one of those moments when diplomatic fatigue can cause actors to throw up their hands in frustration and assume that things couldn't possible get any worse.  Except, of course, they could.  And there are ways in which a renewed uprising would be to the Middle East as the collapse of Lehman Brothers was to the global financial system. 

So, my question to readers:  is this a moment for the U.S. to double down in efforts to restart an Israel/Palestinian dialogue, or is this a moment for stepping back? 

Jad Mouawad and Andrew Revkin report in the New York Times on just the most darling Saudi proposal for how to help solve the global warming problem: 

Saudi Arabia is trying to enlist other oil-producing countries to support a provocative idea: if wealthy countries reduce their oil consumption to combat global warming, they should pay compensation to oil producers....

The chief Saudi negotiator, Mohammad al-Sabban, described the position as a “make or break” provision for the Saudis, as nations stake out their stance before the global climate summit scheduled for the end of the year.

“Assisting us as oil-exporting countries in achieving economic diversification is very crucial for us through foreign direct investments, technology transfer, insurance and funding,” Mr. Sabban said in an e-mail message....

A recent study by the International Energy Agency, which advises industrialized nations, found that the cumulative revenue of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries would drop by 16 percent from 2008 to 2030 if the world agreed to slash emissions, as opposed to the projection if there were no treaty.

But with oil projected to average $100 a barrel, the energy agency estimated that OPEC members would still earn $23 trillion over that period.

If Saudi Arabia was serious about diversifying its economy, it would open up its spigots and let the price of oil fall to the point where there were market incentives for economic diversification.  Somehow, I don't see that happening.   

So, this isn't really going to go anywhere -- but what I do find particularly amusing is that if one thought about compensating dirty energy producers for the costs of climate change mitigation, then oil producers would be close to the back of the line.  Coal-producing economies -- like China and the United States -- would be justified in demanding much greater levels of compensation, since coal is a much dirtier energy source.  Oil would be in front of natural gas producers, and that's about it. 

Readers are encouraged to proffer their own proposals in the comments that would seem more outlandish than the Saudi one.  Creativity counts!!

My latest bloggingheads diavlog is with the New America Foundation's Flynt Leverett, who co-authored an op-ed last week that didn't sit too well with me.  We discuss the Leveretts' proposal for a grand bargain with Iran and all of its implications. 

I come away from the diavlog even more skeptical of the Leverett proposal -- the more I listened, the more I thought that:

1. Today's Iran would not go for it;
2. The collateral damage inflicted on our allies would be nontrivial;
3. There is no domestic political support for such an initiative; and,
4. From a realpolitik perspective, it's not demonstrably better than the alternatives.  

Opinions will vary, however -- give it a listen and let me know what you think in the comments. 

As you can tell from my last post, I think here's an excellent chance that the status quo persists in Iran, with a small chance that the entire edifice crumbles in the wake of a social movement unafraid of security forces.  What does this mean for U.S. foreign policy towards Iran? Here's a dirty little secret -- this might actually be the best possible outcome for the Obama administration. 

Well, not for the next few days. The administration is going to have to tap-dance for the next few days in order to avoid the Schylla of a "Chicken Kiev" moment and the Charybdis of going all in with the reformers only to see them crushed. 

After that, then what? Well, I think the only way the reformers win is with Khamenei going down, which would mean a genuine regime change, which is a game-changer. A new Iranian regime is not going to give up its nuclear program lightly, but I do suspect that negotiations with a reformist regime would be pretty fruitful. 

What if, as I suspect, the current regime keeps its grip on power?  Well, the Obama administration still has a stronger hand to play.  Here's why: 

1)  Tehran's influence in the region is going to ebb. Iran's power in the Middle East in recent years has emanated from a mix of hard power (nuke progam, oil, support of Hebollah) and soft power (Ahmadinejad's economic populism, ranting against corrupt Arab elites, and general pugnaciouness towards Israel).  Regardless of the result now, the election has killed their soft power in the region.  This doesn't mean that Iran's influence disappears -- see all the hard power stuff.  Still, with each passing day of protests, Ahmadinejad looks more like a bully than a leader of a transnational social movement. 

2)  Multilateral coordination just got easier.  Just as with North Korea, it gets ever easier for the United States to create a united front among its allies and other great powers when dealing with Iran going forward.  The reaction in the West has been pretty uniform on the election results.  When the nuclear negotiations break down -- and they will break down -- it should be easier to coordinate both the security and foreign policy responses.

