Monday, March 16, 2009 - 1:07 PM
Bloggers at Foreign Policy and elsewhere have discovered Strange New Respect for IHT/NYT columnist Roger Cohen. Cohen has been writing a fair amount about the Middle East as of late. I've been, well, less enamored of Cohen's writing, though in fairness to him I'm tough on all foreign affairs columnists.
This brings us to today's Cohen column, and the paradox contained in his last few paragraphs. Cohen's recent columns have been all about his trip to Iran, in which he accurately described a country that was not spending every waking moment plotting to destroy the United States.
Today's column points to the pragmatism of Iran's leadership and urges the United States to be equally pragmatic:
Pragmatism is also one way of looking at Iran’s nuclear program. A state facing a nuclear-armed Israel and Pakistan, American invasions in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, and noting North Korea’s immunity from assault, might reasonably conclude that preserving the revolution requires nuclear resolve.
What’s required is American pragmatism in return, one that convinces the mullahs that their survival is served by stopping short of a bomb.
I completely agree with the first excerpted paragraph of Cohen's column -- which is why I don't buy the second paragraph.
As Cohen ably demonstrates, Iran's leadership sees a lot of threats in its near abroad and recognizes the utility of a nuclear deterrent. What can the United States possibly offer that would convince Iran's mullahs to give that up?
Security guarantees? Accepting those is not terribly pragmatic from Iran's perspective. Why should Iran trust the United States' word on this? From Tehran's perspective, would you trust the ability of the Obama administraion to rein in Israel?
The lifting of financial sanctions? As Iran's mullahs might put this, whoop-dee-frickin-doo. Rachel Loeffler argues that these sanctions carry some bite, but the nuclear program is a domestic crowd-pleaser and offers the hope of policy autonomy that a lifting of sanctions does not provide. The only sanction that would really hurt Tehran enough to buckle is a gasoline embargo, and the Russians and Chinese will never sign on to one of those.
Pragmatically, I seriously doubt that the United States can offer anything to get Tehran to halt its nuclear program. This leads to one of two possible decisions: pre-emptive action to delay the program, or accepting the inevitable.
Contra Cohen, the most pragmatic thing for the United States to do is to expect nothing fruitful to come from negotiations with Iran -- and to (nonviolently) prepare for the contingency of a nuclear Iran.
A question to my realist colleagues here at FP -- why on God's green earth would Iran ever accede to an agreement whereby it gives up any autonomy in its nuclear program?
why on God's green earth would Iran ever accede to an agreement whereby it gives up any autonomy in its nuclear program?
Freely? They wouldn't, of course.
Under duress? Because the alternative is worse for them - but that's not so much an "agreement" as an "ultimatum".
is that any deal wouldn't be with the US, but with the Obama Administration. It could easily be set aside by a new administration, and the Iranian leadership is definitely hoping to have a solution that lasts longer than four or eight years.
This is why dictatorships are easier to deal with than democracies. Democracies have frequent leadership turnovers with real changes, particularly in foreign affairs.
If you're the Iranian leaders, the US is an existential threat. That is, it's a threat simply because it exists. This is why having nukes is an imperative for them, and nothing we can do will stop them.
Good point, Dan. To be honest, I've never expected the Iranians to give up a nuclear program unless having it is a greater risk than not having it. Can you honestly say, from the Iranian side, that having nukes would make them less safe at this point from perceived threats (and never mind increased liberty of action)?
In the meantime, Cohen is annoying as usual. What was he trying to prove, that most Iranians aren't hatemongers and fanatics? That's old news, and unfortunately, it's irrelevant; the small percentage of the population that does hold those views also tends to make up the clerics, the military, various militias, and the security forces that control the country. As Friedman said in one of his better columns, "have a nice day."
There may after all be Iranians aware that the last two countries to succeed in acquiring nuclear arsenals, of varying sizes, were North Korea and Pakistan, and that their success hasn't accomplished very much for either of them.
Sure, having nuclear weapons allows the Pakistanis to shake their fists at the Indians, and the North Koreans to shake their fists at everyone. That's about all it has done for either, though. Pakistan is a mess. North Korea has always been a mess. The pursuit of atomic weapons didn't cause every problem in these two countries, but neither did it solve any.
