A few days ago Gideon Rachman had a sharp column in the Financial Times about the limits to Barack Obama's "soft power" approach: 

Mr Bush had a shoe thrown at him in his last appearance in the Middle East. So if Mr Obama receives his customary standing ovation in Cairo, that will send a powerful symbolic message. But the president should not let the applause go to his head. Even if his speech is a success, the same foreign-policy problems will be sitting in his in-tray when he gets back to the Oval Office – and they will be just as dangerous as before....

The president’s charisma and rhetorical skill are real diplomatic assets. If Mr Obama can deploy them to improve America’s image and influence around the world, that is all to the good. There is nothing wrong with trying to re-build American “soft power”.

The danger is more subtle. It is that President Yes-we-can has raised exaggerated hopes about the pay-off from engagement and diplomacy. In the coming months it will become increasingly obvious that soft power also has its limits.

I don't disagree with much of what Rachman says here, but there's a sin of omission that is worth pointing out.  One of the advantages of Barack Obama's popularity is pretty plain -- he gets to say things that, in another man's voice, would sound unbelievably arrogant. 

For exhibit A, let's stroll over to Tom Friedman's column today, which Friedman petty much outsources to Obama himself: 

“We have a joke around the White House,” the president said. “We’re just going to keep on telling the truth until it stops working — and nowhere is truth-telling more important than the Middle East.”

A key part of his message, he said, will be: “Stop saying one thing behind closed doors and saying something else publicly.” He then explained: “There are a lot of Arab countries more concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon than the ‘threat’ from Israel, but won’t admit it.” There are a lot of Israelis, “who recognize that their current path is unsustainable, and they need to make some tough choices on settlements to achieve a two-state solution — that is in their long-term interest — but not enough folks are willing to recognize that publicly.”

There are a lot of Palestinians who “recognize that the constant incitement and negative rhetoric with respect to Israel” has not delivered a single “benefit to their people and had they taken a more constructive approach and sought the moral high ground” they would be much better off today — but they won’t say it aloud.

“There are a lot of Arab states that have not been particularly helpful to the Palestinian cause beyond a bunch of demagoguery,” and when it comes to “ponying up” money to actually help the Palestinian people, they are “not forthcoming.”

When it comes to dealing with the Middle East, the president noted, “there is a Kabuki dance going on constantly. That is what I would like to see broken down. I am going to be holding up a mirror and saying: ‘Here is the situation, and the U.S. is prepared to work with all of you to deal with these problems. But we can’t impose a solution. You are all going to have to make some tough decisions.’ Leaders have to lead, and, hopefully, they will get supported by their people.”

Now, imagine that George W. Bush had said the exact same things to Friedman a year ago (not that much of a stretch, actually).  He would have been crucified for delivering such a high-handed, arrogant, imperious lecture.  Obama, apparently, can get away with it -- if he could, I bet Obama's advance team would have a workplace-safety sign behind him at the upcoming Cairo speech saying, "This is the 134th day that the Obama administration has not invaded an Arab country.  Keep it up!" 

Obama was surprisingly blunt with Friedman about why he can get away with it: 

"What I do believe is that if we are engaged in speaking directly to the Arab street, and they are persuaded that we are operating in a straightforward manner, then, at the margins, both they and their leadership are more inclined and able to work with us.”

Similarly, the president said that if he is asking German or French leaders to help more in Afghanistan or Pakistan, “it doesn’t hurt if I have credibility with the German and French people. They will still be constrained with budgets and internal politics, but it makes it easier.”

Part of America’s “battle against terrorist extremists involves changing the hearts and minds of the people they recruit from,” he added. “And if there are a bunch of 22- and 25-year-old men and women in Cairo or in Lahore who listen to a speech by me or other Americans and say: ‘I don’t agree with everything they are saying, but they seem to know who I am or they seem to want to promote economic development or tolerance or inclusiveness,’ then they are maybe a little less likely to be tempted by a terrorist recruiter.”

One last thought -- I don't disagree all that much with Obama's diagnosis of the region, but it does suggest an important political problem.  Most Middle Eastern states have very little incentive to work towards a two-state solution.  Within many Arab countries, domestic resentment can be channeled into anger at the Israelis and symbolic support for the Palestinians.  Why would governments in the region want to turn off that very useful spigot? 