3)  No more two-level games for Iran. If Mousavi had won outright, the Obama administration would have been in a serious bind on the nonproliferation question. The president of Iran doesn't control the nuclear program; the supreme leader controls it. With Mousavi as the public face of Iran, however, it would have been tougher for the Obama administration to describe Iran as unyielding when it refused to make any serious concessions on its nuclear program.  Furthermore, Mousavi could always ask the Obama administration to back off on the nuclear question because of hardliner resistance back home. That gambit won't play, now.

This doesn't mean that nuclear negotiations will go swimmingly -- I expect they will fail.  What it does mean, however, is that the rest of the world will be hard-placed to blame the end of the negotiations on the Obama administration.  Iran is going to look like the intransigent actor from here on in. 

Just to be clear:  I'm not saying that this outcome is a great one for the United States.  Washington has a weak hand to play.  My point is that, compared to the counterfactual of an Iran with Mousavi as its public face and Khamenei remaining the true leader, this is somewhat preferrable. The "pleasing illusions" of clerical power in Iran have now been stripped bare.

I don't have too many complaints with Barack Obama's foreign policy to date.  But I'm beginning to wonder about his effect on America's foreign policy bloggers. 

Today, I see that Josh Marshall recommends Juan Cole's blog as the place to check for updates on Iranian elections.  I don't always agree with Cole, but Iran is right in his wheelhouse, so off I click.

His top post, entitled, "Iran Awaits Ballot Results; Obama Effect Expected," contains this paragraph: 

Howard LaFranchi at CSM asks what the 'Obama Effect' will be on the Iranian revolution. Although it was not decisive, scientific polling in Lebanon suggests that Obama did have an effect in the defeat of the Hezbollah coalition, "March 8", in Lebanon, even if it was a slight one.

Hmmm.... there was scientific polling done on this?  Really?  Rats.  Earlier this week I expressed my skepticism about the Obama effect in Lebanon's election.  Ready to concede that I might have been wrong, I clicked through Cole's link to find the following: 

Neither [Lebanon nor Iran] has any accurate, independent or publicly available political polling, and no poll has attempted to substantively gauge the effect of Obama's presidency or his recent Cairo outreach speech to Muslims on either country.

One recent poll done on behalf of two U.S.-based public-interest groups found that few Iranians — only 29 percent — said they have favorable opinions of the United States, and that the view had changed little since Obama's election.

Both of Cole's links have quotes from experts claiming that there might have been a mild Obama effect.  There ain't no scientific polling, however. 

Let's everyone slowly walk away from the Obama hyperbole, shall we? 

UPDATE:  Cole has corrected his post. 

From a U.S. perspective, Lebanon's election went very well: 

An American-backed alliance has retained control of the Lebanese Parliament after a hotly contested election billed as a showdown between Tehran and Washington for influence in the Middle East....

The alliance, known as the March 14 coalition, won the majority in the 128-member parliament with 71 seats, compared with to 57 for the Hezbollah-led coalition, according to official results announced Monday by the government. The results represent a significant and unexpected defeat for Hezbollah and its allies, Iran and Syria. Most polls had showed a tight race, but one in which the Hezbollah-led group would win.

Just to pre-empt the question that will inevitably be asked in the United States -- "this was because of President Obama's Cairo speech, right?" -- I would refer everyone to this New York Times story from six weeks ago by Robert Worth: 

[P]arliamentary elections here in June are shaping up to be among the most expensive ever held anywhere, with hundreds of millions of dollars streaming into this small country from around the globe.

Lebanon has long been seen as a battleground for regional influence, and now, with no more foreign armies on the ground, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region are arming their allies here with campaign money in place of weapons. The result is a race that is widely seen as the freest and most competitive to be held here in decades, with a record number of candidates taking part. But it may also be the most corrupt....

[E]ven a narrow win by Hezbollah and its allies, now in the parliamentary opposition, would be seen as a victory for Iran — which has financed Hezbollah for decades — and a blow to American allies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. So the money flows.

“We are putting a lot into this,” said one adviser to the Saudi government, who added that the Saudi contribution was likely to reach hundreds of millions of dollars in a country of only four million people. “We’re supporting candidates running against Hezbollah, and we’re going to make Iran feel the pressure.”

Given that the March 14 coalition outperformed the polling, it's entirely possible that factors other than money played a role in the outcome -- Nate Silver needs to go global in his analysis.  Still, unless Mark Lynch tells me otherwise, methinks this result is clearly not just about the power of rhetoric. 

A few days ago Gideon Rachman had a sharp column in the Financial Times about the limits to Barack Obama's "soft power" approach: 

Mr Bush had a shoe thrown at him in his last appearance in the Middle East. So if Mr Obama receives his customary standing ovation in Cairo, that will send a powerful symbolic message. But the president should not let the applause go to his head. Even if his speech is a success, the same foreign-policy problems will be sitting in his in-tray when he gets back to the Oval Office – and they will be just as dangerous as before....

