Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

This week in non-Foreign Policy publications I take a shiv to both American academics and American policymakers.

On the academic side, my latest essay in The National Interest online explains why the traits that make one a good international relations scholar are not-so-good traits for a good international relations practitioner: 

To borrow from Isaiah Berlin, academic scholars of international relations are rewarded for being hedgehogs—i.e., knowing one big thing. Scholarship is thought to be “interesting” when an academic generates a really big and provocative idea that challenges conventional understandings of big questions about international relations. The incentive structure of the academy also rewards the academic for repeating and rewriting their big idea as often as possible. Are these big ideas right? That’s almost beside the point. As long as their progenitors are alive, ideas never die in international-relations theory (when they do die, someone will eventually dust it off and repackage the idea under their name).

On the other hand, today's policymakers ain't what they used to be -- a point I make in a commentary for Marketplace: 

The dirty little secret inside the Beltway is that international economics either scares or bores America's foreign policy community. Although foreign affairs analysts understand on some level that economics is important, they see it as distinct from geopolitics. As a result, very few of them have the necessary experience or training to talk about international economic matters.

It was not always this way. During the Cold War, some of America's greatest foreign policy minds -- Dean Acheson, Walt Rostow, George Schultz or James Baker -- had substantive backgrounds in economics, finance or business. This allowed them to navigate the waters between high politics and high finance with a minimum of fuss.

[So, to sum up your mood this week:  America's foreign policy community stinks!!--ed.  I don't think that highly of you, either.  Actually, it's worse than that -- after reading this Jacob T. Levy post, I'm not entirely convinced that the academic side of IR should necessarily strive for policy relevance.]

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

In addition to the day job, the blog, the Marketplace commentaries and the occasional essay for Newsweek International, I'm pleased to announce that I am now a Senior Editor for The National Interest -- see, it's on the masthead and everything.  This (not coincidentaly) coincides with the first issue of TNI to be printed under the aegis of new editor-in-chief Justine Rosenthal, who is the most dangerous kind of editor -- the kind who can get me to say yes to stuff.   I mean, there are limits -- if she asked me to write an essay about how Bono is his own superpower, I probably wouldn't do it.  Oh, wait.... Personal biases aside, go check out the latest issue, which is rich with interesting content:  a realist/neocon debate between Stephen Walt and Joshua Muravchik, a review essay on Iraq books by one of Barack Obama's foreign policy advisors on Iraq, and Leslie Gelb's argument for the small-r realists of America to unite.  My favorite essay in this issue, however, is longtime friend-of-danieldrezner.com Amy Zegart's article on George W. Bush's foreign policy legacy.  As much as the Bush administration likes to believes that, over time, they will be viewed like he Truman administration, Zegart sets the historical record straight: 
Harry Truman’s presidency illustrates the lasting impact of first impressions. For many Bush officials, Truman is a comforting role model—another wildly unpopular wartime leader who aimed big and is now viewed as one of the presidential greats. As Rice reflected, “When you’re at the beginning of a big historical transformation, it doesn’t look like you’re doing much right.” Bush himself invoked Truman at his 2006 West Point graduation speech, comparing the struggle against Communism to the war against Islamic radicalism and noting that “Like Americans in Truman’s day, we are laying the foundations for victory.” No one disputes that Bush’s aims are sweeping or that, like Truman, he seeks to transform international relations for a new enemy in a new era. Bush’s second inaugural proclaimed American foreign policy to be nothing less than spreading “democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” The difficulty of the task, he said, “is no excuse for avoiding it.” Ending tyranny would be “the concentrated work of generations.” As Rice noted, the president does not just defend the status quo. When it comes to vindication, however, the Truman parallels fall short. History’s judgment of Harry Truman came early, not late. His greatest cold-war policies were recognized as triumphs from the start, and his failures remain failures to this day. Truman’s March 1947 containment speech to Congress was met with a standing ovation and press reports that instantly hailed it as a historic landmark in U.S. foreign policy. His European economic-recovery program, the Marshall Plan, also attracted widespread public support (thanks in large part to the administration’s own public-relations campaign) and produced impressive and fast results. In 1953, just five years after it began, the Marshall Plan formally ended, Europe was well on its way to economic recovery and Secretary of State George Marshall received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work. At the same time, history has not reversed judgment about Truman’s foreign-policy failures. Nixon may have opened China, but Truman still lost it. For starving North Koreans or anyone who worries about Kim Jong-il’s nuclear weapons and crackpot tendencies, the Korean War is still searching for a happy ending. Truman, like Bush, did face stormy opposition and plummeting public approval during his presidency. But his low popularity had many causes, and foreign policy was not the primary one. Postwar economic reconversion, high taxes, government spending, labor disputes, the firing of General Douglas MacArthur, the anti-Communist hearings of Senator Joseph McCarthy and salacious corruption scandals including influence peddling with fur coats and deep freezers all helped to sour the public’s mood by 1952. In January, Truman’s public disapproval hit a whopping 67 percent, a record surpassed only by the current president. Notably, the same poll asked Americans what they believed were the most important issues in the 1952 presidential election. More said government waste and corruption than the Korean War. Republican Party leaders agreed, ranking corruption and wasteful government spending their top two campaign issues by overwhelming margins in a November 1951 Gallup poll. The Korean War ranked a distant fourth (behind taxes), and other foreign issues were even lower. Domestic policy, not foreign policy, was the administration’s greatest weakness and the Republicans’ best hope. Combating the “mess in Washington” became one of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s central campaign themes. The Republican presidential nominee made headlines and scored one of the biggest ovations of the campaign when he assailed the Truman administration as “barefaced looters” during an Indianapolis stump speech. The notion that Truman was drummed out of office for foreign-policy failures that were subsequently judged successes might be comforting, but it is not correct.
Again, go check it all out.  [Wait, if you're a senior editor, what am I?--ed.  You're the person who should remind me to link to this essay as wellDamn straight!--ed.]

