There's been a lot of chatter during the latest iteration of the North Korea crisis that the DPRK leadership is testing the Obama administration's mettle, or that "[other] nuclear wannabes, such as Iran, are watching how we deal with this provocation. To ignore, excuse, or reward it might send an unfortunate signal."  This comes on the heels of the Obama administration's mantra about changing America's reputation in world politics, from one of bellicose hard power unilateralism to a greater mix of soft power and multilateralism. 

So, apparently, concepts like reputation and credibility matter a lot in international affairs -- and, intuitively, we would think this to be true.  The thing is, reputation is also a fuzzy concept.  Countries should cultivate a reputation for what, exactly?  Can a reputation for toughness in a crisis be reconciled with a reputation for compliance with international law?  Do countries have reputations, or just leaders?  Does a reputation in one issue area -- say, aid generosity -- spill over into other issue areas? 

I could give you a definitive answer to all of these questions, but that would be an act of hubris on my part, and I don't want that rep.  Instead, here are ten books/articles to read on reputation and international relations that might confuse you even more provide some enlightenment on the subject:

1)  Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532 [1513]).  "Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with."  And the debate about reputation commences.   

2)  Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960).  If you're interested in international relations, you should read this book regardless.  Schelling devotes a significant portion of his analysis, however, to the utility of "rational irrationality" -- i.e., making the other side think you are a maniac.  One could argue that the North Koreans have imbibed Schelling in full. 

3)  Earnest May and Philip Zelikow, ed., The Kennedy Tapes (1962 [2002])  Reading the Excom conversations during the Cuban Missile Crisis is enlightening to see the moments when reputation is discussed -- as well as the moments when it simply disappears from the policy debate altogether. 

5)  Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (1996).  Mercer points out the cognitive biases that affect how reputations are constructed.  If we think someone is a bad actor and they do a good thing, we ascribe that to environmental pressure.  If they do a bad thing, it's because of their intrinsic preferences.  This suggests that it's very hard for any international actor to alter their reputation in the eyes of their allies or adversaries. 

6)  George Downs and Michael Jones, "Reputation, Compliance, and International Law."  Journal of Legal Studies 31 (January 2002):  S95-S114.  Do countries have a single reputation that covers all issue areas?  Downs and Jones think the answer is no.  They arhue that the effects of reputation are bounded.  When a state defects from an agreement in one area (i.e., the environment) there is little evidence that they jeopardize their reputation in every other area (for example, trade and security). 

7)  Anne Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy (2005).  Sartori argues in this book tha during crises, what matters is not a reputation for resolve, but a reputation for honest diplomacy.  This is why goverments tell the truth (but not necessarily the whole truth) most of the time -- doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which in turn enhances their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force.  Part of the reason the DPRK acts the way they do, perhaps, is that no one believes what they say any more. 

8)  Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility (2005).  Press makes a provocative argument in this book -- in the heat of a military crisis, reputation does not really matter all that much.  It certainly matters less than the military balance of power.  This suggests that the Obama administration's response to North Korea has no bearing on Iran -- what matters are the viability of military options in both cases. 

9)  Mark Crescenzi, "Reputation and International Conflict," American Journal of Political Science 51 (April 2007):  382-396.  Crescenzi pushes back a bit on Press' argument.  He argues that past actions to affect others' perception of reputation -- provided that countries in question are similar in their capabilities.  So, contra Press, Creszenzi might argue that Iran will pay close attention to how the Obama administration responds to North Korea. 

10)  Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation.  Part of the problem with talking about reputation is its ineffable quality -- how do we know it when we see it?  Tomz looks at a tangible measure of reputation -- the ability of sovereign countries to borrow.  He argues for a dynamic theory of reputation, in which actors can update their beliefs over time about whether governments will honor their commitments. The empirical evidence Tomz brings to the table is very impressive.

Readers are welcomed to proffer their suggestions in the comments.

 
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BLUE13326

2:54 AM ET

May 28, 2009

'Can a reputation for

'Can a reputation for toughness in a crisis be reconciled with a reputation for compliance with international law?'

No.

 

ZATHRAS

3:56 AM ET

May 28, 2009

God, Not Another FP Reading List

Assembling a reading list would not be first on my list of things to do in response to a foreign policy crisis, but that's just me.

