North Korea

The Financial Times' Simeon Kerr and Harvey Morris report on one of those stories that the Bush administration would have killed for about, oh, seven years ago: 

The United Arab Emirates has seized a ship secretly carrying embargoed North Korean arms to Iran, say diplomats.

The interception comes at a sensitive time. North Korea has invited the US for bilateral talks on nuclear issues and the UN Security Council’s western members are pressing for greater Iranian co-operation over its nuclear programme.

The UAE has reported the seizure of the vessel to the UN sanctions committee responsible for vetting the implementation of measures, including an arms embargo, imposed against North Korea under Security Council resolution 1874, according to diplomats in New York. The committee, chaired by Turkey, has made no formal announcement about the case.

Diplomats at the UN identified the vessel as the Bahamian-flagged ANL-Australia. The vessel was seized some weeks ago. The UN sanctions committee has written to the Iranian and North Korean governments pointing out that the shipment puts them in violation of UN resolution 1974.

The authorities seized “military components”, but the vessel has since departed, a person familiar with UAE thinking said. The seizure took place in the UAE, but not the shipping hub of Dubai, the person added.

So, in the past two years, North Korea has been linked to arms build-ups in Syria, Myanmar, and Iran. 

Come to think of it, maybe it's not an Axis of Evil so much as North Korea desperately trying to export the one thing they make that has market value. 

Reports like these are actually good news, I suspect.  It suggests that the enhanced sanctions regime is making it tougher for North Korea to export its ilicit wares.  Which means that the status quo favors the other members of the Six-Party Talks more than it favors Pyongyang. 

Gosh, maybe there's something to this containment idea. 

UPDATE:  More info on the shipment itself here. 

My latest bloggingheads diavlog is with David Frum.  We discuss the situations in Iran and North Korea, and whether John Bolton is the Glenn Beck of U.S. foreign policy. 

You'd think I would have something very deep to say about former President Clinton's recent excursion to Pyongyang to secure the release of two U.S. journalists.  Well, I have four reactions, but I'm not sure how deep they are: 

1. Man, the North Koreans love backchannels more than Henry Kissinger.  They love backchannels more than MTV loves stupid reality shows involving washed-up former rockers.  They love backchannels more than Obama loves teachable moments.  They love backchannels more than Ryan O'Neal loves hi--[We get the point--ed.  Right, sorry.] The North Korean government has always used unofficial interlocutors to communicate with the United States when things get tough and they want a way out.  I'm curious what their message was on the nuclear issue.
2. While the DPRK might like private communications, Bill Clinton is no Jimmy Carter.  Carter went on CNN in 1994 to announce the outlines of a nuclear deal with North Korea without fully briefing the Clinton administration.  Clinton clearly remembers that experience.
3. At the end of the day, the two journalists were released without any change in official U.S. policy.  A fake apology from a former U.S. president might be worth something in Pyongyang, but it doesn't really amount to much.
4. My visceral reaction to Clinton and his delegation sitting with Kim Jong Il posing for a formal photograph was one of complete and utter revulsion.  I don't think Clinton apologized, but in many ways this looks worse. 

Foreign policy should be conducted free of emotion, so I'm hoping that this feeling will fade fast.  I'm willing to bet I'm not the only one who had this reaction, however.  I'm therefoe betting that beyond providing fodder for Maureen Dowd during the dog days of August, this little rescue mission is going to complicate nuclear diplomacy with North Korea for a spell. 

Well, Glenn Kessler's rundown on what's happeing in Phuket is rich with blog-worthy goodness: 

The war of words between North Korea and the United States escalated Thursday, with North Korea's Foreign Ministry lashing out at Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in unusually personal terms for "vulgar remarks" that it said demonstrated "she is by no means intelligent."

Clinton, who earlier this week likened North Korea to an unruly child, has rallied international isolation of North Korea at a 27-member regional security forum here. She met with her Russian, Chinese, South Korean and Japanese counterparts -- the other key partners in suspended six-nation disarmament talks--and won strong statements of support from many delegations....

The Foreign Ministry statement attacking Clinton also amply demonstrated the North Korean mood. "We cannot but regard Mrs. Clinton as a funny lady as she likes to utter such rhetoric, unaware of the elementary etiquette in the international community," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said, according to North Korean media. "Sometimes she looks like a primary schoolgirl and sometimes a pensioner going shopping."

