I might be wrong on Iran, but I'm not sure others are right

Fri, 06/19/2009 - 11:40am

Continuing the Iran discussion, I see John Boonstra at UN Dispatch takes issue (respectfully) with my recent prognostications.  John's rejoinder:

[A] Rubicon may indeed have been crossed, with no going back to "the way things were" in Iran. That certainly seems to be the consensus. But I also wonder if it might be a bit of wishful thinking. There's a tendency to imbue events as-they're-happening as more important than they may turn out to be. To take just the color revolutions to which it has been so trendy to compare the situation in Iran: Ukraine's "Orange" and Georgia's "Rose" (not to mention Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip") were certainly major events, but the hype that they generated at the time far surpasses the attention that those countries, modestly different though their governments might be, attract today.

I think more useful comparisons would be Tianenmen or, better, the monks' uprising in Burma in late 2007. What these examples -- or even, as I suggested before, those of Kenya or Zimbabwe -- show us is the possibility of an outcome distinct from Drezner's either-or (or both) model. At the time, many thought that Burma's junta couldn't possibly survive such a brutal onslaught against the country's most venerable institution. But...it survived. In Iran, the possibilities are simply too many to predict: Khamenei may retrench, and allow Ahmadinejad to take the fall; or, the two of them may make some sort of minor concession to the protestors; or again, they could simply wait until the crowds peter out. Revolution is not inevitable. In such an interesting situation, nothing is.

As someone leery of historical analogies and fond of nuance, I would like to agree with what John is saying.  Except that I don't. 

First, I think it's pretty clear Khamenei is not going to retrench.  The moment he said that Ahmadinejad's victory was a "divine victory," he sealed his position on the matter.  He can't back down now.    I'm pretty sure supreme leaders in Iran don't change political tack because of mass protests -- it undercuts their claim to be, you know, supreme leaders.  In his latest sermon, Khamenei is doubling down on his bet with Ahmadinejad. 

Is there any other way this ends without one camp or the other abjectly losing?  I don't think so.  Minor concessions will not mollify the protestors.  A "compact"-like solution doesn't work terribly well here, since the factions don't trust each other enough to believe that force won't be used down the road.  A re-run of the election won't work, because Khamenei's been digging in his heels and can't back down now.  A straight-out Revolutionary Guards-style coup is possible, but that's going to come with a lot of bloodshed. 

Second, I think Boonstra is slightly misreading my post.  I'm not sure that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei will be out of power soon.  What I am pretty sure of is that the only way they're going to stay in power from hereon in is through a display of brute force on a Tiananmen-like scale. 

Third, Boonstra raises a valid question, which is whether a genuine regime transition would really mean all that much.  Color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan have not necessarily amounted to all that much.  Similarly, I see that Steve Walt has reverted to "regime type is irrelevant" arguments with regard to Iranian foreign policy. 

Hmmm....... nope, not persuaded.  There are two big differences in the case of Iran.  The first is that, unlike all the other color revolution countries, Iran is a regional heavyweight.  Every other color revolution government had to worry about a more powerful neighbor who liked the old regime better staring them down.  Iran is a more powerful and less divided country.  This does not mean that realipolitik pressures will not apply -- but it does mean that they are less binding than in the case of, say, Ukraine.  And because of Iran's material power, a possible Green Revolution matters more in more strategic areas, like the Persian Gulf. 

On the nuclear question, I take Walt's points, but I'm not sure how relevant they are after the past week.  Post-regime transition governments have been quite willing to give up nuclear programs in the past -- Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, to name a few.  Steve cites polls that show strong Iranian support for the nuclear program -- but those same polls also show strong opposition to creating nuclear weapons. 

Iran's security interests will remain paramount to any new government, of course.  But I do wonder just how much of Iran's insecurity has been a product of the current regime's own making.  Would a Mousavi/Rafsanjani regime be as insecure about its staus in the region? 

If, on the other hand, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad manage to keep their grip on power, I can't see them ever giving up their grip on their nuclear program, no matter what is on the table in negotiations. 

I'll leave this as an open question to readers -- to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program? 