A situation like that now presented by North Korea seems pretty clearly to call for the best information possible on who is calling the shots within that country's government, and why. It is more likely, in other words, to be about them than it is about us. Therefore, contemplating how we would look to them if we were them is not the best use of an American policymaker's time, because we are not them and never will be.

 

DANIEL W. DREZNER

2:05 PM ET

May 28, 2009

You're making two assumptions...

1) We have reliable intelligence on the internal politics of the DPRK; 2) What happens vis-a-vis North Korea will have no impact on what happens vis-a-vis Iran. These assumptions might be correct -- but I'm dubious about the first one in particular.
 

ZATHRAS

4:15 PM ET

May 28, 2009

My assumption....

...is that we need reliable information on the internal politics of North Korea, not that we have it already. An apparent major departure from patterns of rhetoric and behavior followed by a government for an extended period of time suggests the strong possibility either that the person or people in charge have changed their thinking significantly, or that the person or people in charge have changed. Finding out whether one or both of these things is true should be our first priority.

My assumption with respect to Iran was conveyed upthread so subtly that not even I was aware I had stated it. I'll go on record, though, in saying that how the North Korean situation develops from here will be a major influence on Iranian thinking only in the extreme case -- e.g. an American-led attack on the North or Pyongyang's successful maintenance of both its nuclear arsenal in being and its ability to profit through proliferation. Anything in between would send a message too ambiguous to be decisive with an Iranian government heavily engaged with local considerations, including Iran's own internal politics, Israel, Arab reaction to Iran's nuclear program and the situation in Iraq.

It would be fair, as an academic matter, to note the possibility that America's failure to quash the North Koeran nuclear program during the early years of the Clinton administration had an influence on Iranian thinking. It is at least within the powers of imagination that decisive action to have North Korea's program shut down, during the same period that Iraq's was being taken apart through international inspection, might have had a chilling effect on other governments thinking about aquiring a nuclear capability. Whether true or not, that water is under the bridge and far down the river by this time.

 

BRIAN O

2:37 PM ET

May 28, 2009

Thanks for another FP Reading List

It is refreshing to see a nuanced and well-sourced discussion about a topic with immediate bearing on current events. This shows the blogging form isn't solely for pithy, empty ideas expressible in a paragraph.

In this case, the distinction between a study of reputation and simply seeking intelligence is one of strategy v. tactics. Of course we should try to know as much as possible about the internal workings of the DPRK, but this does not exclude considering the systemic impact of potential actions.

For what it's worth, I think reputation is: 1. compartmentalized (Downs + Jones); 2. based on relative honesty (Sartori); and 3. dynamic (Tomz). What locks it in is a state's relative size/power/importance, and I think here is where the Press/Crescenzi debate takes the stage. The US has more freedom to define and redefine itself than Georgia, for instance.

 

RALPH HITCHENS

6:14 PM ET

May 28, 2009

Credibility

I reviewed Press's book for the Journal of Military History and felt that his argument was cogent where fairly rational actors were concerned (e.g. Hitler prior to the 1940 campaign) but seemed to break down when the crazies were part of the equation. Saddam Hussein, for example, was all about reputation and unwilling or incapable of making reasonable correlation of force calculations, a la pre-1940 Hitler. Miloševic was not much better, and Mohammed Farah Aideed and Osama bin Laden were completely off the rails. I'd put the Dear Leader and his offspring somewhere along this end of the spectrum, unless one of the latter emerges on top and displays some sense. (Iran, by contrast, has consistently demonstrated geopolitical prudence over the last three decades of religious leadership, and I don't see that changing.)

So I don't think we need to waste time "calculating credibility" in this crisis (or whatever it is). Bide our time, wait on events. Wonder if the DL and his inner cadre really understand that 1) his nukes and missiles are pretty half-baked; 2) his army is only slightly less hungry and impoverished than the general population, and therefore a threat to attack South Korea is so blatantly empty as to be meaningless; and 3) China won't bail him out like they did 59 years ago. If we can't gauge Pyongyang's precise degree of rationality we really have no choice but to wait on events. What real imperative is there for us to do anything else?

 

STEVE SAIDEMAN

11:04 PM ET

May 28, 2009

picky question

Umm, what is number 4? Unless my browser is deleting something, your editing left us one short of ten.

 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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