Monday, March 9, 2009 - 1:21 PM
Three months ago I blogged that the World Bank's growth projections for this year were too optimistic. Let's review my reasons:
- Credit markets have yet to really unfreeze, because the underlying problem -- putting a price on a lot of toxic debt -- has yet to take place;
- It's going to take some time for trust -- a vital public good -- to return to global capital markets;
- The crisis has done nothing to unwind the global macroeconomic imbalances that contributed to the asset bubble in the first place -- if anything, the crisis has temporarily reinforced it;
- There is a very dangerous prisoner's dilemma game brewing in the interplay of fiscal expansion and trade policy. Unless export engines like Germany start to signal that they'll prime their pump as well, you're going to start to see some nasty protectionist attachments to any new government spending;
- Fiscal expansions are going to take a long time to kick in, and the ones being proposed are not necessarily conducive to countercyclical boosts.
- Beyond the fiscal expansion, this crisis is going to result in a lot more state intervention in the economy. Given what's happened, it would be intellectually dishonest of me not to acknowledge that some of this intervention will be necessary. A lot of it, however, is going to be misguided and stunt long-term growth.
I would be very surprised if global growth was not negative in 2009.
With the very partial exception of no. 5, all of the other factors are still very, very present in the global economy.
And, alas, it now appears that the Bank has caught up with my doom and gloom.
Developing countries face a financing shortfall of $270-700 billion this year, as private sector creditors shun emerging markets, and only one quarter of the most vulnerable countries have the resources to prevent a rise in poverty, the World Bank said....
The global economy is likely to shrink this year for the first time since World War Two, with growth at least 5 percentage points below potential. World Bank forecasts show that global industrial production by the middle of 2009 could be as much as 15 percent lower than levels in 2008. World trade is on track in 2009 to record its largest decline in 80 years, with the sharpest losses in East Asia.
The financial crisis will have long-term implications for developing countries. Debt issuance by high-income countries is set to increase dramatically, crowding out many developing country borrowers, both private and public. Many institutions that have provided financial intermediation for developing country clients have virtually disappeared. Developing countries that can still access financial markets face higher borrowing costs, and lower capital flows, leading to weaker investment and slower growth in the future.
There's something else going on that should bother IR scholars. One of the benefits of having a hegemon is supposed to be greater provision of global public goods. According to hegemonic stability theory, if the United States is really still the hegemon, then it should be providing the following things:
The U.S. did all of these things during the Asian financial crisis, for example.
This time around, the U.S. grade is not as high. There has certainly been provisions of liquidity -- though if one defines the start of this crisis as the fall o 2007, then it's not like LIBOR has fallen to pre-crisis levels.
The U.S. is not a market for distressed goods. On the margins this is due to incipient protectionism, but mostly this is due to the U.S. economic contraction. Indeed, this is why the recession has so deeply affected Pacific Rim exporters.
The worst grade, however, is on counter-cyclical lending. As the New York Times' Peter Goodman writes:
American investors are ditching foreign ventures and bringing their dollars home, entrusting them to the supposed bedrock safety of United States government bonds. And China continues to buy staggering quantities of American debt.
These actions are lifting the value of the dollar and providing the Obama administration with a crucial infusion of financing as it directs trillions of dollars toward rescuing banks and stimulating the economy, enabling the government to pay for these efforts without lifting interest rates.
And yet in a global economy crippled by a lack of confidence and capital, with lending and investment mechanisms dysfunctional from Milan to Manila, the tilt of money toward the United States appears to be exacerbating the crisis elsewhere.
The pursuit of capital suddenly seems like a zero sum game. A dollar invested by foreign central banks and investors in American government bonds is a dollar that is not available to Eastern European countries desperately seeking to refinance debt. It is a dollar that cannot reach Africa, where many countries are struggling with the loss of aid and foreign investment.
Developing.... in a very, very bad way.