Daniel W. Drezner | Permalink | | Comments? Login or register
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I'll leave this as an open

by J Thomas on Fri, 06/19/2009 - 12:09pm

I'll leave this as an open question to readers -- to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program?

How could there possibly be any difference at all?

Iran needs electric power and nuclear reactors are their current best choice. They will not give that up, and they will not let foreign nations hold their electric power grid hostage.

Khamenei has issued a fatwa saying no iranian muslim can make nuclear bombs. He can't say it plainer than that. The iranian government has agreed to inspections more intrusive than NNPT asks, to show that he's keeping his word. What could the new government possibly do that would be different? Well, they could give up their electric power program. But they couldn't say or do anything more than the current government has done, short of allowing the USA and israel to do detailed inspections and take GPS readings and remove all the bombproofing so we could take out the sites easier. That's about it.

Wait! There is something different they could do! They could announce that the previous government was lying, and really was trying to build bombs! Then when they say that they've stopped the program and iran will no longer build bombs, we'll believe them! We wouldn't believe them if they just said the same things the other guys said, but if they said the other guys were liars and then they say the same things the other guys said, *then* we'll believe them.

Yeah! We can't make a deal with the current guys because it will look like we're backing down. But if it's a whole new government making the same deal the old government offered, we can accept that. We say the old guys were liars and cheats and we couldn't trust them at all, but we haven't said that about the new government so we won't be changing our minds if we make a deal with them. That's the difference.

Re: to what extent would a

by chitown on Fri, 06/19/2009 - 4:44pm

Re: to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program?

Very little evidence suggests a post-Khamenei Iran would have a different attitude towards its nuclear program. There is very little the United States, the EU, or any other major player, can do to change the future Iranian leadership's attitude. If they are truly dedicated to building or obtaining nuclear weapons, they will do so. I see this proliferation as inevitable, regardless of the desires or actions of outside actors.

Maybe they will realize nuclear weapons are not in their self interest, maybe not. But many economic reforms must happen before Iranian politics stabilizes - however, I suspect Iran will cycle through greater political and economic stability until such changes take place. Strengthened economic growth would put needed pressure on the regime.

Mousavi made his claims before the Guardian Council

by Seth Edenbaum on Fri, 06/19/2009 - 8:01pm

He didn't have much.

The protest, which seeks fresh elections, is short on specifics and long on extraneous, election-unrelated complaints.The first two items relate to the televised debates that were held between the candidates, rather than anything germane to the vote count.

There is also some innuendo, such as a claim that Ahmadinejad used state-owned means of transportation to campaign around the country, overlooking that there is nothing unusual about incumbent leaders using the resources at their disposal for election purposes. All previous presidents, including the reformist Mohammad Khatami, who is a main supporter of Mousavi, did the same.

Another complaint by Mousavi is that Ahmadinejad had disproportionate access to the state-controlled media. This has indeed been a bad habit in the 30-year history of the Islamic Republic, but perhaps less so this year because for the first time there were television debates, six of them, which allowed Mousavi and the other challengers free space to present their points of view.

With respect to alleged specific irregularities, the complaint cites a shortage of election forms that in some places caused a "few hours delay". This is something to complain about, but it hardly amounts to fraud, especially as voter turnout was a record high of 85% of the eligible 46 million voters. (Ahmadinejad was credited with 64% of the vote.)

Mousavi complains that in some areas the votes cast were higher than the number of registered voters. But he fails to add that some of those areas, such as Yazd, were places where he received more votes that Ahmadinejad.

Furthermore, Mousavi complains that some of his monitors were not accredited by the Interior Ministry and therefore he was unable to independently monitor the elections. However, several thousand monitors representing the various candidates were accredited and that included hundreds of Mousavi's eyes and ears.

They should have documented any irregularities that, per the guidelines, should have been appended to his complaint. Nothing is appended to Mousavi's two-page complaint, however. He does allude to some 80 letters that he had previously sent to the Interior Ministry, without either appending those letters or restating their content.

Finally, item eight of the complaint cites Ahmadinejad's recourse to the support given by various members of Iran's armed forces, as well as Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's brief campaigning on Ahmadinejad's behalf. These are legitimate complaints that necessitate serious scrutiny since by law such state individuals are forbidden to take sides. It should be noted that Mousavi can be accused of the same irregularity as his headquarters had a division devoted to the armed forces.