The fit of pique was apparently inspired by an interview Clinton gave ABC News while visiting New Delhi.

"What we've seen is this constant demand for attention [from North Korea]," Clinton said. "And maybe it's the mother in me or the experience that I've had with small children and unruly teenagers and people who are demanding attention -- don't give it to them, they don't deserve it, they are acting out."  (emphases added)

Some random thoughts:

1.  If I'm Chelsea Clinton, I'd be pretty cheesed off right now.  I never thought of her as particularly "unruly," but what other teenagers has Hillary spent time with?  [Cough, cough!!--ed.  Oh... right.]

2.  You have to give the North Koreans major chutzpah points for accusing other countries of being "unaware of the elementary etiquette in the international community."  [UPDATE:  As Rob Farley puts it, "the Nork rhetoric vaguely reminds me of Daily Kos threads from the early days of the 2008 Democratic primary."] 

3.  It's worth pointing out that we're now in a place where the Bush administration look positively dovish on North Korea compared to the Obama administration.  Here's another way of looking at it:  Both Dick Cheney and John Bolton are more comfortable with the Obama administration's Nort Korea policy than Bush administration's.  Think about that for a second. 

4.  A related point -- remember how the Bush administration got pilloried for refusing to talk with Iran, arguing that doing so would confer a reward on the regime?  Kessler quotes Clinton as saying, with regard to the Six-Party Talks:  "We are open to talks with North Korea. But we are not interested in half measures.  We do not intend to reward the North just for returning to the table."   Now there is a difference between this position and that of the Bush administration vis-à-vis Iran -- but it's not nearly as big a difference as Obama defenders are likely to claim. 

5.  What's the end game in all of this?  I think maybe, just maybe, the international community has found a status quo that makes the North Koreans less comfortable than everyone else.  Assuming that the interdiction and sanctions regime works well -- which is a robust but not entirely unreasonable assumption -- then North Korea gets nothing for thumbing its nose at the world except some more weapons-grade fissile material. 

That's not nothing, but it's not all that much either.  Pyongyang already has a deterrent to prevent invasion.  It can't threaten nuclear blackmail all that persuasively, because it's a pretty hollow threat on their part.  And if they can't sell their technology to other countries, then there's no profit in it for them either.  Which means they're stuck, wallowing in their own barren dirt, feeling very, very lonely. 

Am I missing anything? 

A few days ago Gideon Rachman had a sharp column in the Financial Times about the limits to Barack Obama's "soft power" approach: 

Mr Bush had a shoe thrown at him in his last appearance in the Middle East. So if Mr Obama receives his customary standing ovation in Cairo, that will send a powerful symbolic message. But the president should not let the applause go to his head. Even if his speech is a success, the same foreign-policy problems will be sitting in his in-tray when he gets back to the Oval Office – and they will be just as dangerous as before....

The president’s charisma and rhetorical skill are real diplomatic assets. If Mr Obama can deploy them to improve America’s image and influence around the world, that is all to the good. There is nothing wrong with trying to re-build American “soft power”.

The danger is more subtle. It is that President Yes-we-can has raised exaggerated hopes about the pay-off from engagement and diplomacy. In the coming months it will become increasingly obvious that soft power also has its limits.

I don't disagree with much of what Rachman says here, but there's a sin of omission that is worth pointing out.  One of the advantages of Barack Obama's popularity is pretty plain -- he gets to say things that, in another man's voice, would sound unbelievably arrogant. 

For exhibit A, let's stroll over to Tom Friedman's column today, which Friedman petty much outsources to Obama himself: 

“We have a joke around the White House,” the president said. “We’re just going to keep on telling the truth until it stops working — and nowhere is truth-telling more important than the Middle East.”

A key part of his message, he said, will be: “Stop saying one thing behind closed doors and saying something else publicly.” He then explained: “There are a lot of Arab countries more concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon than the ‘threat’ from Israel, but won’t admit it.” There are a lot of Israelis, “who recognize that their current path is unsustainable, and they need to make some tough choices on settlements to achieve a two-state solution — that is in their long-term interest — but not enough folks are willing to recognize that publicly.”

