The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) just released their 2012 report on trends in world military expenditures. The report -- hell, just the press release -- should please a lot of people in the foreign policy community, albeit for different reasons. 

For those decrying the global arms race, the topline figure should be cause for cheer: 

World military expenditure totalled $1.75 trillion in 2012, a fall of 0.5 per cent in real terms since 2011, according to figures released today by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Hooray! Fewer arms, more hugs, or something like that!! 

For neoconservatives, however, the reasons behind that drop in aggregate defense spending will vindicate their worries. The press release confirms the decline in U.S. hegemony in defense spending: 

In 2012 the USA’s share of world military spending went below 40 per cent for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A declining trend that began in 2011 accelerated in 2012, with a drop in US military spending of 6 per cent in real terms to $682 billion....

US military spending in 2012 was also projected to be $15 billion lower than previously planned as a result of cuts to the Department of Defense linked to the 2011 Budget Control Act. The bulk of cuts under this legislation will begin in 2013. 

So, with the decline in U.S. military expenditures, we're in real danger of being overtaken by the Chinese, right? Well ... there's enough grist in the report for neoconservative skeptics as well. 

The fact sheet puts this decline U.S. defense spending in the proper perspective. The United States still spends four times as much on defense as the next-biggest spender (China). Furthermore, "US spending was still more than the combined spending of the next 10 countries (p. 4)." 

Will China's defense spending eventually match the United States? Assuming China grows at a healthy clip -- hardly a guarantee -- sure. But as the Economist noted a few weeks ago, tweaking those assumptions just a tad leads to some very different predictions about when defense parity will occur: 

What's more intriguing is the effect of the Great Recession on defense spending: 

Even in those parts of the world where spending has increased, the effects of the economic crisis can still be seen: slowing economic growth in emerging regions has led to slower rates of growth in military spending. Only the Middle East and North Africa increased their rate of military spending between 2003–2009 and 2009–2012.

The average annual rate of military spending increase in Asia, for instance, has halved from 7.0 per cent per year in 2003–2009, to 3.4 per cent per year in 2009–2012. The slow-down was most dramatic in Central and South Asia, where military spending was growing by an average of 8 per cent per year in 2003–2009, but by only 0.7 per cent a year since 2009, and actually fell in 2012, by 1.6 per cent.

Here's the chart: 

That chart massively undersells the decline in defense spending, because it measures absolute levels of military spending and not spending as a percentage of global output. If you use that metric, then defense spending's share of the global economy has fallen by about half since the end of the Cold War. 

It's almost as if the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession didn't trigger the arms races and general increase in political conflict that some expected would happen. It's almost as if the current threats to national security aren't as serious as they were back in the day. 

This television season has been a mixed blessing for those of us who like to study how humans behave under anarchy.  On the one hand, in addition to Season Three of The Walking Dead about to start, two new shows have explored that theme at some length.  The first to premier was Revolution.  On the other hand, Revolution really isn't that good. 

What about the other new show?  Here's the extended trailer for Last Resort: 

So, you get the premise:  the nuclear sub USS Colorado gets an order to fire their nuclear weapons at Pakistan.  While the codes check out, the order seems just a bit wonky cause it goes through a secondary alert network.  After the captain and executive officer question the order to their superiors, all hell breaks loose. 

My take?  SPOILERS AHEAD. 

Cards on the table:  I definitely liked this show more than Revolution, although that's an admittedly low bar.  This has a lot to do with the acting.  Andre Braugher knows how to project authority, Robert Patrick is perfect as the grizzled and misogynistic chief of the boat, and I'm surprised to report that Scott Speedman is really compelling as the XO.  Having watched the pilot and second episode, the tensions within the crew of the Colorado play out nicely.  The mystery behind the launch also seems quite interesting.  And the pilot does explain why, after a failed first attempt, the U.S. navy doesn't try to take out the Colorado again -- welcome to network television, MAD!!

So there's some potential here -- but there are also some serious, serious problems with the show as it's played out so far.  In ascending order of importance: 

1)  in the pilot, Captain Chaplin relates to his XO an anecdote about Reagan needing to seem just a bit crazy to convince the Russians he could launch a nuke, while Brezhnev had already done that by invading Afghanistan.  This ia a good setup for Chaplin's own need to seem just a bit crazy.  The problem is that, Steve Saideman points out, it was Nixon and not Reagan who believed this logic. 

2)  I've met some submariners, and, well, let's just say that they're a different breed from the rest of the U.S. Navy.  Any individual willing to be in a small hermetically sealed tube for up to six months has to have a particular mindset, and Last Resort doesn't hint at that.  At a minimum, there would have been a few very religiously devout sailors on the Colorado, but that's not talked about at all.  This is a shame, because the presence of Navy SEALS on the boat suggests the opportunities for some culture clashes that haven't panned out. 

3)  The Washington, DC scenes are not terribly convincing, particularly the super-hot defense contractor Kylie Sinclair, played by Autumn Reeser.  Now let's be very clear here:  I have no prejudice whatsoever against super-hot defense contractors.  I do, however, have a problem with the notion that supposedly whip-smart Kylie is going to spill all the beans about her super-secret system that's on board the Colorado to the guy she's about to sleep with. 