I've been playing catch-up this evening by reading Obama's speech on homeland security and then Cheney's speech on homeland security in succession.  Some quick thoughts: 

• My hypocrisy detector went off with both speeches.  For all of Obama's eloquence, there's simply no way to square his position on releasing torture photos with the other aspects of his speech.  Cheney, on the other hand, kept blasting Democratics for using "euphemisms" -- and yet, when describing what happened to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Cheney fell back on "enhanced interrogations." 
• I agree with Christian Brose that it's odd to read these two speeches in light of Jack Goldsmith's TNR essay comparing the Obama and Bush approaches.  Well, actually, it was mostly odd to read Cheney's speech.  The guts of Obama's critique of the prior administration's approach to these issues was nearly identical to Goldsmith's -- a failure to construct a proper legal edifice, a failure to respect checks and balances, etc.  Given that Jack is a rock-ribbed conservative, this is a point for Obama.  I'm pretty sure, however, that Goldsmith agrees with Cheney on the negative effects of the NYT revealing the Terrorist Surveillance Program. 
• I also agree with Joshua Keating that Obama's speech by and large anticipated many of Cheney's arguments.  Obama's rebuttal on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United States was particularly effective.
• Politically, Obama has inherited George W. Bush's greatest political gift -- having adversaries more boneheaded than himself.  While Will Inboden, Philip Zelikow, and Peter Feaver all had some good responses to my lament last week about the state of the GOP on foreign policy and national security, Dick "18% approval rating" Cheney has now cemented his grip on being the party spokesman on this issue in the eyes of the media and the American public.  That's great for Obama and not so good for the GOP.  Beyond the 18% who like Cheney, does anyone think that his speech will persuade others to change their minds? 

What did you think?

Clive Crook wants to know what the Obama Doctrine will be in foreign policy: 

In domestic policy, an organising principle directs the innovation. Mr Obama wants to shove the US in the direction of a more social democratic – Americans say “progressive” – social contract, with universal healthcare and a tax and benefits system much more attuned to reducing inequality. Whether this is wise, feasible or what the country even wants is questionable, but the connecting theme is clear.

Is any such theme emerging in foreign policy? Can one begin to talk of an “Obama doctrine”?

(Let's skip the question of whether Crook's answer on the domestic front is correct {click here for an interesting take on that question}). 

Foreign policy doctrines often emerge after the fact -- i.e., someone looks at foreign policy decisions/actions and suggess a pattern or philosophy that tie everything together in one neat cognitive package. 

Looking at what Obama has done to date, I'd suggest that his foreign policy doctrine comes by way of Montesquieu -- crudely put, useless conflicts weaken necessary conflicts. 

To elaborate:  the United States suffers from an overextension of its foreign policy obligations.  With a weakened economy and a drop in U.S. standing, it is both costly and fruitless for the administration to continue policy conflicts that yield little beyond pleasing those invested in the policy status quo.

It looks like Obama and his foreign policy team have prioritized what issues they think are important -- righting the global economic ship, China, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, nuclear nonproliferation come to mind.  Those are the issues where the United States will stick to its preferred policy positions and be willing to accept no deal rather than a bad deal. 

One other issues -- Cuba, Venezuela, Iraq, trade policy, human rights, democratization, missile defense -- Obama's team sees little to be gained from continuing past policies that have borne little fruit.  Furthermore, by adjusting U.S. policy on these issues, the administration conserves resources, goodwill and focus for the first list of issues. 

Question to readers:  does this seem like an appropriate description?  If it is, do you agree with it?  Or is it just too soon to tell? 

So Timothy Geithner unveiled the Obama administration's bank plan today.

Brad DeLong likes it.

Paul Krugman hates it.

The markets loved it, but, if you think about it, part of the reason there's been a financial meltdown is that the markets has the ability to misprice a lot of stuff, so let's discount this data point juuust a wee bit. 

Who's right? 

I'm not sure, and I'm really jet-lagged.  However, this is important, here's my quick and dirty and partially-informed take:  

Krugman's position is the statement that Geithner's plan is just a warmed-over version of Paulson's initial TARP plan to buy toxic assets.  I don't disagree with that assessment.  By implication, however, Krugman thinks that since so may economists thought this idea was bad back in September, it is therefore bad now. 

If memory serves, however, the reason for this economic consensus at the time was the idea that it would take too long for this buyback program to work.  With credit markets near frozen, the idea of injecting the banks with capital was thought to be a better and quicker idea.

Fast forward six months.  While the bottom has fallen out of a lot of markets, the credit crunch has eased.  There is now time to execute some version of the original TARP idea.  Furthermore, the people doing the implementing have more political legitimacy than the lame-duck Bush administration. 

In other words, I think this plan has a much better chance of succeeding than the original TARP plan.  But I'm nowhere near sure of this. 

Comments on the intrinsic merits of the plan are very much appreciated. 

When Paul Krugman and Megan McArdle agree on Obama/Geithner's lackluster reaction to the economy, that's usually a good sign to go long on duct tape and shotguns.  And this Brad DeLong post doesn't make me feel much better -- because I think he has the political economy just about right. 

Still, I'm going to wait a month before allowing my freaking out flag to fly.  Why?  Because in the time that Barack Obama has been forced to react in real time, I've noticed two tendencies:

1. He tends to take his own sweet time in making decisions;
2. Those decisions have usually worked for him.

So maybe a month from now Treasury will actually have some appointments besides Geithner, and markets will be more certain about what Obama is planning to do.  If these things don't happen, however, I have every confidence in my commenters saying, "I told you so." 

UPDATE:  OK, now we're seeing some movement!  This Reuters story lists three incoming nominees at the assistant secretary level.  It also explains the dithering at the more senior levels: 

On Thursday, sources said former Securities and Exchange Commissioner Annette Nazareth withdrew from consideration to become a deputy Treasury secretary for personal reasons and that she would remain in her private securities law practice.

In addition, Geithner's choice for international affairs undersecretary, Caroline Atkinson, also pulled her name from consideration. Atkinson, a senior official at the International Monetary Fund, has decided to remain at the institution, a person familiar with the decision said.

Both Nazareth and Atkinson had been vetted for the jobs but had not been formally nominated.

Lee Sachs, also currently a counselor to Geithner, is widely considered a top contender for undersecretary for domestic finance, but also has not been formally nominated.

One wonders if the reasons for the withdrawal have to do with the people involved or the rigors of the vetting. 

Ever since Barack Obama was elected, I've received myriad queries about whether I'm going into the administration.  And, for a variety of reasons, my answer has always been, "no, not interested." 

After reading Ryan Lizza's profile of Rahm Emanuel in The New Yorker, however, I must confess that there is one job that I would do for free: 

I noticed that over [Emanuel's] left shoulder, on the credenza behind him, was an official-looking name plate, which he said was a birthday present from his two brothers. It read “Undersecretary for Go F**k Yourself.”

Now that's my kind of job.  It's a bit senior for me, though.  If asked to serve, I would consider the stepping stone to that position -- Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eat S**t and Die. 

As the book club on Tom Ricks' The Gamble comes to a close, Barack Obama announced his future plans for Iraq. 

What's fascinating is the effect of the surge on the political reaction to Obama's proposal to scale down the U.S. presence to 55,000 troops by August 2010.  It has received bipartisan support in the United States.  Iraqi officials have by and large endorsed it (though see here and scroll down).  Obama has even earned the always-crucial Foreign Policy blogger vote. 

Think about this for a second.  If I had told you two years ago that there would be a broad domestic and international consensus on U.S. strategy in Iraq, you would have laughed me off the Foreign Policy web site. 

Ricks argues that the surge has not led to political achievements in Iraq, and he may very well be right.  What it has accomplished, however, is changing the political optics in three crucial ways.  First, it has given Republicans cover for supporting a withdrawal, arguing that it is being done from a position of strength rather than weakness. Second, it has blunted the Democrats' zeal for immediate withdrawal.  So long as things in Iraq are going relatively well, the political pressure to DO SOMETHING NOW! has abated.  Finally, the surge has given the Iraqi government the confidence to believe that a significant U.S. drawdown will not lead them back to the abyss. 

I don't know whether the withdrawal will actually prove to be good policy -- but the fact that we've reached a political consensus that it is good policy is nothing short of astounding. 

I had only one thought as I drifted in and out of sleep while listening to President Obama's non-State of the Union -- he really is the second coming of Ronald Reagan.  I mean that in both good and bad ways.

