It's hard to believe, but ten years ago Robert Kagan published "Power and Weakness" in the pages of Policy Review.  Coming on the heels of the invasion of Afghanistan and the start of the Iraq debate, Kagan's essay seemed to crystallize the state of the transatlantic relationship back in the day. 

To celebrate it's 10th anniversary, Policy Review has come out with a special issue devoted to the essay, asking a variety of smart people to weigh in.  Oh, and me.  As I put it in my essay, "I come to praise Kagan's insights -- and then to bury them."  You'll have to read the whole thing to see what I mean. 

Check out the rest of the essays as well.  With the passing of a decade, it's pretty easy to point out the ways in which Kagan's analysis breaks down (and, to be fair, the ways in which it doesn't).  To his credit, Kagan himself is painfully aware of how his essay has aged: 

Ten years ago, when I wrote the original essay, it would not have occurred to me that anyone would be commenting on it a year later, let alone a decade later. As Tod knows, I only wrote the essay because he had invited me to speak at a conference, and I had to deliver something. No doubt the other contributors will recognize the experience. Therefore from the beginning I have been acutely aware of the essay’s limitations — and have had the good fortune to have all those limitations pointed out to me frequently, in many languages, with greater or lesser kindness over the years, and now again at the scene of the crime a decade later.

I remember talking with Kagan when the original essay came out and blew up, and I can aver that he was just as surprised as anyone else about its impact.  Let this be a lesson for policy wonks everywhere.  Sure, most of the time when you write something it disappears into the ether, to be forgotten almost immediately.  But on occasion, serendiptity or fortuna strikes, and you've suddenly got a major essay on your hands.  Always write with that in mind -- because if your essay does blow up, you better be ready, willing and able to defend every paragraph of it. 

While the debtopocalypse might have been cancelled, I see that the wake for American hegemony is chugging right along.

The interwebs is drowning from variations of the argument that the process by which the debt ceiling deal was reached has dented American power. To sum them up: Sure, the United States government staved off collapse, but the galactically stupid brinkmanship over it has permanently damaged America's brand. Furthermore, the new politics of brinkmanship means that we could potentially see this kind of own-goal as a new permanent fixture of American political economy. Continued political uncertainty over something as obviously necessary as raising the debt ceiling means that actual policy problems like, say, crumbling infrastructure, education, or reassessing grand strategy is a true fool's errand. So, in other words, the USA is screwed.

See the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, David Weigel, David Rothkopf, Felix Salmon, and Joshua Keating for just a small sampling of this compelling argument.

To which I say: mmmmmmmaybe.  

I don't doubt that the U.S. brand of constitutional democracy has taken a pretty severe hit from this episode. Then again, the parliamentary system of democratic governance has long been more popular, so that's not really a new thing.

There are three factors, however, that make me wary of this kind of eulogy. First, I've come to look at concepts like "soft power" and "standing" with a bit of a jaundiced eye. Even if the U.S. takes a hit in that category, I'm not sure that loss translates anything more tangible than … a bunch of foreign-policy pundits bemoaning its loss.

Seriously, compare the last few years of the Bush administration with the first few years of the Obama administration. Any measurable metric of standing or soft power with the presidential transition. The effect on U.S. foreign policy, however, has been negligible.

Second, power is always a relative term, so the question has to be asked -- who's gaining on the United States? Joshua Keating's survey of global schadenfreude doesn't change the fact that the eurozone remains a basket case, Japan and Russia remain demographic disasters, and China has domestic political problems that make partisanship in the United States look like child's play. Even a cursory glance at military spending reveals no peer competitor to the United States. So yes, the United States will endure a rain of rhetorical horses**t for a while … right up until the next crisis in which the world demands America "do something" because it's still the only superpower still standing.

Or, to put this in bond rating language -- even if US power is downgraded from AAA, who else is even above BBB+?