4)  Oh, and about that system that Kylie set up -- essentially, it's a device that renders the Colorado invisible to detection.  Not to put to fine a point on it, but this would not be a system that would make deterrence that stable.  In fact, if memory serves someone made a movie based on this very premise. 

5)  Really, though, 1-4 are small matters compared to the elephant in the room with respect to Last Resort.  The plot gets moving when the USS Colorado is ordered to fire its missiles at Pakistan.  Later in the pilot, we discover that the USS Illinois did obey orders and fire two missiles into Pakistan, "killing millions" as one character later mentions. 

After those missiles are fired, 98% of what we see is how Washington and the crew of the Colorado cope with the Colorado's refusal to obey orders.  Which is pretty important... but maybe, just maybe, not as important as the U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT WERE USED AGAINST PAKISTAN!!!!

Seriously, there are one or two mentions of how things in the world are "complicated" because of this, and that's it.  Nothing on Pakistani retaliation, India's reaction, China's reaction, and so forth.  In the Washington scenes, all anyone seems to care about is the Colorado, which is pretty funny, since I'd think the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945 might raise a few hackles. 

Now you might think that since this is a show about the crew of a renegade sub, that's fine -- except it isn't.  The plot in episode two hinges on Russian Spetsnaz forces trying to seize the boat.  At one point the U.S. Secretary of Defense gets pretty indignant at a Russian official for trying to do this.  In the show, the Russian official just looked sheepish.  If this had played out in the real world, the Russian would have said the following: 

"I'm sorry, what was that?  You, the United States military, initiated the use of nuclear weapons in South Asia, killing millions of people, right?  And now you have a rogue sub firing missiles close to Washington.  You're asking what the hell Russia is doing?  With all due respect, f**k off, Mr. Secretary."

I know I'm not going to watch Revolution again.  I'm on the fence with Last Resort... but this whole nuking Pakistan thing going unmentioned might drive me away. 

Compared to the exciting developments in the Middle East, the 2011 Oscars telecast had all the excitement of watching wallpaper paste harden.  To be fair, however, even judged in a vacuum, these Oscars were galactically boring -- which is saying something given Melissa Leo's tres bleu acceptance speech.  The patter was boring, the gowns were boring, and Celine Dion's braying singing ruined the memorial montage.  I got so bored during the actual telecast that I had to make up a scenario whereby former Oscar hosts started massive protests against the current Oscar regime to maintain any interest in the proceedings. 

[So, why are you blogging about it?--ed.]  To demonstrate my ability to wring world politics insights from even the most mundane of sources, of course!!  And they are:

1)  Last year I noted that films leaning towards security studies trounced the more global political economy-friendly films.  Obviously, The King's Speech (which is about leadership and great power politics) beating out The Social Network (which is about intellectual property rights and network externalities) for Best Picture is a continuation of that theme.  Still, the overall results were more mixed.  The Social Network did pick up a few Oscars, including Best Adapted Screenplay, and in the Best Documentary category, Inside Job upset Restrepo -- which meant a real-live-honest-to-goodness political scientist now owns an Academy Award.  NOTE:  This doesn't mean all political scientists are happy about this. 

2)  I've been a longtime supporter of drug legalization as a way to eliminate multiple foreign policy headaches -- but based on the behavior of many Oscar presenters and winners, I'm now wondering if there should be drug testing before the Academy Awards.   

3)  Here's a thought -- if the Brits keep giving the best acceptance speeches, then maybe the Academy should just outsource the awards hosting duties to them as well?  I mean, after that show, suddenly all the carping about Ricky Gervais seems churlish.  I could see Russell Brand and Helen Mirren doing at least a passable job at it. 

4)  As for the Best Picture Winner, I myself would have preferred The Social Network -- but I enjoyed The King's Speech decently enough despite the massive historical revisionism in the film.  It's not like The Social Network was a straight re-creation of history either.  If the controversy about historical accuracy prompts a deeper discussion about the period under question, so be it.  And let me stress that this position has nothing to do with the fact that the Official Blog Wife feels about Colin Firth the same way I do about Salma Hayek.

Did I miss anything? 

Stephen Colbert's Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's attempt to rally fear in the hearts of Americans through its foiled toner cartridge gambit continues to reverberate in homeland security circles. Clearly, there are still a few bugs in the system. That said, here are my quick takeaways:

1) Al Qaeda failed… again. Seriously, if al Qaeda is ostensibly the New York Yankees of terrorism, the Steinbrenners would have fired the GM and coach years ago.

2) As this New York Times round-up suggests, al Qaeda has had to adopt new tactics because its preferred tactics have been thwarted:

[It was] a rare attack aimed at the air cargo system -- one of the foundations of the global economy -- rather than the passenger system, which has received the most attention from governments working to avoid a repeat of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

The Times story goes on to bemoan the failure to ratchet up security in the cargo system, which is a fair point. An implicit conclusion to draw from this switch in tactics, however, is that al Qaeda-affiliated groups are being frustrated on the passenger front.

