What happens next in Iran?

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner Share

My pace on commenting on Iran has been about as sluggish as CNN's.  By my rough estimate, I'm now approximately 4,567 posts behind Andrew Sullivan on the Iran election. Let's try to get back in the game! 

In this post I want to look at what's likely to happen in Iran; the next post will look at what the Obama administration's response. 

OK, so, Iran. There are protests, riots, and Twitters galore -- will it amount to regime change? 

Alas, I think the answer is no.  I don't want this to be the answer.  No matter how I slice the data, however, I get to that outcome.

Let's stiputlate that the election results were rigged.  Here's the question -- why were they so blatant about it?  The speed and skewness of the "official" results seemed design to trigger disbelief. Was that intentional? 

Hey, you know what, I think it was.  University of Chicago political scientist Alberto Simpser has written about why authoritarian leaders like Khamenei would engage in electoral corruption (.pdf). The answer is not pretty: 

[A]n overwhelming victory today can send a powerful signal to the citizenry tomorrow – a large margin of victory can deter opposition turnout, discourage opposition coordination (e.g. when the opposition is fragmented into a number of parties), and increase the winner’s bargaining power with respect to electorally important social actors by rendering it less likely that they are pivotal in a winning coalition.

I suspect that this was the intent in Iran. The question is whether it will work. Khamenei has backtracked a little from his endorsment of Ahmadinejad as the winner, and now wants the Guardian Council to investigate allegations of election fraud. I suspect this is an effort to play for time, however, in order to get his security apparatus prepped for a more brutal crackdown. Twice in the past 10 years (1999 and 2003), this regime has been perfectly willing to crack down on reformist groups to secure its hold on power. I see no reason for Khamenei to hold back this time around. 

In other words, unless Iran's security apparatus starts to split, I don't see how this ends in any outcome other than Khamenei staying in power. 

What does this mean for the rest of the world?  On to the next post! 

 
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J THOMAS

1:36 PM ET

June 15, 2009

The USA has heavily funded

The USA has heavily funded the CIA for regime change in iran for six years.

This is what we have to show for it?

We know that only a small minority in iran supports the govenrment. The army is mostly against them, the police are against them, the population is against them, but somehow they just keep oppressing everybody. It's fanatics, that's what it is.

How could the CIA possibly not win when they had the majority of the iranians with them? It just doesn't make sense. The media that wasn't influenced by the CIA reported that the new guy was going to win. The media that wasn't influenced by the CIA said Ahmenijad was getting real unpopular in iran. But the political parties that were influenced by the CIA just completely failed to win the election. And now the media that isn't influenced by the CIA says it's fraud. Many thousands of iranians have gotten onto Twitter to say so.

It kind of reminds me of Reagan in 1984. Lots of people hated him. It got to the point that they claimed there was a "silent majority" that supported him even though the media didn't.

But we're pretty sure it was fraud. Like, this opponent was from a special ethnic group and had a special accent, and he lost his home state. How could that happen except with fraud? Like in 2000 Gore lost Tennessee. Well but Bush had a kind of a texas accent, maybe that made the difference....

And like, the exit polls kept saying that Democrats won in 2000 and 2004, but the argument was that it didn't mean the elections were rigged because the exit polls *always* favor Democrats. So that means the exit polls must always be biased in favor of Democrats and not that the elections are always rigged....

I think it would be a good idea to get more evidence.

 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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