Where Iran is headed?

No regime falls so long as it has the support of a minority (e.g.,5%) of the population that is willing to kill or be killed to safeguard it. The Islamic regime's hard core supporters are no small minority. The regime has an ideological force (i.e., the Revolutionary Guard) that is yet to be deployed. It has an ideological militia (Basijis) that to date has used restraints in dealing with the demonstrators.

Current impasse in Iran will NOT end in the 1979 type Iranian Revolution. It is heading towards the Tiananmen Square type resolution. Why?

It matters NOT whether that the Islamic regime was truthful in its claim that Ahmadinejad got reelected with 62% of the votes cast. Pertinent to the impasse and its outcome are what four key groups believe or pretend to believe about the legitimacy of the election results.

First, there are those Iranians who voted for Ahmadinejad. They may think that, if anything, Ahmadinejad votes were under-counted. They have no interest in undermining the legitimacy of the election results or that of the regime. Second, there are those Iranian who voted for Moussavi because they thought that he would a better president than Ahmadinejad. They may not regard the announced results as valid, like to see a re-run, but are not interested in undermining the Islamic regime. Third, there are those Iranians who dislike the Islamic regime and all its “approved” presidential candidates. Their objective is to drain the Islamic regime of any and all legitimacy, and hasten its downfall. They may or may not have voted at all. If they voted, they must have cast their votes for the candidate that they thought would deepen fractures in the Islamic regime. They are now “supporting” the “opposition” as a tactical move. Finally, there is the West and its Press. For the time being, their interests coincide with those of the third group of Iranians. They support Moussavi, the “reformists”, the “moderates”, the “peaceful” dissenters -- everything and anything that keeps up the fun and elevates the disputes.

The first two Iranian groups are led by the two main clerical factions in the Islamic regime, and the third one lacks leadership. One faction in the Islamic regime is led by Ayatollah Mesbah-e Yazdi who heads the Haqqani Seminary in Qom and is a prominent member of the Assembly of Experts -- the assembly that can dismiss, elect, or re-elect the Supreme Leader. This faction is puritanical and its members are not reputed to be corrupt. Ahmadinejad is backed by this faction. Another faction is headed by Ayatollah Rafsanjani who heads the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council. The Rafsanjani faction is more pragmatic, and its members are reputed to be financially corrupt. This faction backs Moussavi. To stay on top, the Supreme Leader -- Khamenei – performs balancing acts by playing the factions against one another. In a televised presidential debate, Ahmadinejad charged that Rafsanjani-Moussavi, et. al. have created an aristocracy in Iran and are corrupt. Following the debate, Rafsanjani fired a letter to the Supreme Leader warning him that Ahmadinejad’s allegations posed a “danger” to the Islamic regime. That warning remains unheeded. The corruption allegations exposed and deepened the factional rift, boosted voter turn out, and may have earned Ahmadinejad additional votes. Un-retracted, the corruption charges would have led Moussavi, et.al., to contest election results even if the balloting had gone to a second round and Ahmadinejad had won, not with a two-to-one margin, but by a single vote. And, Moussavi’s claim of electoral fraud would have been supported not only by those Iranian who voted for him, but also by the third group of Iranians, the West and its Press, Arab rulers and their Media, etc.

Much to the disappointment of the third group of Iranians and the West and its Press, current impasse in Iran is not going to end in the disintegration of the Islamic regime. The regime has roots that, unlike those of the Shah’s regime, than run deep throughout Iran. The Revolutionary Guard, unlike the Shah’s army, is not going to disintegrate when faced with persistent civilian unrest. To be sure there has been violence in recent days, with a number of fatalities or “martyrs”. However, the victims have been exclusively from the foot-soldiers of the “opposition”. The leadership of the Islamic regime is not in a panic mood. The Iranian Students News Agency ( http://isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1357903&Lang=P) , reports in Farsi that on June 17, Khamenei received representatives of the four presidential candidates, heard their concerns and offered them guidance, but then proceeded to exchange recollections with the four representatives, e.g., Karoubi’s representative – an “opposition leader” - recalled how Khamenei had officiated his wedding thirty years ago, and Khamenei reaffirmed that he had a lot of respect for his late father-in law. Compare Khamanei’s conduc with that of the Shah during the last months of his reign. During the period, the Shah made daily calls to the US and British ambassadors to Tehran to be reassured of the US and British support!

Okay, the impasse will not end in the regime’s downfall, but it must find a resolution. How is it going to be resolved? Who will win? And, who will end up losing?

The resolution of the impasse depends primarily on Khamanei’s actions, but also on those of leaders of the two factions. Khamanei controls most levers of power. As the Supreme Leader, he has been Commander-in-Chief for close to twenty years. Ever since appointed by Khomeini in the late 1980’s, Khamanei has been Tehran’s Friday Prayer Leader. He appoints members of the Guardian Council – the body whose responsibilities include vetting candidates, overseeing elections, and adjudicating election disputes. He appoints members of the Expediency Council – a body that is not stipulated in the constitution and has an advisory role, i.e., is used as a sounding board by the Supreme Leader. Khamanei does not have direct control over the Assembly of Experts – the body that elects or re-elects the Supreme Leader every ten years, and has the power to dismiss the Leader. However, Khamenei has made sure that no single faction in the Assembly can command a plurality of votes needed to mount a challenge to him and his position.