The president’s charisma and rhetorical skill are real diplomatic assets. If Mr Obama can deploy them to improve America’s image and influence around the world, that is all to the good. There is nothing wrong with trying to re-build American “soft power”.

The danger is more subtle. It is that President Yes-we-can has raised exaggerated hopes about the pay-off from engagement and diplomacy. In the coming months it will become increasingly obvious that soft power also has its limits.

I don't disagree with much of what Rachman says here, but there's a sin of omission that is worth pointing out.  One of the advantages of Barack Obama's popularity is pretty plain -- he gets to say things that, in another man's voice, would sound unbelievably arrogant. 

For exhibit A, let's stroll over to Tom Friedman's column today, which Friedman petty much outsources to Obama himself: 

“We have a joke around the White House,” the president said. “We’re just going to keep on telling the truth until it stops working — and nowhere is truth-telling more important than the Middle East.”

A key part of his message, he said, will be: “Stop saying one thing behind closed doors and saying something else publicly.” He then explained: “There are a lot of Arab countries more concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon than the ‘threat’ from Israel, but won’t admit it.” There are a lot of Israelis, “who recognize that their current path is unsustainable, and they need to make some tough choices on settlements to achieve a two-state solution — that is in their long-term interest — but not enough folks are willing to recognize that publicly.”

There are a lot of Palestinians who “recognize that the constant incitement and negative rhetoric with respect to Israel” has not delivered a single “benefit to their people and had they taken a more constructive approach and sought the moral high ground” they would be much better off today — but they won’t say it aloud.

“There are a lot of Arab states that have not been particularly helpful to the Palestinian cause beyond a bunch of demagoguery,” and when it comes to “ponying up” money to actually help the Palestinian people, they are “not forthcoming.”

When it comes to dealing with the Middle East, the president noted, “there is a Kabuki dance going on constantly. That is what I would like to see broken down. I am going to be holding up a mirror and saying: ‘Here is the situation, and the U.S. is prepared to work with all of you to deal with these problems. But we can’t impose a solution. You are all going to have to make some tough decisions.’ Leaders have to lead, and, hopefully, they will get supported by their people.”

Now, imagine that George W. Bush had said the exact same things to Friedman a year ago (not that much of a stretch, actually).  He would have been crucified for delivering such a high-handed, arrogant, imperious lecture.  Obama, apparently, can get away with it -- if he could, I bet Obama's advance team would have a workplace-safety sign behind him at the upcoming Cairo speech saying, "This is the 134th day that the Obama administration has not invaded an Arab country.  Keep it up!" 

Obama was surprisingly blunt with Friedman about why he can get away with it: 

"What I do believe is that if we are engaged in speaking directly to the Arab street, and they are persuaded that we are operating in a straightforward manner, then, at the margins, both they and their leadership are more inclined and able to work with us.”

Similarly, the president said that if he is asking German or French leaders to help more in Afghanistan or Pakistan, “it doesn’t hurt if I have credibility with the German and French people. They will still be constrained with budgets and internal politics, but it makes it easier.”

Part of America’s “battle against terrorist extremists involves changing the hearts and minds of the people they recruit from,” he added. “And if there are a bunch of 22- and 25-year-old men and women in Cairo or in Lahore who listen to a speech by me or other Americans and say: ‘I don’t agree with everything they are saying, but they seem to know who I am or they seem to want to promote economic development or tolerance or inclusiveness,’ then they are maybe a little less likely to be tempted by a terrorist recruiter.”

One last thought -- I don't disagree all that much with Obama's diagnosis of the region, but it does suggest an important political problem.  Most Middle Eastern states have very little incentive to work towards a two-state solution.  Within many Arab countries, domestic resentment can be channeled into anger at the Israelis and symbolic support for the Palestinians.  Why would governments in the region want to turn off that very useful spigot? 

After reading Marc Lynch's postmortem of the just-completed Arab Summit in Doha, Qatar, I'm beginning to wonder if I've been too harsh about the G-20 meeting this week. 

Admittedly, the London summit will not accomplish much, but if the draft communique is any guide, some modestly useful steps were taken (expanding the membership of the Financial Stability Forum Financial Stability Board, expanding IMF lending capabilities).  On the margins of the G-20, genuine progress appears to have been made on an arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia. 

Brad DeLong is exaggerating when he predicts, "the best episode of international policy coordination since Bretton Woods itself" I think the Plaza Accord would win that award.  But, lest one get too discouraged, just read Marc's posts here and here. 

And yes, the title of this post refers to this scene.