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If a scholar makes a prediction in a forest of analysts, does anybody listen?
A recurring theme of this blog has been the relationship between academics and policymakers. What, if anything should academics have on offer? What should they have to offer?
Stanford's alumni magazine offers an interesting take on this question, asking six scholars and policymakers affiliated with the university about, "what lessons they drew from conflicts they studied or had a role in, and how they relayed their insights to the people in charge."
The most fascinating anecdote comes from Priya Satia:
In 2007, the U.S. Directorate of National Intelligence invited Satia to address staffers from more than a dozen different intelligence organizations about Middle East counterinsurgency. She spoke about the risks of groupthink, and the price British and Iraqis paid for that. But the message seemed to pass people by.
They wanted to hear more about T.E. Lawrence, she says, not sounding very surprised. “The kind of people who get into intelligence have been inspired by the T.E. Lawrences—they staked their careers on having some kind of secret role in the making of history, and when you tell them that’s not going to work, I mean, what are they supposed to do with that information?”
I assume Satia must have been talking to the operations people, because I find it hard to believe that analysts are really all that inspired by T.E. Lawrence.
That quibble aside, Satia raises an interesting point. Many social scientists focus on the myriad structural reasons why things are the way they are. Policymakers believe they can help shape the way things are. The last thing they often want to hear is why their ideas won't work. And while scholars can often explain why an idea won't work, they are often at a loss to offer a superior, politically viable alternative.
This might be an "irreconcilable" problem, but I'll leave that question to the commentators.






Maybe they're irreconcilable,
Maybe they're irreconcilable, but they both seem to be infected with the utopia bug, and the difference seems largely one of degree. Look at Sri Lanka: The government there made a decision to ignore all the Western NGOs and UN agencies and governments and get their aid from China and kill their opposition in one of the bloodiest modern conflicts and push them into the sea. And now the opposition is dead, and there's no coming back from that. And in one of those unintentionally hilarious quotes, the policy makers in the West were quoted as being concerned that “if the Tamil leadership goes ahead with their threats of suicide will there be anyone left to negotiate with?"
Well, yes, sometimes you don't have anyone left to negotiate with. You've killed them. Along with a lot of people who just happened to be there. And now the Sri Lankans are dancing in the streets because they don't have to worry about getting bombed in nightclubs and China has another link in its raw material sea lane. And everyone's happy. Except the Western policy makers and academics who fear there's no one left to negotiate with.
Dan - government agencies and
Dan - government agencies and components within govt agencies have outside experts come to speak all_the_time. Oftentimes one speaker will offer one approach, and the next expert will over an entirely contradictory approach. People should not come speak to govt audiences assuming that their brilliant guidance will immediately be adopted and lauded. The purpose is to expose employees to many different ideas and ways of thinking - not to find the one expert with the silver bullet and have them come tell the government what to do.
Intelligence Analysts
Must have indeed been an odd group of analysts if not (as you speculate) analysts at all. In my days as an intelligence analyst what I most wanted from outside speakers was the new insight from open sources that we might not have discovered yet or, alternatively, the "top level view" from academia or public policy circles that might or might not coincide with our own conventional wisdom.
Interestingly, the 4-star general heading up the US Special Operations Command recently exhorted his people to "grow more Lawrences" in their military cadres. The professional military is, of course, the last place to look for new Lawrences.
The real Lawrence
Why the picture of Peter O'Toole? Couldn't you find one of the real Lawrence? Try this, on the Brough Superior that finally killed him.
http://www.britishartists.co.uk/des_langford/articles/other/images/lawrence/lawrence_2.jpg
The Man Who Went Native?
It sounds to me that some may have been watching too much "Lawrence of Arabia" starring Peter O'Toole, and not reading enough?
They would find T.E. Lawrence was obsessed, to the point of becoming entangled in uniting the Bedouin tribes under one Arab nation. And who never seemed able to fully transition between his "revolt in the desert," the conditions he encountered there, and conventional military life - viewed as an odd duck by those around him.
Who these days wants to be the odd duck out? What superior would cover for them?