EXPLORE:GLOBALIZATION, FINANCIAL MELTDOWN, HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY, HEGEMONY, PROTECTIONISM, WORLD BANK
Prof. Drezner is funny. Wasn't it just a couple of years ago he was all gloom and doom about the impending collapse of the dollar. After all, I remember reading many, many posts on danieldrezner.com about how the dollar was about to collapse because the world wouldn't keep buying US treasuries.
Turns out, Prof. Drezner's thoughts on that were precisely, completely wrong. 180 degrees wrong. It turns out that the dollar didn't collapse. And the world didn't stop buying US treasuries. In fact, the world is buying *more* US treasuries. And the dollar is *appreciating*. Too much, in fact!
The one constant, though, is Drezner's doom and gloom. Remember, everyone should understand that everything is awful because of X, and if it turns out that actually not-X is the case, well, that's awful too. Ah, to be a professor focusing on international economy. The dollar's about to collapse! The dollar's appreciating too much! Same difference!
Actually, the post that Prof. Drezner references here was fairly accurate, and, like he said, most of the same conditions still exist. I can't say on what he was posting a few years back, but we did have something of a dollar collapse last year; the recent rally in the dollar is partially attributable to a dollar funding gap, which has left banks starved for dollars:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/recession/4939796/Europes-banks-face-a-2-trillion-dollar-shortage.html
Some of this is shocking, particularly the dropoff in capital flows to developng nations.
But the question is whether the US remains the hegemon. Obviously not in the same sense that it was the hegemon in 1997, really in two marked ways. In 1997 the US did two major things virtually singlehandedly: It averted the crash in Asia from turning into a global route, and it fought the Kosovo War.
Arguably the Asian countries were rich enough then to manage their own affairs, and there is no satisfactory reason why Europe should not have been able to handle the Kosovo crisis without substantial US help. But the US intervened and helped avert both crisises - but at a cost. That cost was inflating the internet bubble of the late 90's, which later exploded into the dot.bomb debacle.
The Fed again ran an easy money policy to turn the dot.bomb recession into the housing bubble. Now we have to face the music - no more bubbles are possible. If Asia is suffering some of the consequences of these policies it is only fair in a sense. The US government and consumer helped out Asia in 1997, and Asia is now taking some of the burden as the US moves to a positive savings rate again. I gather the savings rate is up to 5% in February, and some forecasts have it going to 8 or even 10%.
If it happens this will have two implications - that much of the deficits which Obama proposes will be self-financed, although not all. If the deficit declines but the savings rate doesn't, the US deficit may become net self-financing, releasing capital for investment elsewhere. A saving surplus may even develop.
In 2009 the US is unwilling or unable to make the same efforts as in 1997 (mostly unable) - because the US has been impacted deeply itself. Obviously the US consumer cannot be the market of last resort for everyone else for a while because we must save, export, and pay off our bills.
So are we the hegemon any more? Perhaps not. Perhaps this crisis marks the end of the be-all do-all hyperpower and the beginning of a new era in which the US is merely the #1 power in a Great Powers system.
Is that so bad? I think perhaps it is not......
Jean-Claude Trichet weighs in,.....
European Central Bank President Jean- Claude Trichet said today that "investors are underestimating the potential for a return to economic growth and that the world may be approaching a turning point."
His point is that with stimulative spending beginning to take effect globally, central bank interest rates at low levels, and the effect of massive cuts in oil prices, that shares markets may be closer to the inflection point than we realize.
Perhaps, perhaps not. The problem is that we think this recession is different. Most post war recessions have taken the same form - by the time that nations realize that a recession is ongoing and have 'fiscal stimulus' measures put into place, the recession is over or almost over and growth has resumed. Unemployment keeps rising for a time, and the recovery is frequently aenemic, but recovery has begun.
If this drop follows the previous pattern that point should have been reached - about now. Problem is that this didn't occur in the Great Depression in the US. But then no serious stimulative plans were enacted; indeed much government policy in that era could only be described as counter-stimulative.