Obama, like Reagan, has figured out how to drive the opposition party completely nuts without compromising his ability to govern.  Like Reagan, Obama is able to communicate effectively directly with the American people.  I suspect his "going public" strategy will net him significant legislative accomplishments. 

However, Reagan was elected on a platform of massive tax cuts, massive increases in defense spending, and balancing the federal budget.  Older readers of danieldrezner.com might recall that he was never able to reconcile all of these aims, and as a result the budget deficit ballooned. 

After listening to Obama's speech, I find it utterly implausible that the United States can fund energy alternatives, impose a "market-based cap" on carbon emissions, engage in comprehensive health care reform, and institute massive education subsidies, while also halving the federal budget deficit in four years. 

Seriously, am I missing something?  How does that circle get squared? 

In the Boston Globe, Bryan Bender explains that longtime foes of the United States are facing a public relations problem: 

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has an Obama problem. So does the leadership of Al Qaeda. Obama also presents a challenge to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and other leaders who have utilized anti-American feeling to strengthen their grips on power.

The new American president, who has tried to strike a more conciliatory tone toward some of America's most intractable adversaries, may be making inroads into reducing anti-American feeling in some distant corners of the globe: Entire bookshelves from Egypt to the Persian Gulf are dedicated to Obama; a popular Arab pop star is recording a "Song to Obama"; and public spaces that just months ago were dedicated to anti-American posters are festooned with the smiling American leader.

In response, some of the most anti-American governments, along with the leaders of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Hamas, are testing out their own strategy for dealing with Obama: asserting that he's no different from George W. Bush and insisting that US policies won't change.

In trying this approach, these actors are essentially adopting a neorealist explanation for state behavior -- i.e., the disposition of a foreign policy leader is irrelevant, because states will act based on their position in the international system. 

My hunch is that this strategy will not work in the short run, as Obama has pivoted U.S. policy on some important issues (Gitmo, Iran, missile defense, etc.) Not surprisingly, Iran has already begun to deviate from its rabid anti-Obama posture. Yesterday, Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would consider a dialogue with the United States. His foreign minister told Reuters today that, "We look positively on the slogan that Obama raised in the elections. The world has really changed."

Over time, this kind of rhetorical response might work, however. It depends on what Obama does rather than who he is.

Developing....

Your humble blogger will be posting on an odd and infrequent schedule over the next few days, as my day job calls me to a conference on the WTO. 

On the way here, I read two days worth of Financial Times stories and op-eds excoriating the "Buy American" provisions contained in the House and Senate stimulus packages. [But John B. Judis says that those provisions are harmless to world trade, and they will create jobs!!--ed. No. Wrong on both counts.]

I worried that something like this was going to happen back in December, but now that it's actually happening, I'm cautiously optimistic. The extent of the global blowback, combined with the recognition that an economic recovery will require some serious policy coordination, might just be the slap of cold water to Barack Obama's belief that trade was going to be a tertiary issue during his administration. And, encouragingly, Obama has started to signal that he'll take care of it.

Maybe this is me still being an optimist, but I have to hope that this is precisely the scare that both the administration and Congress needed to realize that they can't just stuff protectionist pork into the stimulus sausage without consequence.

Readers -- am I being too optimistic?

Over at Democracy Arsenal, former speechwriter Heather Hurlburt offers her reading of the foreign policy tea leaves in Obama's inaugural address.  It's worth checking out. 

My take away point (which matches Kevin Drum's) is the contrast between Obama's approach to states that disagree with American foreign policy rogue states and to terrorist groups. Here's what he said about the latter: 

[F]or those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken -- you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you. 

As both Heather and noted foreign policy wonk Jon Stewart point out, that part sounds familiar. 

As to the former, the message was somewhat different:

To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. 

To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist. 

Now, this is a different tone.  With terrorists, Obama shows no signs of compromise.  With states, however, the tone of the speech shifts to one of sadness couched with an offer of reconciliation.  It is decidedly not confrontational, nor does it suggest any kind of aggressive American action. 

Whether these governments will accept such a tentative olive branch -- or at least agree to let bygones be bygones -- remains an open question.  Though I have no doubt my commenters can provide provisional answers. 

