Monday, January 24, 2011 - 2:09 PM
Your humble blogger likes to occasionally check the interwebs to make sure that no one is abusing Thucydides in making an argument about modern-day international relations. In descending order of offensiveness, examples of Thucydides Abuse include:
1) Blatantly making up what Thucydides actually said in History of the Peloponnesian War;
2) Exaggerating how Thucydides can contribute to understanding world politics today;
3) Writing the truth, but not the whole truth, about Thucydides' history.
Yesterday David Sanger invoked Thucydides in his New York Times Week in Review essay on a rising China and a fading United States. Let's see how he did:
For a superpower, dealing with the fast rise of a rich, brash competitor has always been an iffy thing....
[A]sk Thucydides, the Athenian historian whose tome on the Peloponnesian War has ruined many a college freshman's weekend. The line they had to remember for the test was his conclusion: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."
So while no official would dare say so publicly as President Hu Jintao bounced from the White House to meetings with business leaders to factories in Chicago last week, his visit, from both sides' points of view, was all about managing China's rise and defusing the fears that it triggers. Both Mr. Hu and President Obama seemed desperate to avoid what Graham Allison of Harvard University has labeled "the Thucydides Trap" - that deadly combination of calculation and emotion that, over the years, can turn healthy rivalry into antagonism or worse....
[I]n both capitals, fear makes for good business: It's a proven way to sell weapons systems.
Meanwhile, Thucydides might be appalled at the nationalistic talk that resounds in both countries. In Chinese newspapers these days, it's hard to avoid accounts of "American decline." Meanwhile, some new members of Congress talk lightly of cutting off Chinese access to the American market - as if that could happen in today's global economy.
In both languages, that's fear talking.
You know what? Given the space constraints, Sanger does pretty well. He manages to nail the subtle point about how fear leads to the worst sort of policy decisions. It is telling that, as the war progresses, Athenian decision-making devolves. Initially, the country's leaders understand that "fear, honor and interest" guide foreign policy. By the time the invasion of Sicily comes around, however, the Athenian leadership has reduced this to fear. Sanger actually quotes Thucydides rather than paraphrasing him. By modern journalistic standards, that's pretty extraordinary.
Nonetheless, Sanger commits the misdemeanor of omitting the whole truth of Thucydides. This is important, because the omission gets at how the historical analogy doesn't really hold up.
First, Sparta was never the hegemonic power prior to the war -- at best, they were a co-equal of Athens. That's not the current situation.
Second, Sparta was scolded by its allies -- and implicitly, by Thucydides himself -- for excessive caution when confronted with a rising power. Throughout the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides contrasts Athenian energy and dynamism with Spartan conservatism and risk-aversion. Spartan fear was triggered by past Spartan inaction and caution.
Now, say what you will about American foreign policy, but conservatism and risk-aversion have not been nouns associated with it for quite some time. Similarly, until about mid-2009, China was not thought of as a source of foreign policy dynamism. Furthermore, when China's foreign policy changed, so did the United States'. Comparing the Obama administration's response to Spartan inaction doesn't hold up.
In the sparest structural sense, there are a few parallels that can be drawn between Greece in the fifth century B.C.E. and the present day. On the whole, however, I think the Athens-Sparta historical analogy obfuscates more than it enlightens.
Readers are warmly encouraged to alert the hard-working staff here at the blog for any further abuses of Thucydides. I mean, you know this is going to crop up on the next Jersey Shore episode.
Monday, February 8, 2010 - 3:37 AM

Your humble blogger watched the Super Bowl and found it both surprising and entertaining. I'd read so many paeans to Peyton Manning over the past week that I'd come to believe that the game itself was just a formality. Oops.
The ads, however, have made me fear for America. The Super Bowl is the place to launch memorable campaigns. For most of my adult life, I can remember laughing pretty hard at a couple of the ads at the very least.
This year? Dear God, they were abysmal. It's telling that the funniest one was the Snickers spot featuring Betty White and Abe Vigoda. And the Coke ad featuring The Simpsons was kind of intriguing, with a very anti-populist message.
Other than that, the ads showed as much snappiness as The Who's halftime show -- which is to say, none at all. There were back-to-back ads where the joke was not wearing pants. My son described the Intel ad as "kind of creepy." The Audi Green ad was so over-the-top about eco-protection that for 90 percent of the ad I thought it was trying to covince Americans to block any measures to halt global warming. This Bridgestone ad was downright offensive. And, as near as I can figure, all of the Bud Light ads were designed by people forced to imbibe at least a keg of their product.
Screw the National Export Initiative -- the Obama administration should set minimal quality standards for Super Bowl ads.
TIMOTHY A. CLARY
Tuesday, November 24, 2009 - 2:36 PM
Anne Applebaum points out an interesting conundrum for U.S. foreign policy:
[W]e are left with a curious situation: America no longer wants to be the sole superpower. The American president no longer wants to be the leader of a sole superpower. Nobody else wants America to be the sole superpower, and, in fact, America cannot even afford to be the sole superpower. Yet America has no obvious partner with which to share its superpowerdom, and if America were to cease being a superpower, nothing and no one would take its place.
This might not be the end of the world—there are quite a few trouble spots that could do with a long period of benign neglect—and it might not last forever. Europe, when counted as a single entity, is still the world's largest economy. China, whatever else it might be, is still the world's fastest-growing economy. Sooner or later, the simple need to defend their economic interests might persuade one or both to start taking the outside world more seriously.
This does mean that the Obama administration has a problem, however: Having come to office promising to work with allies, it may soon discover that there are no allies with which to work.
