I heard your commentary on Marketplace, and want to second it heartily.

I recall a debate that took place over at the Democracy Arsenal website a couple of years ago during an early round in the Russia-Ukraine natural gas wars. Russia and Ukraine were engaged in a game of hardball over price, pipelines, downstream delivery, etc. in the way with which we have all become very familiar since then. The writers at that site - who seem to represent the economically aloof foreign policy community attitudes and formation you discussed in your commentary - seemed convinced that Moscow's actions could only stem from the fact that Moscow wanted to send an ideological signal about their views on "democracy" or whatnot in Ukraine and the Russian near abroad. The idea that Russia was largely driven by business considerations, and that dominating the natural gas market, and making a lot of money in the process, was something Russia was interested in doing on its own merits, apart from whatever additional impact that domination might have on regional ideological outlooks, was something to which the writers were, as I recall, strangely resistant.

On a side-issue in the debate, Russia's tactics were presented by the writers as "anti-globalization". I couldn't understand this notion, since Russia was clearly playing very zestfully in a global arena, and was working to link up a far-flung international distribution network, and dominate an expanding international market comprising many countries. I realized later that the writer confused globalization itself with extreme American-style liberalization: a particular form of global economic interdependency in which states aren't allowed to be major players with a strategic economic agenda or an explicit commercial stake of their own, but only serve as umpires in the commercial dealings of private firms.

From my outside perspective, based on that discussion and several others like them, it appears there is a sort of ethereal, platonic disdain in large portions of the foreign policy establishment for the material aspects of reality, and a strong disinclination to recognize the influence of material and commercial motives on human beings. And even where those motives are acknowledged, there is a resistance to according them any legitimacy; an escapist tendency to avoid thinking practically about how they should be balanced in our own strategic plans; and a disposition to regard them as prima facie evidence of villainy and cynicism whenever their observed presence in the actions of other countries is so obvious as to be inescapable. Among many writers four or five years ago, and still today, it was not uncommon to notice a massive cognitive blind spot about the United States's own behaviors in the world, and a tendency to attribute those behaviors to some sort of platonic striving and exceptional spiritual beneficence. This precious and rosy view of the US was frequently combined with chiding of the cynical behavior of others, whose low minds were taken up with such mundane and uninspiring things as acquiring oil at a cheap price, protecting investments or selling commercial airliners.

There is, in many fields of study and expertise, a permanent risk of a natural but illogical interplay between thinking about normative issues and thinking about descriptive issues. A certain style of high-minded idealist seems to start with the moral conviction that one's own actions should not be driven by seemy economic motives. This somehow leads into a hopeful interpretation of the actions of others, including our government and its key institutions, as in fact not driven by economic motives. Finally, one projects out a whole unreal world that is largely unconcerned with money, and that does battle, where battle occurs, primarily on a lofty ideological plane.

It is really interesting to note this strange evolution of the Democratic Party center. That's because the "left" - which once upon a time included the Democratic Party mainstream - was traditionally known for its marked tendency toward economic interpretations of political events. It is also strange to me that some of the same foreign policy practitioners who seem so averse to the motives springing from the mean and grubby worlds of business, commerce and material profit acquired their own formative professional training working for strategic consultancies who advise corporations on conditions abroad so that those corporations can better profit financially.

OK, but there's something at work here that seems fairly unique to your field, and that is the limited practical application of the degree. I mean, where's the market for the degree outside of government/academia/think tanks? What kind of private industry jobs can the degree get a person? So, it may say less about academia, and more about the nature of the specific degree as it has become more specialized.

For example, when I was in law school, the guy who taught Con law had written one of the seminal papers on Marbury v. Madison. That was his one big idea that made it for him in academia; his academic career and subsequent tenure was built on that one paper and the subsequent work that flowed from it. But, in the meantime, he also had the opportunity to take on clients in a private capacity. So, even if one disagreed with his one big idea on Marbury, he still had a wealth of experience in arguing cases and representing clients that informed his views. And this opportunity allowed him to get beyond his single one idea that brought him acclaim in academia (and it was the combination of the two that put him at one point on the SCOTUS short list of a previous administration). It seems in international relations, there really isn't much in the way of private industry work that can help provide some practical knowledge to help inform academics in the field and modify their views when they come up against reality.

All this talk of hedgehogs and Isaiah Berlin makes me think that Dan has been reading, or needs to read, "The Elegance of the Hedgehog." See:

http://tinyurl.com/drezner

The idea that Russia was largely driven by business considerations, and that dominating the natural gas market, and making a lot of money in the process...

Then again, I've worked on real oil deals in Russia, and I think that the views of the academics you deride have some merit. If Russia were really being driven by market considerations, it would not have nationalized its entire oil industry, which has resulted in production decreasing in 2008 notwithstanding record oil prices in the first three quarters of the year.

But, in the meantime, he also had the opportunity to take on clients in a private capacity.

As a con law specialist? Don't bet on it, especially if he's never done any appellate litigation.