Noam Scheiber has a long story in The New Republic that argues the contrast between Bill Clinton and Barack Obama's leadership styles can be explain by the differences between Harvard law school (Obama's alma mater) and Yale law School (Clinton's alma mater):  "The two schools stand on opposite sides of a cultural chasm in the academic world. Even more than that, they stand for different theories of governing."

I always love Scheiber's long-form stuff (full disclosure:  Scheiber was my editor when I wrote for TNR online), but this seems like an explanation too far for me.  One could reverse the question and ask whether Harvard Business School explains George W. Bush (my guess is no).  As PrawfsBlawg puts it, "this is decidely one of those cases where the plural of anecdote is not data, and the whole piece comes off as weakly supported." 

There's something else about this essay that gnaws at me, however -- why is graduate school now the formative experience for presidents?  I bet more people know that Clinton went to Yale law school than Georgetown as an undergrad.  That holds double for Obama's matriculation at Harvard law school, which overlooks his time at either Occidental or Columbia. 

Speaking for myself, I undoubtedly learned a lot at my graduate school.  If pressed, however, I suspect that my truly formative years were spent at this place.  I also suspect that this is true of more professionals than not. 

I put it to (well educated) readers, however -- what matters more in your biography, your undergraduate years or your graduate years? 

As the new foreign policy leader, Barack Obama will inherit a wonderful political gift - one that will hopefully counteract a first-year liability that will inevitably surprise him. 

Obama's inheritance is the Bad Boyfriend Benefit.  Personal experience, combined with the consumption of way too many Sex and the City episodes, has taught me that one of the easiest gigs in the world is to be the next boyfriend after a bad one.  Because the contrast is so sharp, the legacy of a bad boyfriend is that if the new one is simply adecent human being, they can still have the overwhelming support of friends and family. 

To put this in more concrete terms - the contrast between Bush and Obama is so sharp that he will automatically benefit by the comparison.  Even when president Obama continues the policies of his predecessor, the initial focus will be on the changes rather than the continuities.  This will buy the Obama administration some much-needed goodwill in its first year of office. 

The new president will need that goodwill, because it's a virtual certainty that the administration's first year will not be covered in foreign policy glory.  In George W. Bush's first year, the United States needlessly infuriated its allies through peremptory unilateral withdrawals from multilateral treaties.  In Bill Clinton's first year, the United States badly damaged its bilateral relationship with Japan and committed numerous blunders in Somalia. In George H.W. Bush's first six months, the new administration dithered over how to respond to Mikhail Gorbachev. 

New administrations do this, because top policymakers usually believe that their prior policymaking experience will serve them well in their new job.  Except that things change.  New technologies require ever faster responses.  New issues force their way onto the policy agenda.  New bureaucracies have to be managed.  And so on. 

Even if they live up to their hype, the new administration is gonna screw up.  What might save them is that they will not screw up in the same way as their predecessors. 

Questions to readers:  on which policy dimension will the Obama administration show the greatest improvement compared to Bush?  And on which dimension will they screw up? 

So I took Tom Ricks' advice and read through the transcript of Fareed Zakaria's Global Public Square interview with Barack Obama from this past summer. 

Obama acquits himself well during the whole interview, but this part about Israel and Palestine stood out for me: 

Israel has an interest not just in bunkering down. They've got to recognize that their long-term viability as a Jewish state is going to depend on their ability to create peace with their neighbors.

The Palestinian leadership has to acknowledge that the battles that they've been fighting, and the direction that they've been going in and the rhetoric they've been employing, has not delivered for their people. And it is very hard, given the history of that region and the sense of grievance on both sides, to step back and say, let's be practical and figure out what works.

But I think that's what the people of Israel and the people in the West Bank and Gaza are desperate for, is just some practical, commonsense approaches that would result in them feeling safe, secure and able to live their lives and educate their children.

I'm in complete agreement that this is what the parties in the region should do.  It's become increasingly clear, however, that none of the salient actors in the region possess anything like the willingness to acknowledge these facts of life. 

As Jonathan Chait, Todd Gitlin and Michael Cohen observe, Hamas really is dedicated to the destruction of Israel.  And Israel has long been unwilling to moderate its behavior on housing settlements in the ocupied territories. 

My point here is that while Obama's rough outline of a solution makes perfect sense to me, I have no idea how we get from point A (the current moment) to point B (a moment when the relevant actors in Israel and Palestine agree with Obama).