Let's not throw the theory out with the Big Mac

It hardly needs pointing out too that the McGlobalization theory has been under steady attack by neorealists like Waltz who argues (I think rightly) that economic ties are secondary to security interests which means that we should look at the McGlobalization of Russia and Georgia as having been a factor in successfully preventing war until now rather than having failed to prevent war forever.

And that the argument of economic ties is based on the premise that financial and commodity markets between the potentially warring states are intricately and significantly enough tied. I think the simple economic difference between Russia and Georgia implies that Russia can successfully invade Georgia (economically speaking) while Georgia would be twice over prevented from attacking Russian (economically and militaristically).

Shorter me: I agree with you!

I think you have a strong point about the causal mechanism of the theory doing some work through deinvestment -- something that is hard to get across to students at times is that much of IR theory does not say "all states will do Y," but rather that states that do not do Y will not succeed. Or, more harshly, as good ol' Waltz would say, they may be selected out of the system.

Friedman also expands the McDonalds example to something that does a better job of getting at the underlying mechanism of the McDonalds thesis by looking at the Walmart supply chain. That example fits more closely with the purported mechanism, though I admit I have no idea if both Georgia and Russia are, at any stage, part of the supply chain.

I don't understand why Georgia didn't just bribe them back into the fold. They must be doing quite well with the oil pipeline.

I thought the Friedman theory went out the window when we bombed Belgrade in 1999.

Turn your $64K question around and ask what benefits will accrue from a reduction of tensions.

Clearly, the US & Europe gain by re-establishing links with Russia that are useful/necessary in meeting very demanding problems like nuclear proliferation, Middle East/Arab-Israeli tensions,Afghanistan (NATO supply routes), etc.

Ditto for Russia (with respective differing interests as for example; acquiring continued access to Western technology, keeping open EU entry permits, fortifying Nordstream and Southstream downstream opportunities, etc).

Only Georgia looses out.
I originally thought (post-breakout of hostilities)that the West was trying to establish a long-term bargaining position via an eventual NATO Georgian entry in exchange for accepting (pursuant to long, time-consuming negotiations & probably new local referendums) a de jure loss of South Ossetia/Abhazia.

But Russia's recognition decisions yesterday put paid to that possibility. Maybe why it was done so swiftly.

So, the West has incentives to acknowledge that (NATO) incursions into Russia's "near abroad" will no longer be tolerated or continued. (Imagine a Russian foray into Monroe Doctrine "space").

Russia has thus incentives to contain expansionist drives elsewhere in the "near abroad", having made its position crystal clear....and so acknowledged (by way of example) in the Caucasus.

And (an amputated but perhaps wiser)Georgia at least keeps the benefit of having the right to an independent,sovereign existence of sorts, compliments of this interplay between Russia and the "West".

.....And Big Mac can happily continue dishing out its high fat/high calorie output to all.

A lot depends upon the crucial pipelines that I think Russia wants to control.

A.S., let's also note what Friedman wrote back then:

"Like it or not, we are at war with the Serbian nation (the Serbs certainly think so), and the stakes have to be very clear: Every week you ravage Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulverizing you. You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389 too."

More recently, Friedman apologised for going stupid after 9-11, along with the rest of the United States. But the evidence seems to be that he goes stupid with each war. As do most people. In an ideal world, though, there ought to be a premium for pundits who don't.

It puts the entire globalization theory in jeorpardy, and pretty much destroys what was left of the international legalism that Europeans love so much.

There are hidden premises in your argument that are questionable. First, in any conflict, there will be both positives and negatives, many not knowable for years. For example, you seem to consider the loss of raising capital a bigger negative than the acquisition of land. If only countless rulers had seen war this way. But if we are in a world that is now going to be dominated by the quest for resources, the acquisition of resource or pipeline-rich land may be a far bigger positive. I give this only as an example, to show that your argument rests on a worldview that may be either stale or simply unrealistic.

Now that things have escalated, with NATO having now more firepower in the Black Sea than the Russians (which itself might be a violation of international law, dependant on how one reads Montreax), where's the UN? Where are all those international legal scholars to lay down the law?

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/27/europe/georgia.php

http://www.interfax.com/3/422730/news.aspx

"whether these costs will deter further military aggression by all the parties involved."

"All"? Don't you mean, "Russia and Georgia"? What military aggression has been committed by the US or the Europeans?

If your question is simply about "deterring further aggression", then you mean Russia, in which case the question becomes whether a higher sovereign risk premium and increased capital flight will deter Russia from snatching Crimea from Ukraine. Short answer: it all depends on where and how you raise the cost.

Long answer: "Lex," Russia is "not a normal country" and hasn't been for going on two decades. The IR community's probabilistic laws do not apply to a shambolic regime that has been criminalized by various hybridized security services/mafiya clans and that cannot speak clearly with one voice and cannot or will not undertake what it commits or agrees to do.

So if you want to attack this African-style kleptocracy that understands only force and conceives of power in personal terms that could have been lifted from John Gotti's playbook, you have to look at how the money actually flows in, or more precisely out of, Russia.

Re. increases in the cost of capital, the capital markets are a sideshow in Russia. The real action's offshore. (As the saying goes, "The oil's in the ground, but the money's in Switzerland.") Put it another way, here's a quiz. Which do you think is greater:

a) annual interst payments on Russian debt, or

b) the amount of cash siphoned out of Russian companies via Russian bandits' trading company intermediaries.

Clue: Putin-Mobutu like most Russian bandits owns a large stake (50%) in a Swiss-based oil trading firm. Clue #2: Putin's now worth close to $100 BILLION.

If you really want to raise the cost of aggression by Russian bandit-thugs, hit 'em where it counts: in their numbered Swiss and Liechtenstein acccounts. Precipitate a Chicago-style gangland war for spoils inside Russia's criminalized regime. Divide each clan and pit the nephews vs their uncles, Putin against his FSB-mafiya priyatki.