Third, the thing about democracy is that it has multiple ways to constrain political stupidity and ideological overreach. The first line of defense is that politicians will have an electoral incentive to act in non-crazy ways in order to get re-elected. The second line of defense is that politicians or parties who violate the non-crazy rule fail to get re-elected. So, in some ways, the true test of the American system's ability to stave off failure will be the 2012 election. Politicians from both parties have vastly overinterpreted recent electoral victories as sweeping mandates. I suspect, in 2012, many of them will be penalized for such hubris. If they aren't, well, then the conventional wisdom might have a point.

Smart investors made a ton of money this past month by betting on the full faith and credit of the United States despite the D.C. blood sport. If one could make a similar wager on American power, I'd be inclined to bet against the current market sentiment.

Am I missing anything?

Over at Vanity Fair, James Wolcott blogs about the explosion of forthcoming superhero movies, why they will suck, and what this means for American exceptionalism. 

Actually, let me put that a little differently:  James Wolcott has used prose more bloated than X-Men 3 to attempt a half-assed connection between summer popcorn flicks and America's place in the world. 

First, there's his general critique of today's superhero film: 

For old-school comic fans such as myself (who had a letter published in the Stan Lee-Jack Kirby Fantastic Four in 1967—top that, Jonathan Franzen), these cinematic blowup editions are lacking on the fun side. The more ambitious ones aren’t meant to be much fun, apart from a finely crafted quip surgically inserted here and there to defuse the tension of everybody standing around butt-clenched and battle-ready, waiting for some laureled thespian (Anthony Hopkins as Odin in Thor) to elocute and class up this clambake. Even the films that play it loosey-goosier, such as the facetious Ghost Rider (Nicolas Cage as a skull-blazing vigilante who chills by listening to the Carpenters), end up laying it on too heavy, faking orgasm like a porn star trying to keep Charlie Sheen’s attention. For all of the tremendous talent involved and the technical ingenuity deployed, superhero movies go at us like death metal: loud, anthemic, convoluted, technocratic, agonistic, fireball-blossoming, scenery-crushing workloads that waterboard the audience with digital effects, World War IV weaponry, rampant destruction, and electrical-flash editing. 

 Three thoughts.  First, this critique ain't exactly new.  Second, the reason this critique isn't new is that Wolcott ignores Drezner's Sturgeon's Law of Crap.  Take any artistic or literary category, and 90% of the contributions to said genre will be total crap [Does that apply to your blog posts as well?--ed.  More like 95% in my case.]  Therefore, the easiest thing in the world to blog about is how 90% of any kind of genre stinks.  Third, Wolcott clearly slept through hasn't seen the superhero films that rise above the 90% and possess a fair degree of whimsy, like, say, Spiderman 2, The Incredibles, or Iron Man.   

As for the symbolic implications for American power, er, well, here's his key paragraph: 

Why so much overcompensation? The superhero genre is an American creation, like jazz and stripper poles, exemplifying American ideals, American know-how, and American might, a mating of magical thinking and the right stuff. But in the new millennium no amount of nationally puffing ourselves up can disguise the entropy and molt. Despite the resolute jaw of Mitt Romney and John Bolton’s mustache, American exceptionalism no longer commands the eagle wingspan to engirdle the world and keep raising the flag over Iwo Jima. Since Vietnam, whatever the bravery and sacrifice of those in uniform, America’s superpower might hasn’t been up to much worthy of chest-swelling, chain-snapping pride (invading a third-rate military matchstick house such as Iraq is hardly the stuff of Homeric legend), and our national sense of inviolability took a sucker punch on September 11, 2001, that dislocated our inner gyroscope. Sinister arch-villains make for high-stakes showdowns, but asymmetrical conflict has no need for them, and for all we know the cavern voice of Osama bin Laden could be a Mission: Impossible tape, poofing into smoke at the first shaft of sunlight. The subsequent War on Terror is one waged within a shadow maze of misdirection and paranoia where the enemy might be no more than a phantom army of apprehensions, viral bugs invading the neural network.

Let me be blunt -- I'm not entirely sure if Wolcott wrote this paragraph or outsourced it to a computer program that strongs together random clauses about American foreign policy.  Suffice it to say that the better superhero flicks -- both Iron Man and The Dark Knight Returns come to mind -- contain some interesting commentary on American foreign policy.  Indeed, a few years ago Jesse Walker at Reason argued, with some justification, that "Superhero stories may have begun as power fantasies, but it is our ambivalence about power that keeps the modern genre thriving."

I share Wolcott's distaste for hackneyed comic book films, but sometimes, a bad movie is just a bad movie.  Anyone trying to use any film released in January The Green Hornet as a metaphor for what ails American foreign policy really needs to remember that, most of the time, a bad superhero movie is just a bad superhero movie. 

Sorry, students -- Erik Voeten at The Monkey Cage took up my challenge earlier this week to explain "what were the key factors that determined a country's decision not to attend Lu's Nobel [Peace Prize] ceremony?"  Click here and then here -- there are cool graphs.  

[Then why not replicate them here?--ed.  Because more of my readers should be reading The Monkey Cage anyway.] 

What's interesting is that, in the end, a few countries that originally signaled their intention to abide by China's wishes reversed course in the end.  In particular, some of the anomalous countries -- Colombia and the Philippines, for example -- reversed course and sent representatives. 

In doing so, Voeten found a pretty straightforward correlation between domestic press freedoms and attendance.  That is to say, the countries that declined to send a representative were the countries that censored their domestic press the most.  Foreign policy alignment, as represented by UN votes, does not appear to play a role. 

Voeten cautions that this does not mean that China's political and implicit economic pressure played no role, however: 

All of this does not mean that international pressure is irrelevant to the story. China can probably credibly threaten small punishments to most countries for attending but not big ones. So, the cost of attending may be pretty similar across states. There is much greater variation in the domestic cost for giving in to Chinese pressure. So, press freedom does a pretty good job in accounting for the variation in who attends and who does not. Yet, without China's ability to credibly threaten repercussions, the whole thing would not have been an issue.

Voeten is correct that China's power was in some ways a necessary condition for them to even consider organizing a boycott.  Looking again at the list of attendees and non-attendees, however, I'd mildly disagree with Voeten on China's ability to pressure others.  Voeten assumes that Beijing's ability to apply "small punishments" was constant across countries.  Looking at the list of target countries, however, there were quite a few with significant export dependence on the Middle Kingdom.  China is either the largest or second-largest export market for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran, Japan, and Kazakhstan.  One would expect both Thailand and the Philippines to also have a pretty strong desire not to ruffle China's feathers. 

In the end, however, the only countries that complied with China's request were the countries that already shared China's domestic policy preferences on this issue.  Strictly in terms of assessing Chinese power, it is to Beijing's credit that it was able to get these countries to comply.  The country's inability to use implicit and explicit threats to compel other countries well within its power orbit to change their minds, however, is... let's say interesting. 

Andrew Sullivan flags the latest data point on the rebound in America's image abroad: 

Views of the US around the world have improved sharply over the past year, a BBC World Service poll suggests.

For the first time since the annual poll began in 2005, America's influence in the world is now seen as more positive than negative.

The improved scores for the US coincided with Barack Obama becoming president, a BBC correspondent notes.

As in 2009, Germany is viewed most favourably while Iran and Pakistan are seen as the most negative influences.

Nearly 30,000 people in 28 countries were interviewed for the poll, between November 2009 and February 2010.

Now, on the one hand, this is particularly impressive, because the people of the world are in a really sour mood.  If you look at the entire report, the United States is the only great power and one of only two countries (South Africa is the other) to record an uptick in positive influence over the past year.  This is also fully consistent with other surveys demonstrating an "Obama effect." 

On the other hand, it's worth asking whether this boost in U.S. favorability ratings has yielded anything in the way of tangible policy gains.  Sullivan avers that: 

[I]n trying to defuse as well as defeat Jihadist terror, this kind of profound change could serve America's interests well. The idea that a better reputation abroad is meaningless uplift is foolish. It helps the US leverage its power to greater ends. The more popular the US is, the likelier it is to have a positive impact on other countries' leaders.

