First off, I have to say that I agree that Belichek made the right decision to go for it. (Nate Silver agrees, as well.) He also made a lot of small mistakes that he should be rightly criticized. (Bill Simmons, noted Boston sports homer, called his clock management "worse than anything Andy Reid has ever done," which is a damning indictment in his lexicon.)

As far as something Obama has done that echoes that? His campaign promises have made his job as president more difficult. Aggressively backing the Afghanistan war and promising not to raise taxes on people making less than $250k are both promises that are going to make his life a lot harder in the future. His decision-making process on Afghanistan (his dithering, if you're so inclined) must be influenced in part by his calling it a "war of necessity" on the campaign. And once the economy is on the mend and he has to get the country's fiscal house in order, that promise about taxes will come back to bite him in the rear.

Political practice is no different from medical practice, legal practice or engineering practice. When the interest of the public is at stake, positive outcomes from actions taken are expected. JS Mill likens politics with the free market, i.e a marketplace where buyers and sellers meet to trade on a variety of goods or services. A vote is equivalent to money exchanged for goods and services. A trader who did not meet customer expectations is doomed to perish. A customer who have no money to purchase goods or services is equally, doomed. Thus, the marketplace is not interested to keep anybody alive. You will have fight for your own survival in it. But of course, Mill's invention of politics in his own terms is displaced by philosophies of the Continent, whose understanding of survival differs from that of Utilitarian England. Nevertheless, Liberal thought lives on. More so in the United States, e.g Affirmative Action, The New Deal, AFL-CIO, Medicare/MedicAid, The Entente/Detente, Vietnamisation, Reagan Doctrine, Radio Free Europe, etc. The co-relation between processes and results is difficult to identify or measure. In the heat of battle, decision makers are likely to dispense with it and concentrate on immediate remedies to the problem at hand.

Football as a metaphor is a helpful construct on this point, but it's really the stakes of the game rather than the tactical decisions within the game that are most illustrative. Afghanistan itself is more akin to a backyard pick-up game that we were baited into by a smaller, meaner kid. U.S. interests are not served by playing this game to the end. For the same reason Tom Brady would never play a pick-up game against Joe Schmoe (risk of catastrophic injury too great for the stakes of the game), the United States should not be wasting so many of its young people and resources with the regular season (China, Europe, and Latin America will offer regular challenges), playoffs (Iranian nuclear negotiations) and Super Bowl (potential conflict on the Indian subcontinent) approaching.

Instead of continuing to play a less important game, draining resources and possibly risking critical injury, the President should honor those who have already given their lives there by ensuring that America's true interests are pursued and that we are ready to engage the critical challenges of the next century.

As far as utility goes, drafting a player in the top 6, enjoying his 9 year semi Hall of Fame peak, then trading him for what could be another top 6 pick prior to his impending free agency (increased cost with lower output) is about as good as it gets.

I don't think Obama has made a foreign policy move along the lines of Belichick yet. That said, a personal visit to the Middle East - Jerusalem, Ramallah, maybe Gaza - could be such a move.

History shows that sometimes such a high visibility visit can reignite a stalled peace process. On the other hand, it can be very risky, and if it doesn't work Obama is likely to be criticized by all sides (like Clinton after Camp David). This is complicated by a number of tactical errors his administration made on this issue during the first year in office.

I'd agree with Zyh that Obama has yet to display a foreign policy maneuver that parallels Belichick going for it on 4th and 2 deep in his own territory, but I'd like to suggest what such a radical maneuver might be.
What if he really pushed the Chinese to end their currency manipulation? I'm referring to more than the current nudging that we've seen in recent days/months. It would be unconventional in that such an action is unlikely due to the grave concerns over Chinese backlash (and the subsequent effect that this would have on the US economy). Yet, if it were to work the results would likely be a significant boom to the US manufacturing sector and have residual effects on the trade imbalance as a whole.

I see where you are going with this Prof. Drezner but football is not like the game of Risk, just like statecraft is not like the game of Risk. Maybe you roll the dice because you know your percentages might be favorable that on any given play, 2 yards is fairly easy to gain.

But, the defense adjusts to which down it is and how many yards the offense has to go. You're right it would have been a much better decision for Belichick to run on third down because it would have likely done two things: ran down the clock, and shortened the fourth down enough where Indy's D would have to play honest against the run.

Belichick's decision to pass on third (even though he should have known he was going to use all 4 downs) meant that he would also have to pass on 4th, given that he still had 2 yards to gain.

When Indy knew that he had little choice to pass on 4th and 2, they could set up their defensive package accordingly. Load up on the line and play short for the pass.

It worked like a charm and Belichick failed. Of course, Belichick will always be considered a good coach, but in that instance he should have ran the ball both on third and fourth down making it harder for Indy to concentrate its defense.

So, unlike the game of Risk where you can make reasonable calculations based on numbers, the same cannot be done in statecraft or football because the opponent can alter their defensive package based on each down/iteration.

Lastly, full disclosure: Patriots suck! Go Vikings!

I can understand why Belichick went for it - he didn't trust his defense to hold down the Colts' offense with two minutes left. It's his mistake afterwards that I'm angry about. He should have told his defense to simply let the Colts score as quickly as possible, then have Brady drive the offense down the field into field goal range to kick and win.

Dr. Drezner,

Your comments are interesting and provide data about the decision-making process that many other sources ignore. I would be interested to hear a follow up to this posting that addresses the equally risky (perhaps more so) decision by Jaguars head coach Jack Del Rio, summed up here:

http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2009/11/maurice-jones-drew-after-kneel-down-at-1-yard-line-sorry-to-my-fantasy-owners/1

Instructing Maurice-Jones Drew to take a knee at the 1-yard line, essentially giving up a guaranteed touchdown (albeit running out the clock) and risking it on the field goal kick?

At the risk of sounding crazy myself, I would compare Belichick's decision to one made by Kim Jung Il - crazy on the surface, but based on past results strategically successful given the objectives of the decision-maker (I clearly perceive any and all North Korea policy to be a failure to date).

I likewise compare Jack Del Rio's decision to the decision made to send President Clinton to North Korea in exchange for the release of Laura Ling and Euna Lee. Incredibly risky with potentially unmatched consequences - but it worked.

Thoughts?