Given the thin evidence presented by Mousavi, there can be little chance of an annulment of the result.

Was this a coup or a campaign to instigate a crackdown? Or both?
Which came first?
And what percentage of the marchers want an end to the Islamic Republic?
Not as many as you'd like to think.

Nuclear Iran

by Kratovil IV on Fri, 06/19/2009 - 8:32pm

While Rafsanjani has a track record of advocating a more open approach to the West, when it comes to the Nuclear Program, I find it hard to believe that a Mousavi/Rafsanjani government would significantly change its position. Rafsanjani may be amendable to a deal with the US on the Nuclear issue, it is highly doubtful that they would allow for as intrusive searches as the US would like to see.

There is also very little chance of the program being halted anyways. As stated, Iran is not going to let its energy be controlled by any foreign source and Nuclear Power is the most cost effective form of electricity. On top of that, it is a matter of national pride. Iran has domestically developed nuclear power and has shown the modern advancements of an Islamic State, in spite of the all powerfull West's wishes. Nuclear weapons may not be on the mind of Iranians, but Nuclear power sure is.

None, unless...no, none.

by MDrew on Fri, 06/19/2009 - 8:56pm

I'll leave this as an open question to readers -- to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program?

Likely none. But certainly none if Israeli and U.S. rhetoric is not dramatically moderated, which it will not be. So none.

Nope. The nuke program is a

by foobarista on Fri, 06/19/2009 - 9:27pm

Nope. The nuke program is a separate thing and is a point of pride. My guess would be that any successor regime is likely to be Persian nationalist, and such people don't give up nukes easily.

One other thing; a TAMS "solution" isn't likely to work for very long since Iran has basically no industry to speak of. The CCP was able to rebuild legitimacy on the back of a booming economy. It ain't gonna happen with A'jad.

I'm not sure that Ahmadinejad

by J Thomas on Sat, 06/20/2009 - 2:31am

I'm not sure that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei will be out of power soon. What I am pretty sure of is that the only way they're going to stay in power from hereon in is through a display of brute force on a Tiananmen-like scale.

Is there another way?

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/world/middleeast/20iran.html?bl&ex=1245643200&en=8a62b898dc6d5152&ei=5087%0A

“Flexing muscles on the streets after the election is not right,” he said ... “It means challenging the elections and democracy. If they don’t stop, the consequences of the chaos would be their responsibility.”

Khamenei keeps his influence because the mass of iranians believe he's right and moral. If they lose that belief what does he have left? A government that acted by force might keep him as a figurehead because the public respected him -- but only while the public respected him.

Would the iranian elections guys have investigated a charge of election-rigging without mass demonstrations? Khamenei says yes, because he wants the government to behave properly. Are they really corrupt? If iranians agree that the government does the right thing, then they will calm down. Can they be persuaded of that?

Newspapers said Thursday that a group of members of Parliament reported that the paramilitary forces of Basij were responsible for the attack on a dormitory in Tehran and a housing complex called Sobhan this week. Students said that five students — two women and three men — were killed in the attack.

In his sermon, Ayatollah Khamenei criticized those who carried out the attack. “Have you calculated the impact of going to the dormitories in the name of the leader?” he asked. “Muscle-flexing after elections is not right. Put an end to this.”

He tells them not to do a terror campaign but only to do what is right. This is what he ought to say. Can he persuade iranians that it will happen that way?

If he can get Mousavi to consider the merits of the case, what happens then? The defeated candidates had observers at lots of the polling places. Did they see much vote-rigging? Are they being coerced into lying that they didn't? Was the vote much different in the places they didn't observe from the places they did? How could this sort of vote-rigging happen? Sure you could do it in the USA where our voting machines give no real recount and there's nothing for observers to see. But how would it happen in iran? They'd have to intimidate thousands of observers. They couldn't really do that in secret, the secret would get out. Many fewer people would believe. They'd pretend to believe so they wouldn't get beat up or worse, but they'd just be pretending. It would fall apart, though it might take years.