Do we know that for sure? No way. And we won't begin to know for several months.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=axI1BvVndWZM&refer=news
Trichet has been consistently wrong on just about everything for the past couple of years.
Just last summer, for example, he was saying everything was fine with the European economy, raised their 2008 forecasts for economic growth, and was even talking about raising interest rates!
Trichet is a mainstream economist
Mainstream economists have been pretty consistently wrong for the past couple of years. It's been the weird outliers who called this one.
Most recessions begin to end right about the time that people recognize the crisis and governments lay on stimulus programs. Which they have done now in most coutries.
Trichet is reflecting that fact and also the fact that most of the world have made strenuous stimulative efforts, plus factoring in the stimulus effect of huge drops in energy prices. The way to bet is massive inflation in a year or two, I think. Trichet probably believes that also, though he can't say it in public.
But - he could be wrong. We all could be wrong. We may continue sliding into deflation as happened in the 30's.
We just don't know, because this particular set of policies and circumstances have never been tried out before. We had a deflationary spiral between 1930 and 1933, but policy was actually the opposite of stimulative for much of that period; massive stimulus wasn't tried until later (and perhaps not even then to this degree).
The post made me think of an article in Foreign Affairs by Walter Russell Mead, "Only Makes you Stronger." If one consequence of the economic crisis is a constantly strengthening dollar (as people flee to the perceived safest assets), doesn't that make the country with the most liquid (easily accessed) power China?
They holds trillions of of ever more valuable U.S. dollars, and since a great deal of that wealth is in much-demanded Treasury bonds, they can easily convert that wealth into purchasing power any time they want. If I were in China's position, I would go on a huge global asset buying binge. Even the worthwhile stuff is at fire-sale prices, so the Chinese seem poised to emerge from this crisis in a hugely advanced position.
That's a highly questionable premise. Maybe we can borrow huge amounts of money without it negatively impacting our currency and debt, but even the Chinese think that's very unlikely:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ba857be6-f88f-11dd-aae8-000077b07658.html
Luo Ping, a director-general at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, said after a speech in New York on Wednesday that China would continue to buy Treasuries in spite of its misgivings about US finances...
Mr Luo, whose English tends toward the colloquial, added: “We hate you guys. Once you start issuing $1 trillion-$2 trillion [$1,000bn-$2,000bn] . . .we know the dollar is going to depreciate, so we hate you guys but there is nothing much we can do.”
Blue, I feel for the poor frustrated Chinese banker, but consider one thing.
That Chinese investment in US government bonds was probably the #1 performing asset in the world last year. I've read that US bonds actually appreciated 14% last year as the dollar appreciated against every major currency except the yen and perhaps the yuan. I live in the UK, so let's look at the dollar against the pound:
At the beginning of 2008 the pound bought $2, give or take. That rate fell to about $1.40 or even lower. Now let's assume that Obama's policies result in a massive fall against the euro and the pound (which it probably won't because the Europeans and Brits are arguably in worse shape). But if it did, what might it fall to? $1.80, maybe even $2 per pound? A massive fall indeed but back right to what it was at early last summer. Is the euro going to move to $2.50? I don't think so, given the rotten fundamentals in many of the European countries. The euro isn't just Germany and France, but also Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland. Many of those countries are relative basket cases.
Add in the fact that banks in the 'core' countries like Germany, Austria, and Spain are heavily lent into Eastern Europe and Latin America and the weakness is even more obvious.
That is why China is not getting out of the buck - there are no better alternatives for China in the current state of the world. The only alternate policy china could pursue is to bring that money home and invest it in China - things like education, consumer goods, domestic consumption, etc.
The dollar would crash, perhaps to half it's value against the yuan. And soon afterward the US would become an exporting country, sending goods to china and probably worldwide.
