What does Charter 08 tell us about China in 09?

Dr. Drezner, to begin, I'd like to wish you congrats on the new digs. You are certainly in good company, and the FP blogs seem poised to become one of highlights of the blogosphere in 2009.

And now the bad part: while I've very much enjoy your political economy work, it feels like you're falling into the liberal triumphalist trap of wishful thinking when it comes to China. (Really man, even Fukuyama doesn't believe it anymore!)

Yes, the publication of Charter 08 is an interesting chapter in China's intellectual history, but it is seemingly staged more for Western curiosity than actual impact within China. The main problem with your thesis is the degree to which Chinese intellectuals can shape the discourse, rouse the public, and force policymakers to engage their ideas, and that degree is almost zero.

There are several reasons for this, including the general Chinese apathy towards all things political that are not simultaneously nationalistic; the tendency of the Western media to treat dissidents as "pets" and therefore alienate common Chinese; the tendency of dissidents to factionalize, Red Guard-style, and therefore undermine themselves, as was witnessed in the democracy movement, post-1989; the fact that the vast majority of educated Chinese have bought into the Party's plan for capitalist development and spend little time dwelling on the intellectuals' calls for a new China; and the abundant, overwhelming sense of cynicism that leads Chinese to support the status quo on the grounds that, in the words of The Who, the new boss would be the same as the old boss.

This is not to say that there aren't uprisings (so-called "mass incidents" happen ) or manifestations of dissent within China, but they are first and foremost organic and spontaneous, almost universally springing forth at the grassroots level while spreading through electronic fora or through word of mouth, and are directed at private corruption or state entities at the local level rather than the central government level.

And this is a point that is worth examining: We in the West have, for decades now, drawn the wrong picture of China as a totalitarian monolith when in fact the nature of the Chinese state is that of a federalist autocracy without the rule of law. Beijing sets general goals for the nation and the localities implement policies to pursue these goals in ways suitable to the interests of the locality and/or the officials involved (too often the latter). And while the people may despise their local cadres for sticking their dirty fingers into too many pies, they nonetheless support Beijing's vision for China.

Because of the nature of the system, the Chinese central government you deem on the verge of collapse remains strong, as local governments and the police as a general entitity draw most of the contempt from the populace. All Beijing need do in times of significant unrest is take steps to punish a few local leaders or enact policies such as the recent tax cuts for rural farmers, and much anger will subside.

Finally, it is not stretching to say that Chinese people are, as hinted at above, highly nationalistic. In response to this fact, Hu and Wen have successfully unified their personal identities with that of the country, effectively producing a cult of personality without a cult. Though they may rail against local corruption, most Chinese will tell you that Hu and Wen are "good men." So long as this opinion holds sway over the populace, so long as the literate and the passionate buy into the promise of prosperity rather than the possibilities of change, the words of Charter 08 will fall on deaf ears.

I can't agree more with stinson's comments. Charter 08 does not have any power to rally large sectors of the population. While many people are frustrated and angry about local corruption and the corrosive effects it has on their daily life, a large percentage of the "mass incidents," as they are called in China, are isolated and directed at local level government. It would take *a lot* to trigger nationwide protests directed at the central government, and despite the economic down turn, i don't see this happening.

There are huge differences between now and 1989. The Tiananmen protests in '89 were preceded by other student protests in 1987 as well as by much more open criticism of the *central* government.

I also am a big fan of your new site, though i think that this will be one of your wrong predictions.

Exiled dissident Wan Runnan did a pretty good run down of this in his 2006 article "Why The Chinese Communists Are Not Doomed To Finish Yet", here's how he summed up:

" 1. From the lessons of the former Soviet Russia and eastern Europe, the Communist Party is more firm and clear about suppressing the opposition;

2. After forming alliances, the Communist Party has established a relatively stable international environment;

3. The continuous economic development has provided adequate resources for improving their ability to govern;

4. Under the pretext of "we won't argue," the Communist Party has actually totally abandoned their former ideology;

5. The Communist Party has become a political party that represents wealthy people and the social elite. This newly created middle class is the foundation of stability in Chinese society today;

6. The confirmation of their model for power succession has eliminated the concerns about their ability to maintain government.

It is said that the existence of something includes two aspects: the existence of the spirit and the existence of the body. Then, in terms of spirit, the Communist Party no longer exists. It is finished because it has killed itself. In terms of body, it is still there but without a soul. They can now speak of "being based on people" and "eight honors and eight shames", but most of these spiritual resources can be readily found in the governing philosophy of various Chinese rulers in history. In the predictable future, I do not see any likelihood for a sudden collapse of the Chinese Communists. "

(read the whole thing here:
http://zonaeuropa.com/20060511_2.htm )

As much as I would like to see the back of them, I have to agree. The CCP will survive the next 5-10 years because they have co-opted the leading elements of society, because they no longer believe in communism (although the communist political system remains), and because economic growth continues (and no-one is predicting GDP growth of less than 6-7% for the next few years).

I hate to say this, but Bao Tong's opinions are pretty much irrelevant. Deng Xiaoping has been dead 12 years, criticising him has about the same level of effect as blaming Reagan or Thatcher for the current economic crisis. It might have some academic significance, but China has changed so much in the last two decades economically and socially that 1979 might as well have been the middle ages. Criticism directed at the current generation of leaders might have had a noticeable effect, but there is already significant non-official criticism of the Jiang Zemin era, and this does not seem to have shaken the government at all.

Finally - and I can't stress this enough - but exiled dissidents lose their significance very quickly after they leave China. They can therefore be a rather unreliable source of information on the current situation in their country of origin, and often seem to be living in the past. The opinion of resident dissidents is far more important, as they may play a part in bringing about change. As Wan Runnan himself admitted in the article quoted above:

"which comparable overseas democratic movement anywhere ever had any influence? After the eastern European movements, we visited Poland and we asked Solidarity Union friends a stupid question: When the Polish military government began suppression, a number of dissidents went into exile overseas. What did these people do in the latter changes inside Poland? They replied without any pause: Nothing whatsoever. Then they sensed our embarrassment and consoled us: "Those exiles served some purpose because they gave us some fax machines and stuff."

. . . I met Dai Qing (??) overseas and she said: "You do not have a place in the future change in China." I replied: Yes. The change in China is like a chemical reaction with reagents and products. We are just the temperature, pressure and catalyst that bring about this chemical reaction and we do not have a position in the final product."

When coming up with predictions as to what is going on in a country, listen to the people who live there. To be honest, I find as much significance in the arrest of nationalist activist Guo Quan for writing an article demanding democratic reforms as I do in Charter 08, as the nationalists have much more in the way of support than any of the explicitly pro-democracy movements. Put it this way, if you have lived in a major Chinese city for more than a few years you have probably seen or heard of a nationalist demonstration - how many explicitly pro-democracy demonstrations have taken place in the last four years? How many have taken place since 1989? Yet the nationalists, with the government's acceptance and encouragement, have carved out a niche in the Chinese body-politic from which they may not easily be extracted.