There are a lot of Palestinians who “recognize that the constant incitement and negative rhetoric with respect to Israel” has not delivered a single “benefit to their people and had they taken a more constructive approach and sought the moral high ground” they would be much better off today — but they won’t say it aloud.

“There are a lot of Arab states that have not been particularly helpful to the Palestinian cause beyond a bunch of demagoguery,” and when it comes to “ponying up” money to actually help the Palestinian people, they are “not forthcoming.”

When it comes to dealing with the Middle East, the president noted, “there is a Kabuki dance going on constantly. That is what I would like to see broken down. I am going to be holding up a mirror and saying: ‘Here is the situation, and the U.S. is prepared to work with all of you to deal with these problems. But we can’t impose a solution. You are all going to have to make some tough decisions.’ Leaders have to lead, and, hopefully, they will get supported by their people.”

Now, imagine that George W. Bush had said the exact same things to Friedman a year ago (not that much of a stretch, actually).  He would have been crucified for delivering such a high-handed, arrogant, imperious lecture.  Obama, apparently, can get away with it -- if he could, I bet Obama's advance team would have a workplace-safety sign behind him at the upcoming Cairo speech saying, "This is the 134th day that the Obama administration has not invaded an Arab country.  Keep it up!" 

Obama was surprisingly blunt with Friedman about why he can get away with it: 

"What I do believe is that if we are engaged in speaking directly to the Arab street, and they are persuaded that we are operating in a straightforward manner, then, at the margins, both they and their leadership are more inclined and able to work with us.”

Similarly, the president said that if he is asking German or French leaders to help more in Afghanistan or Pakistan, “it doesn’t hurt if I have credibility with the German and French people. They will still be constrained with budgets and internal politics, but it makes it easier.”

Part of America’s “battle against terrorist extremists involves changing the hearts and minds of the people they recruit from,” he added. “And if there are a bunch of 22- and 25-year-old men and women in Cairo or in Lahore who listen to a speech by me or other Americans and say: ‘I don’t agree with everything they are saying, but they seem to know who I am or they seem to want to promote economic development or tolerance or inclusiveness,’ then they are maybe a little less likely to be tempted by a terrorist recruiter.”

One last thought -- I don't disagree all that much with Obama's diagnosis of the region, but it does suggest an important political problem.  Most Middle Eastern states have very little incentive to work towards a two-state solution.  Within many Arab countries, domestic resentment can be channeled into anger at the Israelis and symbolic support for the Palestinians.  Why would governments in the region want to turn off that very useful spigot? 

By Daniel W. Drezner

I think the Obama administration has come up with a novel way of dealing with the North Koreans -- get everyone to talk about something else. 

Half-seriously, this is not a bad idea, because I'm not sure that anything else is going to work better (beyond my modest Britney Spears proposal).  For this decade, the following facts have held: 

1. North Korea wants to be able to trade its nuclear program for security guarantees and cash -- and then be able to do it again a few years later.
2. The leadership in Pyongyang is perfectly willing to starve its own population rather than concede a smidgen of autonomy.
3. No one is entirely sure about the internal politics of the DPRK elite.  This includes China, by the way. 
4. None of the actors in the region want North Korea to collapse.  China and Russia likes the buffer, Seoul doesn't want to pony up the cash for reunification, and Japan (and China) doesn't want a unified Korean peninsula. 
5. None of the actors in the region really want North Korea to proliferate either, but that's less important than a collapsing North Korea.  Proliferation is Somebody Else's Problem -- i.e., the Middle East rather than Northeast Asia. 
6. So, oddly enough, the ideal short-term solution for the region is for the continued existence of the DPRK regime, the absence of any new nuclear activity, and some kid of "strategic ambiguity" regarding North Korea's nuclear status. 
7. The alternatives to the repeated short-term carrot strategy are even less appealing.  There is no viable military option unless everyone is comfortable with the destruction of Seoul; there is no viable sanctions option unless China decides to cut off the energy tap, and they'll only do this if they're sure it won't lead to a stream of North Korea refugees entering Manchuria. 

The one thing that seems different this time around is that North Korea is really pulling out the stops this time to strip away the "pleasing illusion" that the U.N. Security Council will do something.  Paradoxically, this might actually goad China and Russia into doing something -- sanctions that might increase the likelihood of a DPRK collapse but also increase the likelihood of Pyongyang altering its behavior before that happens. 

