Posted By Daniel W. Drezner Share

Seth Robinson has a interesting essay over at The New Republic that explains why Russia is loathe to sanction Iran over nuclear issues.  The key part: 

How does Russia benefit from its nuclear cooperation with Iran? Simple economics provides a compelling first answer: The Russian economy has not only reaped the benefits of the Bushehr deal, but it has also been bolstered by the sale of fuel and the potential sale of additional reactors. What's more, the nuclear project is only one of many economic agreements between the two countries. Total bilateral trade hovers around $2 billion, as Russia supplies Iran with consumer goods, oil and gas equipment, and military technology. Russia also enjoys privileged access (along with China) to Iran's Southern Pars gas fields.... Second, Iran is still a powerbroker in the Caspian oil trade; its position on the Caspian Sea, which is estimated to hold more than 10 billion tons of oil reserves, makes it an important and influential partner for Russia. Tehran has been extensively involved in coordinating transnational oil and gas deals, arranging transportation of exports with a number of regional states. Russia is in a position to use its good relations with Iran to challenge Washington's efforts to create new pipelines and foreign direct investment in the Caspian region. Iran has already proven an effective regional ally for Russia--in addition to cooperating on energy deals, Tehran has pointedly refrained from criticizing Moscow's Chechnya policy and has held strategic meetings with Moscow on the Taliban.  Finally, Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran provides the Kremlin with leverage over the United States. Moscow remains guarded against Western advances into its "near abroad," and has fought to keep neighboring states from being brought into the NATO fold. By dangling the Iranian nuclear issue in front of the United States, Moscow may believe it has a means to maintain regional dominance. Russian leaders have already extracted concessions from Washington, as the United States recently altered plans for missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. Yielding on the Iran issue would strip Moscow of the ability to coerce the United States and damage its own ability to reassert local influence.  

The first reason is both sufficient and compelling; I'm not entirely sure I buy the latter two.  Iran's nuclear program gave the United States just cause to insert missile programs into Eastern Europe in the first place -- so Iran's nuclear ambitions have caused as many problems for Russia's near abroad as they have ameliorated.  As for the Caspian argument, it's not clear how a Russian-Iranian axis challenges U.S. energy diplomacy in the region.  If anything, that axis probably incentivizes the smaller energy producers to find a viable pipeline alternative that flows outside of Moscow and Tehran's orbit. 

That said, the economic interest argument is pretty powerful.  So, does this mean sanctions would be fruitless?  Not necessarily.  The paradox about economic sanctions is that although allies are more reluctant to coerce each other, they are also more successful once they make the decision to coerce.  At the same time, successful sanction efforts almost always end at the threat stage.  So if Russia ever signaled that it would seriously contemplate a cut-off in bilateral exchange, the Iranians would be likely to concede before implementation. 

This is the outcome the Russians would prefer the most -- a mild threat from the P5 + 1 prods Tehran into taking just enough action to avoid further isolation, and any further implementation of sanctions.   

But I could be wrong.  Persuade me in the comments. 

 
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BLUE13326

2:57 PM ET

October 27, 2009

What if Russia just wants

What if Russia just wants Iran to get a nuclear bomb because it would provide something of a shield for its proxies in the region to cause trouble for us and our allies? In other words, what if Russia's gambit is really just primarily about weakening what it sees as its greatest adversary?

Granted, an Iranian nuke is not good for Russia over the medium/long term, but neither was our creation of al-Queda in Afghanistan to weaken the Soviets.

 

HASS

3:18 PM ET

October 27, 2009

Russia is probably "loathe"

Russia is probably "loathe" to join sanctions on IRan because they know that 1- there's ZERO evidence that Iran seeks nuclear weapons and 2- the sanctions themselves will be largely ineffective but 3- the proponents of sanctions (Israelis) see it as a way to prevent US-Iran engagement while gradually forcing the US into an eventual (military) confrontation with Iran.

 

ZJIN

4:56 PM ET

October 27, 2009

If anything, that axis

If anything, that axis probably incentivizes the smaller energy producers to find a viable pipeline alternative that flows outside of Moscow and Tehran's orbit.
--------------------

The reality on the ground told us the opposite. Without EU and US's efforts, there is no small energy producer daring moving out of Moscow and Tehran's orbit.

 

ALEXETRA

5:09 PM ET

October 27, 2009

Not economic but strategic

With a GDP of 1.6 trillion dollars bilateral trade of 2 billion dollars with Iran is pretty paltry. Russia has far larger trading relationships with many countries.

Explanations that focus on strategic considerations are far more persuasive. A better understanding of the geopolitical competition in Southwest Asia and Russia's desire to gain influence on its southern periphery is far more persuasive than economic ties.

First, the issue of energy is important (even leaving aside the Cold War history of Russia's interests in SW Asia). It sounds hackneyed but there is a "second great game" element to all of this. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a huge geopolitical vacuum in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. A major goal of US policy in the post-Cold War period has been the "integration" of FSRs into the global economy (and making the end of the Russian monopoly of control over these states irreversible). In practical terms this has largely meant access to energy and other natural resources (at least in SW and Central Asia). Unfortunately, all the infrastructure in the region was designed to satisfy the extractive needs of the Soviet Union (and to discourage links between republics and foster dependency on the Russian core). As a result all the energy and transport infrastructure needed to bring Central Asian resources to market go north into Russia. This enables Russia to exert monopoly control over the delivery of these resources to the major Western market in Europe while simultaneously exercising political control over former republics.

