Tuesday, July 14, 2009 - 6:01 PM
In the past month, two peer-reviewed academic articles have aimed point-blank at realism and yelled "Fire!"
In Perspectives on Politics, Ido Oren argues that there is a logical tension between the idea of realism as an objective paradigm and realists proffering policy prescriptions:
Realist International Relations thinkers often intervene in political debates and criticize their governments' policies even as they pride themselves on theorizing politics as it “really” is. They rarely reflect on the following contradictions between their theory and their practice: if there is a “real world” impervious to political thought, why bother to try to influence it?
Samuel Barkin makes a similar point in the latest issue of Foreign Policy Analysis:
Attempts by some contemporary realists to both claim that international politics are objectively predictable and at the same time prescribe particular foreign policies cannot hold together logically, because they are internally contradictory. The core argument of this article is that these attempts not only fail to fulfill their goal, but that the attempt to be scientific, to see the world as predictable, is ontologically incompatible with the core insight of classical realism, that we must see the world as it is, rather than as we want it to be.
To which I say.... meh.
I see where Barkin and Oren are coming from, really, I do. It is certainly the case that this is an area where, say, constructivism has a comparative advantage over realism -- because the former is a theory that allows discursive and rhetorical strategems to affect real world events.
That said, this is also one of those logical points that sounds devastating in a grad seminar but seems less persuasive when applied outside the world of Imre Lakatos (though I would pay money to see someone from APSA flash their badge at the annual meeting and say, "Freeze, Mearsheimer!! You can't use an interest-group explanation to explain such a broad swath of American foreign policy and still call yourself an offensive realist! That violates section 2.1 of the negative heuristic. You'll have to come with me!")
First, it's not clear to me that these sins are unique to realism. Other paradigms can claim objectivity, posit systemic effects and yet still proffer policy advice.
Second, structural effects can take different forms at different junctures. A realist could therefore proffer policy advice along the lines of: "No matter what you do as a policymaker, the inevitable outcome is going to be X. However, if you choose policy action A, X will happen with a lot of unnecessary bloodshed and expenditure, whereas if you choose policy action B, X happens with a minimum of negative side-effects."
Third, there is a difference between a scientific paradigm and individual experts offering concrete advice. The latter might contradict the former, but then again, the complexities of the real world often contradict the simplifying assumptions we make in our models. The art of policymaking often requires knowing exactly which model applies under what conditions -- and this is hardly a matter of settled debate.
What do you think?
EXPLORE:INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY, FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNITY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, REALISM
I think one of the problems with realist foreign-policy advice (at least the sample I've seen, with the exception of your colleague Stephen Walt's blog) is its one-sidedness. Especially in some of the Cold War-era material, there seems to be an assumption that the "other side" is comprised of cool-minded rational actors working for the interest of their nation, while us feckless Westerners are willing to get carried away by piddling domestic concerns. So I agree with you that theoretical realism isn't necessarily antithetical to the offering of practical advice; Waltz is explicit in the first chapter of Theory of International Politics that he's making a simplification of complicated reality. But much of what I've seen fails to consider how the same factors hindering "us" from achieving our supposed national interest may affect "them" as well.
I don't know about other realists, but John Mearsheimer always makes a point in his classes to declare that offensive realism is imperfect. He says that he feels good with a batting average around .750 on the big stuff.
I think your second point, Dan, is spot on. A realist in 1900 could look at the balance of power in Europe and tell you war is inevitable, but not know precisely how or when that war would happen. Policymakers can then decide to move preventively, or try to forestall war, depending on which better serves their interests.
They are right, however, that realism is at times quite determinist, while at other leaving states a great deal of agency. I try to reconcile the two by seeing it as determinist on the big questions (those involving vital interests), while allowing states more agency on small potatoes (the non-vital interest issues). So, the Cold War was inevitable, but invading Iraq was optional - within optional enterprises, the value of realism is in exploring how we cost minimize, predict outcomes, etc.
But there is something to those articles - realism does tend to have it both ways.
If realism is claiming to be scientific, then it should be testable, it should have predictive power, and this should not be retroactive (because it would run the risk then of being simply descriptive); so, what are the main predictions of leading realists for the next 10 years? 50 years? Is there consensus?
Lots of economists, for example, spend a lot of time on theories the purport to show that their field is scientific; yet, they have very little predictive power.
This reminds me of an argument that George Stigler and Milton Friedman used to have. They were good friends and had each won economics Nobels. Both thought that the economic paradigm--opportunity cost, consistent choice--was applicable in areas far beyond traditional economics. And both thought that this sort of reasoning had shown that people made government too big--too big in the sense that people wound up poorer than they would be with a smaller government.
Friedman thought that this meant economists should try to convince people that more government wasn't better. Stigler argued that if good theory said people were going to make government too big, there was nothing economists could do about it.
The Reagan administration provided a little support for Friedman's position. Bush II did the same thing for Stigler.
If realism is the answer, then why did Mearsheimer have to resort to domestic explanations to understand the US-Israeli relationship?
The problem is that if you say the theory predicts X will happen, and X keeps not happening, and not happening, and not happening, eventually it says something about your theory.
The realist solution to this is to argue, strongly, that the failing is ours: our foolish domestic politics get in the way of "logical" realist foreign policies.
But if those foolish domestic politics seem to be influencing things everywhere you look, eventually the weight of cases starts to say something about your theory.
Which is why, if you look at the PhD students coming out of top 20 universities, or the even smaller subset of them that are competing for top jobs (whether rightly or wrongly), a rapidly shrinking percentage of them are realists.
The older generation hasn't gotten it yet, but the younger one is voting with its feet -- away from realism.
I don't see any inescapable contradiction in moving back and forth between "this is the way the world does work" and "this is the way the world should work." But realists still are in no position to offer advise about anything. The problem is that realism (really post-Waltzian neo-realism) doesn't actually offer logically valid arguments about what is or what should be. The "structure" of an "anarchical system" cannot on its own explain or predict or prescribe anything about the behavior of states. To actually arrive at such an explanation or prescription requires the introduction of some factor that realists insist is either irrelevant or counterproductive, depending upon whether they are wearing their "theorist" or their "policy advisor" hat. Mearsheimer and Walt of course implicitly acknowledge this: Domestic politics apparently do matter insofar as they interfere with the natural order of things. Which implies that a necessary precondition to the "structure" of the "anarchical system" inexorably leading to whatever it is realists seem to think it leads to ("balancing"? "bandwagoning"? does anyone even think these are meaningful terms anymore?) is the absence of interference from the domestic sphere. Which means you have to explain that absence somehow. Which means... etc.
This is why there aren't any realists under 40 (except grads at Chicago). There is no there there.
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
Read More
(7)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE