Friday, July 31, 2009 - 4:02 PM
Just as TNR's precise transcription of Denis McDonough's talking points long disquisition about the Obama administration's policy planning process comes out, Roger Cohen unfurls his long-form essay in the New York Times Magazine about the administration's thinking on Iran, the Middle East, and U.S. foreign policy.
Here's the bigthink of Cohen's essay:
Just how far Obama is ready to go in engagement’s name has become clearer in Iran. At the time of that Thursday demonstration, almost a week after the election, the toughest thing he had found to say about the turmoil was that the suppression of peaceful dissent “is of concern to me and it’s of concern to the American people.” He had also equated Ahmadinejad with Moussavi, from the U.S. national-security standpoint, because both support the nuclear program, even as people died for the greater openness that Moussavi espoused.
A sobered America is back in the realpolitik game. A favored phrase in the Iran team goes, “It is what it is.” Now the question is whether such an approach can yield results. Can Ross honor his own precept to match objectives with “available means”? To the nuclear clock has been added a democracy clock, complicating every diplomatic equation. An Iran of mullahs and nukes has morphed, for many Americans, into the Iran of beautiful, young Neda Agha-Soltan, cut down with a single shot while leaving a June 20 demonstration, a murder caught on video that went viral. Whatever Obama’s realism — and it’s as potent as his instinct for the middle ground — a president on whom so much youthful idealism has been projected can scarcely ignore the Neda effect.
All well and good, but there's a nugget buried in Cohen's tale that wories me juuust a bit. As fans of Laura Rozen are aware (and if you're not a fan, you should be), Barack Obama had a disappointing meeting with Saudi King Abdullah last month:
[T]wo sources, one a former U.S. official who recently traveled there and one a current official speaking anonymously, say the meeting did not go well from Obama's perspective. What's more, the former official says that Dennis Ross has told associates that part of what prompted Obama to bring him on as his special assistant and NSC senior director for the "Central Region" last month was the president's feeling that the preparation for the trip was insufficient.
Ok, except that after reading Cohen's story, I can't help but wonder whether Ross was part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Here is Cohen's description of Ross' meetng with the Saudi King -- which occured six weeks before Obama's:
On April 29, in Dammam, in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, Ross sat down with King Abdullah. He talked to a skeptical monarch about the Obama administration’s engagement policy with Iran — and talked and talked and talked. When the king finally got to speak, according to one U.S. official fully briefed on the exchange, he began by telling Ross: “I am a man of action. Unlike you, I prefer not to talk a lot.” Then he posed several pointed questions about U.S. policy toward Iran: What is your goal? What will you do if this does not work? What will you do if the Chinese and the Russians are not with you? How will you deal with Iran's nuclear program if there is not a united response? Ross, a little flustered, tried to explain that policy was still being fleshed out.
When the Saudis are accusing you of being all hat and no cattle, you know you have a problem.
Seriously, let's think about this from Abdullah's perspective for a second. A new envoy comes to chat filled with new plans and ideas on Iran. Except it turns out that these new plans and ideas haven't been filled out exactly -- key contingecies haven't been thought through, etc. For a leader who had to deal with eight years of George W. Bush, this had to sound a lot like U.S. foreign policy déjà vu. Why should he have been more forthcoming with Obama.
So, just to be clear, Obama found that meeting unsatisfactory -- and as a result he brings in the guy who might have laid the groundwork for the unproductive meeting?
Look, Ross is a smart guy, and he might have ust had a bad day when he met with Abdullah. But there are times when the Obama administration, for all the talk about embtracing realpolitik,* doesn't sound terribly realist at all.
*Granted, there are other points in the essay where the administration sounds positively Waltzian.
He talked to a skeptical monarch about the Obama administration’s engagement policy with Iran — and talked and talked and talked. When the king finally got to speak, according to one U.S. official fully briefed on the exchange, he began by telling Ross: “I am a man of action. Unlike you, I prefer not to talk a lot.”
Ouch! Considering how much the Arab leadership in that area loves to drag their feet and talk over coffee, that's quite an insult. Either that, or the Saudis are very, very worried about the Iranians.
Sounds like Ross is very much in tune with the administration's gestalt. Not that I'm knocking Obama's listening skills, I imagine that he would not be so discourteous to blather on like it sounds Ross did. But Obama does prefer talk-talk and is most definitely NOT a man of action - he will put off a decision until it becomes absolutely impossible to dither anymore.
One of the fascinating aspects of all this is that we're at a point in history where only a leftist can be a realist or even close to it; if a right-winger took these ideological stances the human rights lobby, the unions, the press, to name just a few, would be all over them. Imagine if Bush or Rice had gone to China and said, 'We don't care about your human rights abuses; just keep buying our dollars and supporting our debt.'
They would have been ripped apart.
"Imagine if Bush or Rice had gone to China and said, 'We don't care about your human rights abuses; just keep buying our dollars and supporting our debt.'"
Bush pretty much did this in 2008, actually.
@ blue
I believe it is more that any policy the late Bush II administration proposed would have been challenged after so many early missteps. I think this actually led to them taking up more realist policy as evidenced by Rice's ascent and actions in 2006-08.
If you are speaking in regards to the entire Bush II presidency, I think you are wrong. I can imagine little outpouring of grief save from a few crazies had the Bush administration decided not to invade and occupy a country for six years at a cost of over a trillion dollars in order to remove a second-rate dictator who posed no immediate or future threat to the US. Just as there was no mass outcry when the administration didn't actually invade China in 2001 to retrieve its crashed spy plane as was proposed by a number of the same said crazies.
ross might have a credibility problem, which would add up...
...to lots and lots of bad days...
Ross is a smart guy, and he might have just had a bad day when he met with Abdullah.
ross was the chairman of the JPPPI (Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, jerusalem) until early 2009.
Yehezkel Dror, the Founding President of JPPPI, has called, in the jewish forward, for all jews to abandon their morals in defense of israel...
...presumably to include lying their asses off.
.
seeing as how america seems to have such a vital role in the defense of israel, and seeing as how ross is a big wheel in america policy circles, and seeing as how ross was, until very recently, the chairman of an outfit whose founder thinks jews have to abandon their morals to defend israel...
...well, wouldnt all that put ross in an awkward position?
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in fact, it sounds like the saudi king knows more about doc aumann's game theory than ross does.
you will no doubt remember that one of aumann's nobel-winning theories is: you can tell what people are up to by watching their actions.
.
If one player does manage to access information about their rivals and has some form of strategic advantage therefore, what is the best way to utilise this knowledge?
If this situation arose, would playing your hand to gain short-term benefit reveal that you did actually know more than you were letting on?
For the player who does not have the information they would like, could they discover anything about the player's position by reviewing the strategies and decisions made by that player in the past?
.
and...
.
The extension introduces yet another strategic element: incentives to conceal or reveal private information to other players.
How might a person, firm or country who has extra information utilize the advantage?
How might an ignorant player infer information known to another player by observing that player’s past actions?
Should an informed player take advantage of the information for short-run gains, thereby risking to reveal his information to other players, or should he conceal the information in order to gain more in the future?
Robert Aumann’s and Thomas Schelling’s Contributions to Game Theory
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not to mention the king might actually have heard of leo strauss and his "noble lies"...
the king might even remember that america was lied into the iraq war.
so it looks like there's gonna be a credibility problem until zionists figure out some way to restore faith in their word... and until they do restore faith in their word (assuming that's not too radical a departure from zionist philosophy), everybody's gonna pay more attention to what they do than to what they say.
of course, there remains the possibility that game theory...
...is a load of cobblers, and the king doesnt need a bunch of nobel prizes to know a pile of bullshit when he sees one.
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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