If I, rather than my boss, were advising the Obama administration on this issue, the one other deliverable I would aim for in response to this latest provocation would be to get China to join the Proliferation Security Initiative.  China has resisted this for a whole bunch of reasons unrelated to North Korea.  If Beijing were to reverse course, it would make it much easier to engage in interdiction activities along North Korea's coast.  It would also signal to Pyongyang that, yes, there actually are some serious costs to thumbing one's nose at the U.N. Security Council.   

Am I missing anything?   

The Wall Street Journal's Jay Solomon, Evan Ramsted, and Peter Spiegel provide a nicely detailed rundown on what U.S. officials think is happening in North Korea.  Essentially, U.S. policymakers in the know believe that the arrangements for a power succession from Kim Jong Il to his relatives are causing Pyongyang to act even weirder than usual. 

The story contains that classic combination of Kremlinology and bizarre personal detail that make the DPRK regime so entertaining for anyone not living within the range of the Taepodong-2 missile.  For example:

U.S. officials said they increasingly view [Kim Jong Il's third son] Kim Jong Un as an important player in North Korea's power equation. The 26-year-old has emerged as a stronger contender than either of his brothers. Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Il's eldest son, was widely discredited in 2001 when he was detained in Japan for traveling on a forged Dominican Republic passport in a bid to visit Tokyo Disneyland. The middle son, Kim Young Chol, has been described as frail and unlikely to possess the stature to lead.

Kim Jong Il seems to view Kim Jong Un as the most like him in views and values, said the senior U.S. defense official. The younger son's mother, Ko Yong Hee, who died in a 2004 car crash, is also believed to be Kim Jong Il's favorite of his three wives.

Kim Jong Un fascinates North Korea analysts as he studied at an international school in Bern, Switzerland and is reported to be a fan of Western pop stars. (emphasis added)

I see the makings of a deal here -- instead of security guarantees and light-water nuclear reactors, what if the U.S. instead offered to build a Pyongyang Disneyworld complex?  With special VIP-only lines for relatives of Kim?  [Who could afford the regular lines?--ed.  Oh, they'd still want the velvet ropes.] 

Furthermore, in this blog's ongoing efforts to find social utility from washed-up pop stars, shouldn't the U.S. also offer a lifetime contract for Miss Britney Spears to host the resort?  Now, I know what you're thinking -- Drezner is behind on his Entertainment Weekly reading hasn't pop culture moved past Britney? Well, I figure that it takes a few years for these trends to trickle into the DPRK.  See, it's win-win!!

Somewhat more seriously, I have to wonder about the utility of this kind of Kremlinological analysis.  I've been... unimpressed with the kind of research that tries to predict future policy prefereces based on past biography.  These kind of analyses often do a good job of explaining things after the fact -- but I don't remember anyone using this kind of work to correctly predict a Gorbachev or a Deng.  For the DPRK, the family dynamics make it even harder to discern, of course. 

Dean Stephen Bosworth sent out the following e-mail to the Fletcher School community less than an hour ago:

In the past few weeks, you have most likely seen news reports of my possible appointment as Special Representative for North Korea Policy.  I have wanted to keep you informed but naturally could not comment until Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had made a formal announcement.  Now that she has done so, I can confirm that I have accepted her offer.

This honor comes at a truly critical time as the Obama Administration begins to develop its strategy for engaging with North Korea.  I will serve as the U.S. representative to the six-party talks, which seek to find a peaceful resolution to security issues on the Korean Peninsula.
 
I want to assure you that, with the full support of our President Lawrence S. Bacow, our Chairman of the Board of Overseers Peter Ackerman, and Fletcher’s senior leadership team, I will continue to serve as Dean and will work to ensure Fletcher remains the world standard for graduate institutions of international affairs.  My commitment to The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy is undiminished.

Here's the Korea Times coverage on the announcement. 

The hard-working staff here at Danieldrezner.com wishes Dean Bosworth the best of luck in getting Pyongyang to agree to, er, anything.  As I said last week, "trying to manage faculty meetings at the Fletcher school is excellent prep work for negotiating with the obsteperous officials of the DPRK."