One could argue that this is the downside of path dependence. The United States enjoys many perquisites of power because the U.S. has been the hegemonic power for so long that everyone else expects the U.S. to continue as the lone superpower.
The plus side of this convergence in expectations is that U.S. leadership of the international system is by and large accepted. Of course, leaders are useless without followers, so this is more about the appearance of power than power itself.
The down side of this arrangement is that the United States gets blamed when global public goods are not provided -- even if the United States is largely blameless.
Applebaum goes on to suggest that thw U.S. should reconsider the unilateralism of a few years ago. Actually, I wonder if the U.S. shouldn't go in the opposite direction. The current problem is one of free-riding -- rising powers assume the United States will shoulder a disproportionate burden in msnaging the international system. If the U.S. was prepared to weather the effects of non-cooperation, a retrenchment strategy eliminates the "moral hazard" issue that blunts the incentive for rising powers to share the burden.
Of course, I'm not convinced of this -- I'm just wondering. It is entirely possible that countries like China are perfectly prepared to shoulder a greater burden -- they just have a different set of preferences than the United States. Or, it could be both.
Question to readers: do you think the Obama administration should follow Applebaum's advice?
Thursday, October 1, 2009 - 6:43 PM
My latest column for Newsweek International is now available. It looks at optimistic and pessimistic modes of thought with regard to China's future, and suggests that they can both be right:
I belong to the third camp—the one that believes that the Bubblers and the Extrapolators can both be right. My camp looks at China and sees the parallels with America's rise to global economic greatness during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. From an outsider's vantage point, America looked like a machine that could take immigrants and raw materials and spit out manufactured goods at will. By 1890, the U.S. economy was the largest and most productive in the world. As any student of American history knows, however, these were hardly tranquil times for the United States. Immigration begat ethnic tensions in urban areas. The shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy led to fierce and occasionally violent battles between laborers, farmers, and owners of capital. With an immature financial sector, recession and depressions racked the American economy for decades.
It is not contradictory for China to amass a larger share of wealth and power while still suffering from severe domestic vulnerabilities. From the perspective of the rest of the world, however, this is not a good thing.
As for why it's not a good thing, well, you'll have to read the whole article.
Saturday, April 25, 2009 - 12:31 PM
FP readers have no doubt discerned that your humble blogger's #1 topic of interest for 2009 has been the relative rise of China, the relative decline of the United States and the effects of these power shifts on the global political economy.
That said, an emerging subtheme will be breathlessly hyped reporting that melodramatically exaggerates either shifts in China's power or shifts in Chinese preferences.
For exhibit A, I give you the Financial Times Jamil Anderlini and Javier Blas , who report, "China reveals big rise in gold reserves." Let's go to the lede:
China has quietly almost doubled its gold reserves to become the world’s fifth-biggest holder of the precious metal, it emerged on Friday, in a move that signals the revival of bullion after years of fading importance.
Gold rose to a three-week high of more than $910 an ounce after Hu Xiaolian, head of the secretive State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which manages the country’s $1,954bn in foreign exchange reserves, revealed China had 1,054 tonnes of gold, up from 600 tonnes in 2003.
The news could spark interest in gold among other central banks. “When the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves discloses an increase in gold holdings, other countries may decide to think more carefully about underweight gold positions,” said John Reade, a precious metals strategist at UBS.
The increase in China’s gold reserves has come primarily from domestic production and refining. However, the news raises questions about the future of Beijing’s foreign reserves policy.
Ooooh.... this could be a Very Big Deal!! Gold could supplant the dollar!! Hide the children in the basement!!
Well, let's crunch the numbers first. Unless MS Excel's my math is way off, China's gold reserves are now roughly worth $30 billion. Which means they constitute less than two percent of China's total reserve holdings. Furthermore, China's doubling of its gold reserves in the past five years actually means that Beijing has diversified away from gold, since the total value of China's foreign exchange reserves has increased tenfold during the same period of time.
No wonder, therefore, that buried deep down into this story you see the following passage:
Paul Atherley, Beijing-based managing director of Leyshon Resources, said that even after the latest purchases China had a very small percentage of its reserves in gold, far below the US or other developed countries.
“Those [gold] holdings are still too low in terms of the size of its economy and the growing significance of its currency,” he said.
China's power is undoubtedly increasing. Not every action by Beijing, however, is indicative of attempts to alter the current global political economy.
Thursday, April 23, 2009 - 8:22 PM
Hmmmm.... let's see what is on the commentary page of the World section of the Financial Times website. See if you can spot the trend:
Monday, April 20, 2009 - 2:28 AM
As one reads what the Chinese economic elites are saying about the rest of the world's economies, one begins to wonder why they don't start blogging. The snark level is rising fast.
Consider China Investment Corporation head Lou Jiwei:
Lou Jiwei, head of China Investment Corp, said he was pleased he did not make a single trip to Europe in 2008 after EU officials expressed concerns about his fund’s transparency and intentions.
But speaking at the Boao Forum for Asia, China’s riposte to the annual World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, he said he was considering investing on the continent again, now that European officials have been humbled by the global financial crisis. “I have to thank these European officials,” Mr Lou said. “They saved me a lot of money. Now they come to me without conditions and I am beginning to consider making investments in Europe again.”
Mr Lou did not mention CIC’s experience in the US, where the fund made controversial – and costly – investments in Blackstone, the private equity group, and Morgan Stanley on the eve of the crisis.
Actually, Lou could probably retort that since CIC held a lot of their overseas assets in liquid dollar investments, they did surprisingly well in the past year.
To the wise investors, go the snark.
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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