It is instructive to study how Khamanei manages disputes. After removing Rezaei – one of the four presidential candidates in 2009 -- from the Revolutionary Guard Command, Kamanei appointed him to the Expediency Council. Khamenei merely admonished Karoubi – another presidential candidate of 2009 – for attributing his loss in the 2005 presidential election to irregularities. Khamanei selected Rafsanjani to head the Expediency Council shortly after conceding the 2005 presidential election to Ahmadinejad. Later on, Rafsanjani was elected to the Assembly of Experts, and now heads that Assembly. Khamanei gives consolation prize to those who lose power in the Islamic regime, but do not go on to undermine the regime’s legitimacy.

Let us see where we are in the Iranian standoff. The Guardian Council approved four candidates – Ahmadinejad, Moussavi, Karoubi, and Rezaei – to run for president, oversaw the election, and declared Ahmadinejad as the winner. Khamanei congratulates Ahmadinejad on his re-election. The losing candidates allege fraud and tap into public discontent to mount mass demonstrations. Khamenei orders the Guardian Council to investigate the alleged irregularities, consoles calm, but does not order a crackdown of the “opposition”. The “opposition” pretends that it wants a re-run, knowing full well that a “re-run” means admission of fraud by the regime, while offering no assurance that it will be a one-time affair. The “opposition” leaders, particularly the experienced ones, know that a “re-run” is not on the cards. They press their “re-run” requests till they get assurance that they will retain their seats at the regime’s table and their key concerns will be addressed (e.g., Ahmadinejad’s corruption allegations shall not stand!). Khamanei has reaffirm the election results and signaled the beginning of a Tiananmen Square type crackdown in Iran.

That the Iranian impasse would end in the Tiananmen Square type crackdown should not have been in doubt to begin with. However, the scale and scope of the crackdown remains to be determined. The more “opposition” leaders that advise followers to refrain from further demonstrations, and the more such advise is heeded, the smaller will be the scale and scope of the unfolding tragedy. The outcome of Iran’s Tiananmen Square will not be different from that of China’s -- the regime will prevail.

Who will be the winners and losers of Iran’s Tiananmen Square experience? The main losers will be those foot-soldiers of the “opposition” that have fallen – or will fall – victims of violence. The “opposition” leaders that remain publicly defiant will lose their seats at the regime’s table, as those Chinese leaders that persisted in support of dissidents in 1989. Those Iranians that joined the “opposition” expecting to undermine the regime and facilitate its downfall will suffer disillusionment. The West and its Press will stick to its moral high ground, and congratulate itself for standing up for human rights, peaceful dissent, etc., etc. As in China, Iran’s Tiananmen Square will be used by the West to irritate the regime if and when it suits its purposes. And, Iran’s response to such irritations will be similar to that of that China’s.

There will be debates in the West as to the impact that Iran’s Tiananmen Square should have on the West’s policy towards Iran. Some will argue that the event weakens the case for “engagement” lest it confers legitimacy on the Islamic regime, knowing full well that the Islamic regime has never craved a legitimacy that is the West’s to confer. Others will say that the West should treat Iran the way it treated China, i.e., treat Iran’s Tiananmen Square no different than China’s, accommodate Iran’s aspirations as those of China’s, treat Israel in the Iran-West equation the same way that Taiwan was treated in the China-West equation, etc.

It might be useful to have a comparative timeline between present events and historical overthrows of governments. The pervasive coverage and breadth of analysis of the turmoil in Iran is overwhelming, and gives the sense that events should be nearing their predicted conclusion already. I think a timeline of the 1979 Iranian Revolution - at what time did protests become riots become a viable revolution? - would be a useful guide to ground us in knowing what the pace of events is actually likely to be.

It is funny how anonymous readers write "comments" longer than Dan Drezner's entry and expect anyone will read it.

Yes, Rafsanjani is "risk averse." He also know that Kahminei (sp?) PURPOSELY fixed this race to humiliate Rafsanjani! Mousavi was the "tool." And, the hatreds within the mullah system actually got laid bare.

Will it go on for months and months? Possibly.

Will it go to a general strike where things move slowly; the way the French work, when they decide their prime ministers' need to hear from the street? It's harder to crack down on workers who work slower; than it is for snipers to shoot into crowds; while they remain hidden from view.

A long time ago, in France (1380), the french peasants revolted. Out came the king. Paraded in front of them. And, swore to them things would change. So they took the king's word. Sad. The french didn't revolt again until the 1790's. And, for their troubles they got Napoleon.

Why is Rafsanjani in Qom? To save his own life. Why is Sistani working with Rafsanjani, now? To save the Shi'as, strong in Iran and Irak. So that they can keep their playing cards. How can they do anything? Dunno. The sunnis, in irak, just exploded a shi'a mosque in Sadr City. Many dead.

Conversations, even with people averse to risk; can get dramatic, when their bridges home have been burnt down. And, they see with their own eyes, that Ahmadinijad isn't on TV. The man got wall-to-wall coverage for five years. Ranting. And, the TVs are silent. Kahminei (sp?) has run into the hills and is in hiding.

It's gonna be a long, hot summer. With the possibility? Well the iranian government is blaming the Brits! (America no longer has an embassy in Iran.) While in England, Hezbollah, in droves, have gone to live. Perhaps? Sleeper cells, asleep, but waiting for a blast to turn the terror into the streets of London?

Well, if you can cow the Iranian protestors, it's not as if the goons remain asleep at their switches. They're lives and power are at stake. There are no good guys. No one will come and disrupt their meetings. No scenes from The Godfather. Where mafia goons, hearing the feds approach, fly out of windows to escape their "round up."

Obama's teleprompter? Didn't service him, yet, the way the radio mike gave FDR a singular voice.

The democraps? Wow. Listening to that ballet dancer with his dirty mouth; may also bring blow back. I keep wondering how long it will take for Obama to re-adjust the chairs among his staff. But I'm not the Oracle at Delphi. I don't do futures.