Re: to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program?

Very little evidence suggests a post-Khamenei Iran would have a different attitude towards its nuclear program. There is very little the United States, the EU, or any other major player, can do to change the future Iranian leadership's attitude. If they are truly dedicated to building or obtaining nuclear weapons, they will do so. I see this proliferation as inevitable, regardless of the desires or actions of outside actors.

Maybe they will realize nuclear weapons are not in their self interest, maybe not. But many economic reforms must happen before Iranian politics stabilizes - however, I suspect Iran will cycle through greater political and economic stability until such changes take place. Strengthened economic growth would put needed pressure on the regime.

He didn't have much.

The protest, which seeks fresh elections, is short on specifics and long on extraneous, election-unrelated complaints.The first two items relate to the televised debates that were held between the candidates, rather than anything germane to the vote count.

There is also some innuendo, such as a claim that Ahmadinejad used state-owned means of transportation to campaign around the country, overlooking that there is nothing unusual about incumbent leaders using the resources at their disposal for election purposes. All previous presidents, including the reformist Mohammad Khatami, who is a main supporter of Mousavi, did the same.

Another complaint by Mousavi is that Ahmadinejad had disproportionate access to the state-controlled media. This has indeed been a bad habit in the 30-year history of the Islamic Republic, but perhaps less so this year because for the first time there were television debates, six of them, which allowed Mousavi and the other challengers free space to present their points of view.

With respect to alleged specific irregularities, the complaint cites a shortage of election forms that in some places caused a "few hours delay". This is something to complain about, but it hardly amounts to fraud, especially as voter turnout was a record high of 85% of the eligible 46 million voters. (Ahmadinejad was credited with 64% of the vote.)

Mousavi complains that in some areas the votes cast were higher than the number of registered voters. But he fails to add that some of those areas, such as Yazd, were places where he received more votes that Ahmadinejad.

Furthermore, Mousavi complains that some of his monitors were not accredited by the Interior Ministry and therefore he was unable to independently monitor the elections. However, several thousand monitors representing the various candidates were accredited and that included hundreds of Mousavi's eyes and ears.

They should have documented any irregularities that, per the guidelines, should have been appended to his complaint. Nothing is appended to Mousavi's two-page complaint, however. He does allude to some 80 letters that he had previously sent to the Interior Ministry, without either appending those letters or restating their content.

Finally, item eight of the complaint cites Ahmadinejad's recourse to the support given by various members of Iran's armed forces, as well as Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's brief campaigning on Ahmadinejad's behalf. These are legitimate complaints that necessitate serious scrutiny since by law such state individuals are forbidden to take sides. It should be noted that Mousavi can be accused of the same irregularity as his headquarters had a division devoted to the armed forces.

Given the thin evidence presented by Mousavi, there can be little chance of an annulment of the result.

Was this a coup or a campaign to instigate a crackdown? Or both?
Which came first?
And what percentage of the marchers want an end to the Islamic Republic?
Not as many as you'd like to think.

While Rafsanjani has a track record of advocating a more open approach to the West, when it comes to the Nuclear Program, I find it hard to believe that a Mousavi/Rafsanjani government would significantly change its position. Rafsanjani may be amendable to a deal with the US on the Nuclear issue, it is highly doubtful that they would allow for as intrusive searches as the US would like to see.

There is also very little chance of the program being halted anyways. As stated, Iran is not going to let its energy be controlled by any foreign source and Nuclear Power is the most cost effective form of electricity. On top of that, it is a matter of national pride. Iran has domestically developed nuclear power and has shown the modern advancements of an Islamic State, in spite of the all powerfull West's wishes. Nuclear weapons may not be on the mind of Iranians, but Nuclear power sure is.

I'll leave this as an open question to readers -- to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program?

Likely none. But certainly none if Israeli and U.S. rhetoric is not dramatically moderated, which it will not be. So none.

Nope. The nuke program is a separate thing and is a point of pride. My guess would be that any successor regime is likely to be Persian nationalist, and such people don't give up nukes easily.

One other thing; a TAMS "solution" isn't likely to work for very long since Iran has basically no industry to speak of. The CCP was able to rebuild legitimacy on the back of a booming economy. It ain't gonna happen with A'jad.

It depends on one big thing: The price of oil.

If their economy is in enough pain they may be willing to barter their nuclear weapons program. But, with oil prices where they are now, it doesn't seem likely.

I'll leave this as an open question to readers -- to what extent would a post-Khamenei Iran have a different attitude towards its nuclear program?

Possibly not much. But it might very well change our government's attitude toward their nuclear program. Without an Iranian president engaging in holocaust denial and talk about wiping regimes from the pages of history and such, Washington might not care quite so much about Iran enriching uranium for its nuclear power program.