There's some truth to this -- otherwise you don't get the largest number of world leaders on American soil since the founding of the United Nations.  That said, I do wonder just how much leverage this kind of soft power carries with it.  Consider the ability of the U.S. to enact multilateral economic sanctions.  The Bush administration, at the depths of its unpopularity, was still able to get the UN Security Council to pass three rounds of sanctions against Iran, as well as measures against North Korea.  The Obama administration, despite a serious effort to open a dialogue with Iran, is encountering resistance from China, Brazil, and Turkey in its efforts to craft another round of sanctions. 

All else equal, it's better to see these numbers going up.  I'm just unsure of how much this translates into usable leverage.

What do you think?   

Lost in the Nobel hoopla yesterday was this fascinating New York Times story by Michael Wines about the ways in which China's economy and foreign economic policy are vexing its neighbors. 

China has long claimed to be just another developing nation, even as its economic power far outstripped that of any other emerging country.

Now, it is finding it harder to cast itself as a friendly alternative to an imperious American superpower. For many in Asia, it is the new colossus.

“China 10 years ago is totally different with China now,” said Ansari Bukhari, who oversees metals, machinery and other crucial sectors for Indonesia’s Ministry of Industry. “They are stronger and bigger than other countries. Why do we have to give them preference?”

To varying degrees, others are voicing the same complaint. Take the 10 Southeast Asian nations in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, known as Asean, a regional economic bloc representing about 600 million people. After a decade of trade surpluses with Asean nations that ran as high as $20 billion, the surplus through October totaled a bare $535 million, according to Chinese customs figures, and appears headed toward a 10-year low. That is prompting some rethinking of the conventional wisdom that China’s rise is a windfall for the whole neighborhood.

Vietnam just devalued its currency by 5 percent, to keep it competitive with China. In Thailand, manufacturers are grousing openly about their inability to match Chinese prices. India has filed a sheaf of unfair-trade complaints against China this year covering everything from I-beams to coated paper.

Read the whole thing -- Wines does a nice job of contrasting China's policy responses in 2008 to what it did a decade earlier.  To sum up:  those dogs that were not barking previously are starting to growl. 

This problem is not going away anytime in the near future.  The problem for the rest of the Asia/Pacific is that their comparative advantages (labor costs, process innovations) are also China's comparative advantages.  Unless China starts acting as an important consumer market as well -- which admittedly might be happening as I type this -- then China's mantra of being a "responsible power" is going to meet a greater level of static very, very soon.   

UPDATE:  The Chicago Council on Global Affairs' Tom Wright has a report on how the financial crisis has affected China's soft power in the Asia/Pacific region that buttresses the Wines story.

Children of the 1980's have suffered a series of body blows this summer -- the death of Michael Jackson, the death of John Hughes, etc.  Well, now it appears we will have to suffer another indignity.  MGM recently announced that they remaking Red Dawn (this week they announced their casting choices), a staple of basic cable outlets for twenty years -- and one of the most unintentionally campy movies ever made. 

For the uninitiated, the movie depicts a Russian/Cuban/Nicaraguan invasion of the United States, and the fierce resistance put up by a band of high schoolers.  As one of FP's movie geeks, I love this movie almost as much as I love Starship Troopers.  Harry Dean Stanton shouting "Avenge me!!"; Lea Thompson and C. Thomas Howell acting all tough;  Patrick Swayze shouting "because we live here!" as the justification for killing Russians; Powers Boothe's scenery-chewing; the Cuban occupiers subduing the population by accessing gun registration forms -- it's all good.  Wolverines!!!!!

Now, this movie -- the first one rated PG-13, by the way -- was pretty absurd even by Reagan-era standards.  Which brings one to an interesting question -- why remake it now? The commissioned screenwriter has provided the following justification:

Similar to the way the original played off Cold War fears in the 1980s, [writer Carl] Ellsworth says the remake will play off of current fears related to post-9/11 terrorism. ''As Red Dawn scared the heck out of people in 1984, we feel that the world is kind of already filled with a lot of paranoia and unease, so why not scare the hell out of people again?''