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

I had a bloggingheads diavlog with Bob Kagan on China and the Olympics.  I play the mainstream member of the foreign policy community to Bob's crusading, articulate neoconservative.  My favorite part is when we wander into the abstruse question of how 19th century America viewed Prussia.  Go check it out (for the higlights, check out the New York Times synposis).  There's also another Marketplace commentary.  This one is keyed off of a Boston Globe story from last month on how the Boston Fed is hosting a mortgage counseling session at Gillette Stadium (home of the New England Patriots).  I imagine how such an event would be covered by sports announcers.  Go check it out too
My latest Newsweek International column has some fun at the G8's expense: 
In the good old days, summit meetings were held in big cities—London, Tokyo, Venice, Toronto, Paris and so on. Ever since the 2001 meeting in Genoa, which attracted more than a quarter of a million protesters, the leaders of the Group of Eight have held their yearly confabs in ever-more remote locations. When leaders met in the resort town of Heiligendamm, Germany, last year, only 25,000 protesters showed up. This year's meeting, in Toyako on Hokkaido Island, has so far drawn far fewer. The resort strategy appears to be working. Of course, there might be another reason why fewer protestors are bothering with this year's G8 summit: It matters less. It's not hard to see why. Half of the leaders involved—Gordon Brown, George W. Bush, Yasuo Fukuda and Nikolas Sarkozy—are deeply unpopular at home. Beyond these individuals, however, the G8 countries are simply less powerful than they used to be. At this rate, a philosophical question might be in the offing: What if the great powers held a summit and no one cared?
Go check it out!

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner

I'll be a guest on KQED's Forum with Michael Krasny for the next hour on the topic of the G8 summit.  The other guests are the Economist's John Micklethwait and UC-Berkeley's Steve Weber, so actual smart people will also be on hand to handle the really tricky questions.  I suspect Mickelthwait will be bringing up this, and Weber will bring up this.  Go listen! UPDATE:  You can access the podcast here

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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