Whwat if Mousavi checks with the observers and finds that he doesn't actually believe the vote was rigged enough for him to win? Then shouldn't he back off? Gore backed off in shadier circumstances. So did Kerry. Two of our last three presidential elections were won in shady circumstances and quite possibly rigged. This iranian election is won by such a large margin that it should not be possible to secretly rig it. Either a whole lot of people know it was rigged -- because they were there and saw it happen -- or those people know that their own polling stations were not rigged nearly enough to get that result. Which is it?

If they know it was rigged then Khamenei will have to back down or lose his authority. If they know it wasn't, then over time word of that will get out too, and it will all calm down.

"The legal mechanisms in our country do not allow cheating. How can one cheat with a margin of 11 million votes?"

If you were in Khamenei's place and you wanted to do the right thing, what would be right? Is there a way to secretly rig the election 11 million votes worth? Is it not a secret but people hypocrtically pretend it didn't happen?

stop the disinformation!!!

by AllanGreen on Sat, 06/20/2009 - 5:51am

Thank you for the clear-eyed analysis Daniel. And I commend FP bloggers, for taking a generally reasonable, and intelligent line on events in Iran. It's a source of fresh air.

That said.

Here are some facts that raders need to know, and perhaps FP should do some fact-checking, and post on this.

1) There is a fundamental difference between Moussavi and the regime on foreign policy. Anyone watching the pre-election debates, and the Moussavi campaign, knows this. Anyone stating otherwise is either deliberately lying, or is deliberatley stupid.

2) Moussavi has explicitly been critical of Ahmeni-Nedjad (lest do th UK version), on Holocaust Denial, and his Israel statements.

3) Moussavi has explicitly proposed an international uranian enrichmenet consortium - effectively putting to rest ALL questions about weapons aspirations. Nor has Moussavi indicated aspirations for Nuclear Weapons. His desire of detente with the West, implies greater guarantees on the nuclear program.

Those are the facts folks - so Walt and Neocon (now in the same bed) need to get your head out of the sand.

As for elections.

1) No vote count is attested for the election.

2) Polls are entirely irrelevant - as they never received answers for more than 57% of potential voters at a given stage.

3) Nor do exit polls matter.

4) What matters is that before the election was over, paramilitaries were smashing peoples faces, and the government shut down all communication.

Potential results?

I think there is no backing down on either side, but a the regime should have taken a softer line if it wanted even a Mugabe/Tsvangirai result. It cannot win in the long run, and repression only hasten its fall. Any crackdown will mobilise Global opinion to a point, when even Russia and China will no longer be able to oppose sanctions. And yes, to a point where Obama's words will no longer mater. I believe that may be the objective of Axelrod and Comp.

In a way, Obama has been supportive of events, in as much as his team is extremely confident about the methods they are using. Again, Axelrod and Comp.

The goal is to maintain the illusion of non-intervention - making this possibly the most successful coup in American history. - I may be completely wrong about all this (except the first series of facts)

stop the disinformation!!!

by J Thomas on Sat, 06/20/2009 - 9:44am

stop the disinformation!!!

It's ironic that you'd give your comment this title.

Moussavi has explicitly been critical of Ahmeni-Nedjad (lest do th UK version), on Holocaust Denial, and his Israel statements.

Why would this symbolic stand make any difference to iranian foreign or domestic policy?

Moussavi has explicitly proposed an international uranian enrichmenet consortium - effectively putting to rest ALL questions about weapons aspirations.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,622225,00.html

SPIEGEL: You could make an important contribution by accommodating the wishes of the international community on the nuclear issue. How can the world believe you when you say that you are not building a bomb if you are not even willing to suspend uranium enrichment?

Mousavi: Our nuclear policy is transparent, and we have opened our facilities to United Nations inspectors. However, we will not abandon the great achievements of Iranian scientists. I too will not suspend uranium enrichment. However, I will attempt to avoid unnecessary tensions. We have a right to enrich uranium.

SPIEGEL: As a compromise, would you at least consider the outsourcing of uranium enrichment -- to Russia, for example?

Mousavi: No.

SPIEGEL: You also do not differ from your president in that respect. Where are the differences?

Mousavi: Must there always be fundamental differences between two candidates on vital national issues?