Well, sure, except that this makes no f***ing sense.  Post-9/11 terror scares Americans because of the prospect that an attack could take place at any moment.  The one thing actors like Al Qaeda can't do terribly well is secure and hold territory -- which is exactly what the Russians were ostensibly trying to do in Red Dawn.  I fact, in the original movie, it's the Wolverines who act a bit like terrorists, bombing Russian installations and such.  So I can't see how Red Dawn is a usable template for talking about post-9/11 terrorism concerns. 

This isn't as bad an idea as remaking Hogan's Heroes -- but it's pretty close. 

The Pew Global Attitudes project has released their 2009 report, which means we finally have some hard numbers to see whether the election of Barack Obama has altered global perceptions of the United States. 

And it turns out the answer is yes in most places: 

The image of the United States has improved markedly in most parts of the world, reflecting global confidence in Barack Obama. In many countries opinions of the United States are now about as positive as they were at the beginning of the decade before George W. Bush took office. Improvements in the U.S. image have been most pronounced in Western Europe, where favorable ratings for both the nation and the American people have soared. But opinions of America have also become more positive in key countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well.

Here are the numbers:

Most of the results are not surprising.  The Obama effect is pretty substantial in Western Europe and Latin America, and nonexistent or negative in the Middle East and Russia.  A small positive effect in sub-Saharan Africa, though this is in pat due to the fact that U.S. favorables were already pretty high in that region. 

The surprising results are in Eastern Europe, Pacific Rim and South Asia.  Obama does poorly in Poland -- perhaps because he's been perceived as more accomodating towards Russia. 

In the Pacific Rim and India, however, favorability ratings increased by a fair amount.  I'm particularly surprised by the bump in India, given the occasionally prickly tone between the policymakers of the two countries. 

Question to readers:  Obama said a few weeks ago that he thought a soft power bump would help advance U.S. interests.  Given the data, do you agree? 

UPDATE:  Wow.  Kevin Drum digs through the report and finds an even better measure of the increase in U.S. standing -- asking respondents whether they think "America will do the right thing in world affairs."  The numbers here are pretty stunning: 

Wow.  I mean, wow.  In a lot of ways this is the more interesting result, because it suggests that other countries think the United States is now more competent. 

A few days ago Gideon Rachman had a sharp column in the Financial Times about the limits to Barack Obama's "soft power" approach: 

Mr Bush had a shoe thrown at him in his last appearance in the Middle East. So if Mr Obama receives his customary standing ovation in Cairo, that will send a powerful symbolic message. But the president should not let the applause go to his head. Even if his speech is a success, the same foreign-policy problems will be sitting in his in-tray when he gets back to the Oval Office – and they will be just as dangerous as before....

The president’s charisma and rhetorical skill are real diplomatic assets. If Mr Obama can deploy them to improve America’s image and influence around the world, that is all to the good. There is nothing wrong with trying to re-build American “soft power”.

The danger is more subtle. It is that President Yes-we-can has raised exaggerated hopes about the pay-off from engagement and diplomacy. In the coming months it will become increasingly obvious that soft power also has its limits.

I don't disagree with much of what Rachman says here, but there's a sin of omission that is worth pointing out.  One of the advantages of Barack Obama's popularity is pretty plain -- he gets to say things that, in another man's voice, would sound unbelievably arrogant. 

For exhibit A, let's stroll over to Tom Friedman's column today, which Friedman petty much outsources to Obama himself: 

“We have a joke around the White House,” the president said. “We’re just going to keep on telling the truth until it stops working — and nowhere is truth-telling more important than the Middle East.”

A key part of his message, he said, will be: “Stop saying one thing behind closed doors and saying something else publicly.” He then explained: “There are a lot of Arab countries more concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon than the ‘threat’ from Israel, but won’t admit it.” There are a lot of Israelis, “who recognize that their current path is unsustainable, and they need to make some tough choices on settlements to achieve a two-state solution — that is in their long-term interest — but not enough folks are willing to recognize that publicly.”

