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The stakes in the Great Game are getting awfully high
I'll be on the road most of tomorrow, so blogging might not be possible. Before I go, however, it's worth considering the ways in which the ongoing social uprising in Iran is tripping up great powers other than the United Ststes.
There have been some interesting developments here -- particularly with regard to Russia. Andrew Sullivan posts the following from a reader:
Famed film director, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, on behalf of Mousavi's campaign, was on BBC just now, He accused Ahamdinejad of giving up Iran's rights in Caspian Sea and other areas in the last 4 years and now is enjoying Russia's firm backing. Then he called it a Russian Coup! He said he has information that high ranking Russian advisers are teaching Ahmadinejad's thugs as to how to oppress the opposition effectively. This is Mohsen Makhmablf, not just any director. Already Iranians are gathering in front of Russian consulate in Toronto.
Over at TNR, Julia Ioffe takes a look at Russian press coverage of the election -- and more intriguingly, the Russian government's rapidly evolving relationship with Ahmadinejad:
[T]he winds are changing. Obama has taken a less militant tone with Tehran and with Moscow. Medvedev, lately showing more sleight of hand than his predecessor, seems to have finally picked up on the world's extreme skepticism about the election results and the growing seriousness of the unrest in Iran.
Here's what happened: Slated to arrive in Yekaterinburg on Monday for the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit (Iran is an observer in the group, which is a sort of answer to NATO in Asia), Ahmadinejad postponed his trip because of the situation at home. When he finally arrived yesterday, Ahmadinejad found that his two-hour tete-a-tete with President Dmitri Medvedev had been canceled due to the president's "overly-saturated schedule." Instead, he shook hands in front of the cameras with Medvedev, whose spokesperson insisted that this fleeting encounter was nothing more than a flicker "on the sidelines." As Gazeta noted in its main headline on Iran of the day, "Ahmadinejad Can Wait."
I'm not sure this backtracking will be terribly adroit. If Ahmadinejad and Khamenei fall, methinks it's going to be pretty easy for the new Iranian leadership to Google this AP story:
"It's quite symbolic that the Iranian president arrived in Russia on his first foreign visit since re-election," Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said at a briefing. "We see that as a sign that the Russian-Iranian relations will advance further."....
Ryabkov said the election was Iran's internal affair, but he endorsed Ahmadinejad as the victor.
"We welcome the fact that the elections have taken place, and we welcome the newly re-elected Iranian president on the Russian soil," he said. "We see this visit as a reflection of partner-like, neighborly and traditionally friendly relations between Moscow and Tehran."
A pure realist might argue that regardless of who is in power in Iran, the bilateral relationship with Russia will remain strong. A week ago, I would have agreed with this position. Now, however, we're talking about a regime transition, as opposed to the simple change in government that would have taken place with a clean Mousavi victory last week. And new regimes remember who helped their domestic adversaries in the past.
An Iran led by a representative government unfettered by the clerics is a game-changer on several levels. If a new Iranian regime wants to talk turkey with the Obama administration, then the United States suddenly needs Russia a whole lot less. Authoritarian states everywhere will become much more nervous about contagion effects. I'm not sure how the Sunni regimes in the region would react to a liberalizing Iran, but I'm betting that they wouldn't like it. Come to think of it, the effect on Iraq is unclear as well, but I'm pretty sure there would be some effect. I'm trying to game out how it would affect energy markets, and my head hurts from trying to weigh the cross-cutting effect on all of the variables.
As the previous paragraphs suggest, I'm pretty sure a Rubicon has been crossed in Iran that can't be uncrossed. This isn't 1999 and 2003 -- too many days have passed with the Khamenei regime on the defensive. The regime as it existed for the past twenty years -- hemmed-in democracy combined with clerical rule -- is not going to be able to continue. With the largest protests of the past week scheduled for tomorrow, I think this ends in one of two ways: the removal of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei from power, or bloodshed on a scale that we cannot comprehend.
Actually, come to think of it, those two outcomes are not mutually exclusive.






I've heard some good
I've heard some good arguments that the clerical regime has already been either undermined or subverted by the Revolutionary Guards, culminating in the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005. But I just don't know enough about the internal situation of Iran to go further.
I think this ends in one of
I think this ends in one of two ways: the removal of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei from power, or bloodshed on a scale that we cannot comprehend.
OK. So, of those two good alternatives, which is better?
The incomprehensible bloodshed, definitely. If a new islamic government comes in, probably nothing much will change. But if there's mass bloodshed nobody will notice if we send in hit teams to kill as many physicists and nuclear technicians as we can find. It could set the iranian nuclear program back by a decade or more.
That's definitely the better choice, unless you have something against bloodshed on a scale you cannot comprehend.
Best, Worst, Other
The best and worst cases are rarely the only possibilities in any situation. I admit that they are possibilities here, but let's not get carried away.
There's a lot we don't understand about the internal political dynamics of the Iranian government. We do know that, as was also the case in the 1978-79 period, it can crush its opposition -- it has all the guns. The opposition knows that as well, and so far has appeared careful to avoid overt provocations. On the other hand, Khamenei has never dealt with opposition of the kind now manifesting itself. More to the point, neither have his allies, or sponsors, in the Iranian security services, and these people have a lot to protect.
They might choose to protect it only through force, but they are probably debating right now whether that is the only course open to them. I could be wrong, but it doesn't appear to be. Mousavi is no radical, as best I can tell; he hasn't said anything about throwing baseej off the government payroll or cutting Revolutionary Guard muckety-mucks out of positions running government ministries. How he feels about other things the security services appear to regard as priorities -- weaponization of the nuclear program, support of Hezbollah, support of Hamas -- is unclear to me (though it might not be to key people within Iran).
Most of all, neither Mousavi nor the protesters in Tehran's streets were saying anything that called into question the basic power arrangements in Iran until it became obvious that the announced Presidential vote had been fixed. Maybe things have advanced so far that this particular cat can't or won't go back into the bag. Maybe not. Just because we can't see the situation clearly here doesn't mean Iranians can either. Should we be shocked to see Khamenei and his allies try to preserve their positions by conceding to Mousavi and ordering new elections, in effect throwing Ahmedinejad over the side?
I have no idea, but I'd bet good money the idea has occurred to someone there.
We do know that, as was also
We do know that, as was also the case in the 1978-79 period, it can crush its opposition -- it has all the guns.
We don't know that.
If the opposition is a mainstream group that has a decent chance to win an honest election, the army might not be willing to crush them. Or allow them to be crushed by the paramilitary forces.
Or the army might split. It might deadlock itself, allowing the paramilitary guys to take over etc. Then after things settle down the army gets purged of unreliable elements which degrades its ability to fight off external attacks.
We really don't know much, and most of what we think we know may not be so.
I thought I just said that.
I thought I just said that.
Sorry, I was being
Sorry, I was being overpicky.
You said you knew one specific which I think is iffy. But I don't want to jump on every little sentence. I just did jump on an isolated sentence to make my own point, when I didn't diagree with your main point at all.
Hard to say
It is hard to say what is going to end up happening in Iran. We do know that the United States will most likely not get involved unless forced to and even then it will be iffy. casino en ligne