Nuclear weapons are expensive to acquire, more expensive to maintain. They require extensive security measures; in Iran, they would need to be subject to some understanding as to how responsibility for keeping, deploying and ultimately using them were to be assigned among the various power centers in the Iranian government. Iran without nuclear weapons is at risk of attack only because other nations fear it might acquire them; Iran with nuclear weapons is at risk of a first strike from the one country in the region than has them already and that fears, with some cause, that Iran might strike first if left to itself. Iran is also surrounded by non-nuclear Arab neighbors that might not stay non-nuclear for long once Tehran gets the bomb. Finally, in a world of $100/barrel oil, a nuclear weapons program might be an affordable luxury, even with the risks. Iran doesn't live in that world right now.
Nuclear weapons, in short, are a lot of trouble. If the United States needs a realist perspective on Iran's nuclear program, surely one component of it ought to be consideration of what a realist perspective in Tehran might look like. Granted that there is every likelihood that national pride arguments -- that's really all they are, as they were in Pakistan over a decade ago -- for acquiring nuclear weapons will remain attractive to many Iranians. Even the "we have to have nukes because the Israelis have them" argument may make sense to the majority of Iranians unaware that Iran long maintained cordial relations with Israel but now quarrels with the Jewish state because its own government has chosen to and for no other reason.
It is still passing strange that successive American administrations have followed a public line that reinforces the Iranian government's rhetoric about foreigners' determination to deprive Iran of its "rights" and national aspirations. Iran has interests, too; the Tehran regime doesn't necessarily have the last word on what Iranians consider those to be. There is a good case to be made that Iran could gain a great deal more by bargaining away its pursuit of nuclear weapons than it could by throwing money that could be used for development at it, but the American government is not making that case at the moment.
A question to my realist colleagues here at FP -- why on God's green earth would Iran ever accede to an agreement whereby it gives up any autonomy in its nuclear program?
Why do you assume that autonomy is the chief Iranian value? People exchange degrees of autonomy all the time for more security, prosperity and influence. Why is Iran any different? I assume most Iranians are a bit tired of being isolated, threatened, surrounded and artificially poor. Surely the allure of a more normal national life, less strained international relations and the liberation of economic potential carries some force. And Iran's government knows that its long-term health depends on delivering on the aspirations of its people. It's quasi-democratic system of government means that the mullahs can't keep the lid on these aspirations over time, even if they were disposed to do so.
You seem to be convinced that Iran is inherently and perpetually a state of revolutionary fanatics who will sacrifice every kind of material benefit for the sake of precious independence and purity.
This is a side comment and I don't really have any ideas at the moment about what is the best strategy on the Iranian side and what is the best course of action on the American side, but you raised an important issue, In fact AUTONOMY is the MAIN goal for the Iranian population and it has nothing to do with the current government. Any Iranian who has taken the sequence of History course at high school, feels a great insecurity and distrust towards others. they knows about all the occasions of invasions by Greeks and Arabs and Mongols and Afghans,... (not that accent Iran has done any better, although Iranians firmly believe it has)and most importantly every single Iranian is still mourning over their land loses in two wars to Russia over a hundred years ago.
I want to emphasize that Iran faced the modern world through wars and loss of land in those wars, and the feeling of insecurity and deficiency is, perhaps wrongly, internalized in the psychology of that society.
This is why I disagree with anyone who would say a democratic Iran will not seek nuclear weapon, in fact a democratic Iran will eventually seek any weaponry and beyond that as long as this psychology exist among the people of that nation, and its not a rational reaction. Its a reaction of a fearful, somewhat paranoid, nation who feels cornered since over a hundred years ago by stranger nations
Thanks for posting this. I stopped reading American newspapers when the opinions of the Religious Right was deemed to be equal to scientific results of studies for balance.
I am glad that some in the USA are finally catching that Iran has problems at its borders. Nuclear armed nations that are not looking exactly stable in a region where a religious war is being waged, and Iran is the other side of its neighbors in many cases. That Iran is not a democracy, no matter how much their virtually powerless elected official's distasteful bravado helps our foreign policy implementation.
It sounds like an article well worth reading.
To 'reign in'? I can accept spelling mistakes, but this...
or are NIEs not alarmist enough for certain hysterics
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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