There are a lot of Palestinians who “recognize that the constant incitement and negative rhetoric with respect to Israel” has not delivered a single “benefit to their people and had they taken a more constructive approach and sought the moral high ground” they would be much better off today — but they won’t say it aloud.

“There are a lot of Arab states that have not been particularly helpful to the Palestinian cause beyond a bunch of demagoguery,” and when it comes to “ponying up” money to actually help the Palestinian people, they are “not forthcoming.”

When it comes to dealing with the Middle East, the president noted, “there is a Kabuki dance going on constantly. That is what I would like to see broken down. I am going to be holding up a mirror and saying: ‘Here is the situation, and the U.S. is prepared to work with all of you to deal with these problems. But we can’t impose a solution. You are all going to have to make some tough decisions.’ Leaders have to lead, and, hopefully, they will get supported by their people.”

Now, imagine that George W. Bush had said the exact same things to Friedman a year ago (not that much of a stretch, actually).  He would have been crucified for delivering such a high-handed, arrogant, imperious lecture.  Obama, apparently, can get away with it -- if he could, I bet Obama's advance team would have a workplace-safety sign behind him at the upcoming Cairo speech saying, "This is the 134th day that the Obama administration has not invaded an Arab country.  Keep it up!" 

Obama was surprisingly blunt with Friedman about why he can get away with it: 

"What I do believe is that if we are engaged in speaking directly to the Arab street, and they are persuaded that we are operating in a straightforward manner, then, at the margins, both they and their leadership are more inclined and able to work with us.”

Similarly, the president said that if he is asking German or French leaders to help more in Afghanistan or Pakistan, “it doesn’t hurt if I have credibility with the German and French people. They will still be constrained with budgets and internal politics, but it makes it easier.”

Part of America’s “battle against terrorist extremists involves changing the hearts and minds of the people they recruit from,” he added. “And if there are a bunch of 22- and 25-year-old men and women in Cairo or in Lahore who listen to a speech by me or other Americans and say: ‘I don’t agree with everything they are saying, but they seem to know who I am or they seem to want to promote economic development or tolerance or inclusiveness,’ then they are maybe a little less likely to be tempted by a terrorist recruiter.”

One last thought -- I don't disagree all that much with Obama's diagnosis of the region, but it does suggest an important political problem.  Most Middle Eastern states have very little incentive to work towards a two-state solution.  Within many Arab countries, domestic resentment can be channeled into anger at the Israelis and symbolic support for the Palestinians.  Why would governments in the region want to turn off that very useful spigot? 

I don't disagree with Steve Walt's read of Obama's Ankara speech (see Marc Lynch as well), or other hosannahs being heaped on Obama for his European tour.  Barack Obama acquitted himself well in London, Strasbourg, Prague and Ankara.  U.S. soft power would appear to be in a better place than it was, say, a year ago.

Does it mean anything, however?  I also don't disagree with Gideon Rachman's analysis of Obama's trip in the Financial Times:

On many levels, the new US president’s first tour of Europe was indeed a triumph. Mr Obama was articulate, ambitious and charming. His personal style has a touch of the emperor and a touch of the rock star – but with an appealing humility that is common to neither profession....

So Mr Obama scored very highly for style and ambition on his European tour. But can he deliver the substance? Here, the verdict has to be much more doubtful – for reasons that have more to do with the sheer difficulty of the situation he has inherited, rather than any particular failings on the part of the new president....

The new American president faces an economic disaster at home, a stalemated war in Afghanistan, unpredictable adversaries in places such as North Korea, and largely unhelpful allies in Europe. This week Mr Obama cemented the impression that he is an unusually gifted and intelligent politician. But that does not mean he will succeed. It could just be that he is the right man at the wrong time.

If there's any good news, it's that, after reading Arms Control Wonk, the North Koreans look more and more like an irritant rather than a threat.  

Question to readers:  will Obama's trip pay any long-term policy dividends?   

I'll be semi-mute on the blog for a few days, as I'm in Charlottesville, VA to prep for a conference on America's standing in the world.  Since my big blog boss will be at this event, I'll be devoting long hours in order to try and sound smart. 