This is the face Mousavi presents to europe, it isn't campaign promises.

Those are the facts folks -

And they speak for themselves, don't they?

1) No vote count is attested for the election.Polls are entirely irrelevant - as they never received answers for more than 57% of potential voters at a given stage.

Agreed. We never had much basis to predict the election.

We decided on very little evidence that Mousavi would win. Then when he lost we thought it must be election fraud. We have only the vaguest circumstantial evidence for that.

Nor do exit polls matter.

Yes, we have a precedent there in the USA. When exit polls showed more people voting Democrat than the actual polls showed, the response was that exit polls always show more votes for Democrats than the actual polls. So if we assume that the actual polls are not consistently biased toward Republicans, we then must assume that there is some sort of consistent bias in the exit polls. Once we assume that the votes are not rigged then by necessity we must discount the exit polls.

Khamenei claims the iranian government is honest and will do "the right thing". So the iranian government will for example recount 10% of the ballot boxes. If they find some evidence of fraud then it goes somewhere from that. If they find evidence of massive fraud that could elect the wrong candidate then it goes somewhere else. The question turns into -- do iranians trust the system, though they don't trust particular factions? If they think Khamenei ordered false elections and the whole government went along, then they need to throw out the entire government and set up a new one, with honest people.

I sincerely recommend readers

by AllanGreen on Sat, 06/20/2009 - 7:33pm

I sincerely recommend readers read the entire interview from Spiegel. But let's parse the quote

SPIEGEL: As a compromise, would you at least consider the outsourcing of uranium enrichment -- to Russia, for example?

Mousavi: No.

How do you square this, with multiple sources and observers stating precisely the contrary? The "No" is most likely refering to "Russia". Because that has been the idea till now. Quite logically, he's proposals for an inetrnational consortium are limited to operating in either Iran, or somewhere near.

But what you do not take me on on, is the fundamental emphasis this man has made, on detente. He has repeated, several times now - that the regime's handling of the Holocaust, had been a disaster. He has also emphasized, on numerou occasions, a dedication to freedom of speech.

How the hell could anyone miss the opportunity with this guy!?

Actual Iran and regional experts, are in agreement, that Moussavi is an opening for peace. I mean CFR fellows, debate analysts (plenty of favorable summaries), Robert Fisk.

I recommend reading more indepth information on the debates of Moussavi and Ahmedi-Nejad, rather than going off one inteview, which doesn't square with dozens of other statements he has made.

You can do so here -
http://www.iranian.com/main/2009/jun/mousavi-ahmadinejad-debate

and plenty of other Farsi sources.

as per your take that the

by AllanGreen on Sat, 06/20/2009 - 7:34pm

as per your take that the "Holocaust" stance would be symbolic, I don't think your observation warrants comment. I am sure you could play your own devil's advocate.

I find it incredibly hard to

by Kratovil IV on Sat, 06/20/2009 - 8:15pm

I find it incredibly hard to believe that Mousavi would allow, regardless of campaign rhetoric, Iran's enrichment program to be outsourced to another country. That is giving a significant amount of leverage to another country. The interview on SpiegalOnline paints a clear picture of how Mousavi feels: He is willing to show full transparency, but is not going to sacrafice enrichment.

I think it is important to keep in mind that even if Mousavi is in power, it does not change the fact that he still has to deal with the Guardian Council and the geopolitical realities of the region Iran sits in. Both of those are overriding factors that will ensure that Iran pursues nuclear power to the fullest.

"Trust can slowly be developed once again. We can contribute to this by moderating our tone ... A policy of detente will be a central issue for me."
—On defusing tensions with the U.S. (Der Spiegel, April 27, 2009)
This quote says it all: We will soften our tone towards the West, but that doesn't mean we'll be any easier to deal with.

Guardian Council or not, do

by AllanGreen on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 5:19am

Guardian Council or not, do you want Iran to have a democratic precedent?

I am baffled by people's reaction on all this. If it wasn't for Obama's wafling, and for tepid media interest, you would all be brainwashed by the MSM and demanding that Ahmedi-nejad is decapiated!!

Stop looking at the opinions of decision un-makers. Look at the facts on the ground. Do you want people's votes to count or not!?