Connecting Central and Eastern Europe with Central Asia without going through Russia leaves few options. One, the Caucuses and Turkey. Two, South and East towards the gulf and the energy hungry countries of South Asia (Pakistan and India).

Isolating Iran diplomatically and economically (a long standing US policy) makes gaining non-russian access to those resources from the South rather more difficult (Read: Afghanistan and Pakistan imbroglio).

In short both Russia and Iran share an interest in forcing the US and EU to deal with them rather than the weaker regional states. They thereby strengthen their control over regional states and gain or maintain a monopoly on access to the Caspian and Central Asian states and their energy resources.

US policy in the post-Cold War period toward Russia and Iran has thus been working at cross purposes: On the one hand we want to gain access to the FSR without having to ask Moscow for permission. On the other we are unwilling to deal with the one country that has relatively stable institutions, is substantially industrialized and has the requisite infrastructure to access Central Asia without being subject to Russian manipulation: Iran.

The list of areas of potential strategic overlap doesn't end there. There is also the question of their shared interests in Afghanistan, in opposing the kind of Salafi Wahabi groups that target Sistan-Baluchistan as well as Dagestan and Chechnya.

Iran is a thorn in the US side in the Middle East. It keeps the US distracted and unable to challenge Moscow while the Kremlin works to rebuild influence in the "near abroad." For Iran, along with China, Russia provides protection from the 'Western (liberal) hegemony' of the US and Europe.

From Kiev to Islamabad, Baghdad to Kabul, its one fluid system. Sorry to say it, but $2 billion is less than the personal fortune of more than a handful of oligarchs. I ain't buyin' it.

 

VASHEE

6:29 PM ET

October 27, 2009

Sitting in a tree?

Russia and Iran may be sitting in a tree. But Israel has America bent over taking it from behind! Hey, it was your analogy!

 

KEVINMALEY

3:19 AM ET

October 28, 2009

I think you may be wrong

I am in agreement on all three reasons given from TNR; since you agree also with the first but not second and third, I'll focus on the latter two.

When head of Halliburton, Dick Cheney once famously said of the Caspian region that it is "the area of greatest resource potential outside of the Middle East." The Clinton Administration and Bush Administration afterward made it a top priority to make sure pipelines flowing out of the Caspian went either East or West (through friendly states) rather than North/South (via Russia/Iran). This is a very open record and reflected in current pipeline deals, ie BTC pipeline. That Russia, intentionally being bypassed, would seek cooperation with Iran, which is also being bypassed, is no surprise and in fact should be assumed.

Secondly, the Middle East is dominated by American military power; whether explicit or through client states. The same could be said of Europe and to a lesser degree, South East Asia. With domination of the ME a top priority for the US (since WWII) and Iran one of the only states that is not subservient to American power; it is no surprise that Russia (feeling threatened by the US in many arenas) would use its influence with Iran as leverage against the United States. It is straight up real politick.

 

MIKP9

12:00 AM ET

October 29, 2009

We will see

I think in the end, as Alexetra argued, Russia is not (solely) into this for direct economical gains.

Expansion eastwards towards "Euroasia" can be very lucrative.
By acting as a provider of nuclear and technical assistance to Iran, Russia shows itself as a trusteable partner for other countries in the region who might be interested in partnership.

Maybe Russia is not sure what way to take, but it does want to keep US and Western powers out of Central-Asia and Middle East out for reasons which are actually reasonable. How much influence have not the west already had in Middle East?

 

GRANT

1:17 AM ET

October 29, 2009

While I hope Russia has

While I hope Russia has better sense than that, it is entirely possible. The United States was willing to overlook Pakistan's nuclear ambitions after all, and China recently agreed to help Pakistan with nuclear power. In my opinion the rhetoric of the United States being short-sighted is wrong, it's the entire planet that's the problem.

 

FABIAN NGUI

9:51 AM ET

November 20, 2009

The Prince of Persia

I suppose that maintaining consistency in foreign policy is difficult to achieve. This is because the effort to maintain consistency itself will cause inconsistency. Persia was a strategic point of power play between Russia and Great Britain before WW2. The domination of the hinterland is key to the control of the whole world. That was the predominant geo-political theory of the British Empire. The struggle for Iran means the continuous leadership of the British Empire over other European powers in dominating the world. In reference to Seth Robinson's article, the United States and its allies should do the following:

1. Give the Russians the exact amount of money that they would have earned from the nuclear reactor project and other trade activities in Iran.

2. Give an assurance to the Russians that they will not interfere with Russian interest in the Caspian Sea, provided that the Russians would in turn terminate Iranian involvement in the area.

3. Tell the Russians that the Western powers is willing to cut forces in NATO, provided that they're willing to participate in the sanctions against Iran.

The missile deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic is to counter ballistic missiles fired against NATO forces. A large amount of ballistic missiles will have to be fired to destroy those forces. Iran would not be able to do that. It takes a far more superior force to achieve that result. That force would be Russia. The missile deployment is actually an offensive move in disguise.

In the Caspian region, billions of dollars are at stake everyday as oil is being moved across the area to reach the industrialized world. Russian predominance would certainly block out any other powers from interfering in the region. Iranian presence is at the auspices of Russia.

If Seth Robinson's second and third reasons are not the reason why Russia is against sanctions against Iran, and only the first reason holds water, then economic sanctions is an effective method to punish Iran anyway. But this conclusion would cancel out the military and political solution. That said, it means that Iranian forces are large enough to inflict serious damage on the invader and Revolutionary Islam is immune from counter-propaganda. In other words, there's no reason to fear the US outside of the Western Hemisphere as they do not have real power beyond that point of the globe.

 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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