The question of standing is a tricky one for international relations -- much like debates about soft power.  It's clear that Americans care about it -- but America's standing is not really independent from American policies.  So, the question arises -- will Americans be willing to see policy changes that boost U.S. standing, even if they require significant costs for the United States (cough, global warming, cough)? 

I have my doubts -- but I can be persuaded otherwise.  So, question to readers -- do you care about America's standing?  Has the election of Barack Obama enhanced America's standing?  Should we care? 

In the Boston Globe, Bryan Bender explains that longtime foes of the United States are facing a public relations problem: 

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has an Obama problem. So does the leadership of Al Qaeda. Obama also presents a challenge to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and other leaders who have utilized anti-American feeling to strengthen their grips on power.

The new American president, who has tried to strike a more conciliatory tone toward some of America's most intractable adversaries, may be making inroads into reducing anti-American feeling in some distant corners of the globe: Entire bookshelves from Egypt to the Persian Gulf are dedicated to Obama; a popular Arab pop star is recording a "Song to Obama"; and public spaces that just months ago were dedicated to anti-American posters are festooned with the smiling American leader.

In response, some of the most anti-American governments, along with the leaders of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Hamas, are testing out their own strategy for dealing with Obama: asserting that he's no different from George W. Bush and insisting that US policies won't change.

In trying this approach, these actors are essentially adopting a neorealist explanation for state behavior -- i.e., the disposition of a foreign policy leader is irrelevant, because states will act based on their position in the international system. 

My hunch is that this strategy will not work in the short run, as Obama has pivoted U.S. policy on some important issues (Gitmo, Iran, missile defense, etc.) Not surprisingly, Iran has already begun to deviate from its rabid anti-Obama posture. Yesterday, Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would consider a dialogue with the United States. His foreign minister told Reuters today that, "We look positively on the slogan that Obama raised in the elections. The world has really changed."

Over time, this kind of rhetorical response might work, however. It depends on what Obama does rather than who he is.

Developing....

Having learned the limits of force in Iraq and Afghanistan, US military strategists are rewriting decades-old military doctrine to place humanitarian missions on par with combat, part of a new effort to win over distrustful foreign populations and enlist new global allies, according to top commanders and Pentagon officials. The Defense Department is implementing a series of new directives to use the American arsenal for more peaceful purposes even as it prepares for war, including a little-noticed revision this year to a document called "Joint Operations," described as the "very core" of how the military branches should be organized. The effort illustrates a growing recognition that, to combat radical ideologies and avert future wars, the Pentagon must draw more heavily on its deep reserves of so-called soft power - its ability to set up medical clinics in a remote part of the world, for example - to balance the more traditional "hard power" of military force, according to more than a dozen US military officers in several regions of the world and planners inside the Pentagon. "Things have changed significantly," Jerry Lynes, a retired Marine Corps colonel who is now chief of education and doctrine for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in an interview. "We have taken our traditional principles of war and added to them." The changes have already translated into new military operations. When a US military team arrived by helicopter in Cambodia's rural Kampong Chhnang Province in late May, the imam from the local mosque spread the word and hundreds of locals descended on the Americans. But it was not confrontation they sought. It was free healthcare. The Friendship Clinic, offering primary and vision care, dentistry, a women's health center, and medical training, was part of a first-of-its kind humanitarian mission called Pacific Angel by the Honolulu-based 13th Air Force.

[W]hile the change in emphasis is generally accepted as a positive development, some are also warning that the military risks taking on nonmilitary missions that should be the purview of the State Department and other civilian agencies. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, who has called for greater emphasis on diplomatic and economic tools to further American interests, warned in a speech this month about the "militarization" of American foreign policy and repeated his calls for building new civilian capacity for strengthening fragile states. Others have also cautioned against using the military to perform jobs better suited to civilians, such as democracy building and development aid.

"Our [foreign] policy is out of whack," said Kenneth Bacon, a former assistant secretary of defense who now runs Refugees International, a nonprofit organization. "It is too dominated by the military and we have too little civilian capacity."