Or do you want the Shura to have the impression, that it can do whatever it damn well pleases, and suffer no repercussions?

If your enemy is strong , and you weaken him by a kick in the balls, it takes a certain kind of coward to say "yes, but afterwards he'll..."

No, if you kick him hard enough, you'll place a limit on his impunity. That's what this Hossein - unlike our Hussein - is. A mighty kick in the Shura's and Khamenei's balls.

And you bet there will be pressure on the council, and its power will weaken.

Guardian Council or not, do

by J Thomas on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 8:57am

Guardian Council or not, do you want Iran to have a democratic precedent?

Sure. I want democracy for everybody. Maybe we should start with cuba, which is close to us, and then go on to egypt. Get rid of Mubarak and let them have a democracy. How long would Mubarak last without our support? We are actively preventing democracy in egypt, for no good reason.

What proof do we have that iranian elections were dishonest? Let's encourage them to make their election process more transparent, and while we're at it let's make our own election process more transparent too, get rid of those damn touch-screen voting machines that cannot allow a recount. We've had bad problems about that in two out of the last three presidential elections, and the third one would have had problems if the vote had been closer.

I am baffled by people's reaction on all this. If it wasn't for Obama's wafling, and for tepid media interest, you would all be brainwashed by the MSM and demanding that Ahmedi-nejad is decapiated!!

Yes, that's what you want, you want the media to brainwash us into something stupid like it did with iraq. Malicious neocons are like that.

Or do you want the Shura to have the impression, that it can do whatever it damn well pleases, and suffer no repercussions?

Their own people will give them repercussions, if their own people want to. If our covert guys can manipulate it right they'll have two sides that each think they have a large majority, and they'll fight a big long bloody civil war. So what do you want us to do, drop cluster bombs on the Shura?

If your enemy is strong , and you weaken him by a kick in the balls, it takes a certain kind of coward to say "yes, but afterwards he'll..."

We don't need iran for an enemy. We have close to 2 million iranians living here, sending DVDs home to their friends. And there are no particular strategic reasons that iran should be our enemy.

We have no reason to keep iran as an enemy, except israel.

So kicking them in the balls is the wrong thing to do. Better to gradually establish a detente, and then cordial relations.

Hey, I've got no problem with

by Kratovil IV on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 11:02am

Hey, I've got no problem with a democratic Iran, more power to them if the government yields and reruns elections (not likely). However, a democratic Iran does not change Iran's position towards the US and key issues like Nuclear Power, significantly. I think that is where you are getting confused. Mousavi is not the Obama of Iran, who is going to fundamentally change the way they do business with the West. A softer tone towards the US does not translate into the results we want.

What you should hope for, though, is the weakening of this hybrid theocratic democracy, with the endgame being its elimination and the establishment of a full democracy. Every failure of Islam to get it right in government is another chance for the religion to become more compatible with the 21st century.

How do you square this, with

by J Thomas on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 4:20am

How do you square this, with multiple sources and observers stating precisely the contrary?

He said it himself. You decide how to square it with other sources and observers.

One thing -- he said that he doesn't want iran to make nuclear weapons. This is nothing new, the current government has consistently said that too. The big difference is that you are ready to believe him while you are not ready to believe them. He says the same thing they say but maybe you think he isn't lying....

But what you do not take me on on, is the fundamental emphasis this man has made, on detente.

Sure, he says he'd talk to us. So does the current government, it's just taken us a long time to agree to talk to them.

He has repeated, several times now - that the regime's handling of the Holocaust, had been a disaster.

Nu? And you're surprised that he'd lose an election by 11 million votes? So what difference in iranian government policy would you expect to come from this, if he had won? Of course all nations should respect holocaust survivors whether they are jewish or not, but there aren't very many of them left and they mostly don't travel all that much. How is this issue important to iranian policy?

He has also emphasized, on numerou occasions, a dedication to freedom of speech.

Free speech is good. But as we have seen in the USA, free speech gets inevitably moderated by local community standards. Still I like that he says that.

You decide how to square it

by AllanGreen on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 5:36am

You decide how to square it with other sources and observers.

Well, you made the decision previously. What prevents you from interpreting the same quote you brought up, in light of the information I provide?