3) Will Juan Williams now be fearful every time he sees a toner cartridge, even though most toner cartridges are not evil?

4) A common mantra about combating terrorism is that homeland security officials have to aim for a 1.000 batting average, while terrorists just need to get lucky once. I wonder if this is really true, however. Each time a new type of attack is thwarted, government officials learn a great deal about new tactics and methods, and a treasure trove of intelligence can be quickly generated. Failed attacks are likely to discourage some al Qaeda sympathizers, leading to more informants.

No, al Qaeda doesn't need a perfect track record, but failure after failure does carry strategic and operational costs.

5) The Saudi counterintelligence effort is getting an awful lot of good press.

Am I missing anything?

Andrew Exum has posted a response to my post -- and a bevy of others -- regarding his manifesto for quantitative analysis. 

Shorter Exum:  "the posts on this blog are meant to be light and irreverent.... I am sorry that folks got their proverbial panties in a twist about a post that was meant to be funny."  He then outsourced a more substantive response to Scott Wedman, who said eminently reasonable things.

According to Spencer Ackerman, Exum also pwned me. 

Some are dissatisfied with this response.  As for me... meh.  If Exum's original post really was intended as a humorous lark, then so be it.  I apologize for misinterpreting and overreacting  -- though I gotta say, the bulk of his recent posts aren't exactly overflowing with wit. 

Steve Walt alerts us to a curious post by CNAS' Andrew Exum -- a.k.a., Abu Muqawama -- intended to create a "manifesto... for those using quantitative analysis to study war." 

Steve thinks these are "wise words indeed."  I think... well, let's go through Exum's rules, shall we? 

War is a human endeavor. I recognize that it is a phenomenon that does not conform to neat mathematical equations.

Sure.

I will use quantitative analysis in conjunction with theory and qualitative analysis to describe what I see as phenomena in war and peace. I will be honest about the limits of both my theory and my analysis

Of course.  Good job nailing the compulsories so far. 

In war and peace, the variables are infinite, and not everything can be measured or assigned a numerical value

Um... the variables are infinite on just about every dimension of life.  No operationalization, econometric equation or formal model is going to completely capture reality.  I guarantee you, however, that no qualitiative analysis will perfectly capture reality either (I will further note that qualitative scholars often fool themselves into believing this is not the case, which gets them into all sorts of trouble -- but some quant jockeys commit this sin as well).  This doesn't mean you give up on explanation -- it just means you acknowledge the limitations of your approach. 

I will not use numbers to signify what are fundamentally qualitative assessments without acknowledging to my reader that I have done so in order to satisfy a departmental requirement, gain tenure, or get published in the APSR. Or because I have been in graduate school for so long that I have forgotten how to effectively write in prose.

Yeah, this is where Exum's manifesto departs from the land of common sense and enters the world of unadulterated horses**t.    First, I've  occasionally used this kind of data, and I sure as hell didn't do it to get tenure -- I did it because I thought it was a good way to test my explanation.  Second, whether someone can write clear and crisp prose has nothing to do with whether they use quantitative methods or not.  That Exum seems not to know this is the first sign that we're dealing with some very muddled thinking.  

I recognize there are no mathematical equations in Vom Kriege and that it is nonetheless unlikely that my legacy will transcend that of Clausewitz.

Um... I could provide the undisputed, univerally-hailed-by-all explanation for why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 and  my legacy wouldn't transcend Clausewitz.  Or Thucydides.  But that's a really high bar to set. 

Just to turn things around, there are plenty of mathematical equations in Strategy of Conflict and it is nevertheless likely that Exum's -- or your -- legacy will never transcend that of Thomas Schelling. 

And finally: 

I recognize that very few squad leaders in the 10th Mountain Division have ever taken a course in statistics yet probably know more about the conduct and realities of war than I do.

I think there is some truth to this statement.  It is also a fair statement, however, that very few graduate students in security studies have ever served a day in uniform yet probably know more about the causes of war than those squad leaders do.  

As Drew Conway points out, it takes a special kind of chutzpah for someone who admits that they don't "get" quantitative methods to write something like this.   

Be sure to read the rest of Conway's post, as well as Cato's Justin Logan. 

UPDATE:  Also check out Kindred Winecoff and Henry Farrell on Exum's post as well.  Farrell's concluding point about the value of social science is worth repeating in full:

In my opinion... the most important lesson that the social sciences have to offer to policy makers - be careful about selection bias. Policy debates in Washington DC are rife with selection effects, with advocates highlighting convenient cases for a particular policy argument and hiding inconvenient ones. I’m co-teaching a big MA intro course on IR theory and international affairs practice with a practitioner this semester. If I can get this one single point across to my students, so that they really understand it, I think I’ll have given them good value for money.

Quite true.  Sophisticated qualitiative scholars are quite adept at coping with this issue.  But there's a lot of hackwork that misses this point entirely.