Don,
I agree with your comment above about inflation being the long-term threat. The problem with our approach is we are trying to reflate the value of assets that were purchased at inflated prices, through the incurrence of trillions of dollars of new debt to stimulate demand to buy these assets. At best the government may be able to provide a short-term boost to the economy, but debt-financed government demand can't be sustained indefinitely. At some point, we do have to generate revenue to pay for Obama's spending. While the US balance sheet may seem to be limitless right now, it's hard to imagine this continuing to be the case indefinitely. This is why Obama's policies are so harmful to our economy and why the market has taken its hit since they were revealed: He hasn't come close to proposing solutions to deal with the longer-term issue of savings-induced growth. His policies are setting us up for sub-par growth for years going forward, and this doesn't even take into account the trillion dollar tax increase via cap and trade, which, as best as I can tell, will be both a tax on industrial activity and burden the poor and middle class; maybe it will turn out great, but this uncertainty is harming confidence at a time when we need confidence badly (in this context, his growth projections are a big joke). Absorbing trillions of dollars of bad debts will likely cause a transition of our resources away new productive endeavors.
Yes, just about the only thing we've got going for us in terms of our debt and currency is that most others are in worst positions than us, but if they pursue wiser policies this could all change down the road (I mean just 9 months ago many were talking about $200 oil and the death of the dollar). And what's going to happen when we've got all this new debt and suddenly the cost of servicing it rises dramatically? Or if our financing needs suck most of the available capital out of world markets and many countries worse off than us are forced into default?
I said during the election that if Obama actually believes the economic doctrine he was pushing at the time, we could see Dow 6000; now I'm thinking 5000 is possible (yes, there will be bear market rallies). It's not too late for him to change course.
Of course, I really have no idea how this is all going to play out; the real wildcard is the possible meltdown of Eastern Europe.
It seems to me that you're making an awfully strong case for the creation of unbacked reserve currency. Can someone give me a good, non-ideological reason why the fed shouldn't offer a negative overnight lending rate and create additional reserve "out of thin air?"
"According to hegemonic stability theory, if the United States is really still the hegemon, then it should be providing the following things:
Provisions of liquidity
Market for distressed goods
Long-term cunter-cyclical lending"
Or, maybe the hegemon overextended its means. Perhaps, we are still not allowed to consider such theories even after Bush has left office?
I would love to read a comparative study of the internal economy of end of empire Britain and the US today, if only to have a better understanding.
I suppose a neorealist might say viz hegemon theory that globalism for the nonce does not suit our immediate interests, whether that leads to an unwinding of the system, well - or is the whole system just too big and complex therefore rendering hegemonic considerations meaningless once a crisis gets bad enough?
The headline of this blog posting is amusing.....
"The United States flunks hegemonic stability theory"
A theory is an idea which purports to explain objective reality in some way. Should the theory fail to do so, normally one would ascribe the failure to shortcomings in the theory, not to defects in reality.
The headline of this blog post implies otherwise - that the US has an obligation to uphold a certain theory in it's public policy whether it is possible in actual reality or not. Amusing.....
Hegemonic theory in the last few decades has for the most part been based on the United States as a hegemon. Prof. Drezner actually makes a good case for why the United States might not be such a hegemon after all. That doesn't mean he implies defects in reality (that's usually the realm of economics), just defects in the assumption that the USA is a good example of a hegemon.
It's a funny theory, historically speaking......
I don't think there are that many examples of true hegemons in history, and almost no examples truly similar to the US.
Looking back, I think one might point to certain Chinese dynasties as hegemons; perhaps the High Ming era might be an example. Possibly Spain under Charles V before he broke up the uber-empire into Spanish and German components.
Some point to the British Empire in it's heyday between 1815 and 1860, before the 2nd Industrial Revolution spread. Possibly France under Louis XIVth. And of course the late Roman Republic and early Roman Empire. But that is about it, I would think.
Unfortunately a theory which essetially defines itself on one case might not have a terribly long shelf life, because such circumstances are historically quite rare and tend to break down within a relatively short period for various reasons.
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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