I made my interpration, in light of corraborating evidence - I pointed out that there are numerous reliable sources stating that he floated the consortium idea - which frames the Spiegel quote to imply that the consortium would not grant Russia a geographic monopoly on the enrichment.

he big difference is that you are ready to believe him while you are not ready to believe them.

I have never gone on record stating that I believe Iran pursues nuclear weapons. What I have commented on foreignpolicy.com, is that Iran is behaving aggressively, and its rhetoric is war-like, and unacceptable.

This is precisely where Mousavi is different. And that's where the difference in credibility comes from. I am sure Ahmedi-nejad knows why he wants to kill people to keem Mousavi from power. Anyone who followed the campaigns, knows this.

Sure, he says he'd talk to us. So does the current government, it's just taken us a long time to agree to talk to them.

Ok - I get it. This is revelatory phrasing. You seem to know close to nothing about Mousavi. Your opinions come from the MSM and what the Leader Hussein, sells you. The "say's he'd talk" tell-tale. I have absolutely nothing to add. If you want to accept someone's interpreation of the facts, because it suits your comfort level with Hussein, and our foreign policy, so be it.

As for Holocaust survivors. Your comment is funny, and I am assuming that's how you intended it - as a kind of humor? I mean I think it is funny.

0000

A note on the people of Iran.

As the debates between Ahmedi-nejad and Mehdi Karroubi exemplified, a proper understanding of Iran, needs to see beyond rhetoric. All participants affirm fidelity to Khomeini and the Revolution, and the Ayatollah Khamenei. Mousavi supporters will shout Allah-is-Great, and most women remain veiled.

But if we could accept this in Turkey, while appreciating the AKP's democratic qualities, then we can appreciate the precedent in Iran. The regional impact will be no smaller, than democracy in Iraq - and actually far more constructive.

There are no other options on Iran. If we want a future candidate who is gay and secular - then we'd have to begin with democracy - and Mousavi, is that beginning.

What prevents you from

by J Thomas on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 9:19am

What prevents you from interpreting the same quote you brought up, in light of the information I provide?

Mousavi: Must there always be fundamental differences between two candidates on vital national issues?

You say there is a big dramatic difference between what Mousavi wants versus what the current iranian government wants. Mousavi says there isn't. Who should we believe?

Iran is behaving aggressively, and its rhetoric is war-like, and unacceptable.

And we are not? If you have big public discussions where you say somebody is your enemy and you debate the best approach to kicking him in the balls, it isn't implausible he might get aggressive. Of course you'd prefer that he get timid and meek, but it doesn't always go that way.

The "say's he'd talk" tell-tale.

Mousavi: The language Mr. Obama uses is refreshingly different from that of his predecessor, George W. Bush. But actions must now follow. We will pay careful attention to what happens next. If his actions are in keeping with his words, why shouldn't we negotiate?

SPIEGEL: You sound like Ahmadinejad.

....

Mousavi: The more realistic US policy becomes, the better. Washington included us in an "Axis of Evil," and now we want to see concrete steps. When that happens, trust can slowly be developed once again. We can contribute to this by moderating our tone.

What are you on about?

As for Holocaust survivors. Your comment is funny, and I am assuming that's how you intended it - as a kind of humor? I mean I think it is funny.

Seriously, how does iran's policy toward holocaust survivors matter beyond the symbolism? Are there any holocaust survivors in iran? Why is this even an issue for the USA?

If we want a future candidate who is gay and secular -

Why should this be a goal for the USA for iran? Is there some particular reason we'd want a gay secular candidate in the USA?

It depends on one big thing:

by blue13326 on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 2:48pm

It depends on one big thing: The price of oil.

If their economy is in enough pain they may be willing to barter their nuclear weapons program. But, with oil prices where they are now, it doesn't seem likely.

The Change Might Be Ours

by Dan Kervick on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 7:20pm

I'll leave this as an open question to readers -- to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program?

Possibly not much. But it might very well change our government's attitude toward their nuclear program. Without an Iranian president engaging in holocaust denial and talk about wiping regimes from the pages of history and such, Washington might not care quite so much about Iran enriching uranium for its nuclear power program.