Tuesday, November 24, 2009 - 2:36 PM
Anne Applebaum points out an interesting conundrum for U.S. foreign policy:
[W]e are left with a curious situation: America no longer wants to be the sole superpower. The American president no longer wants to be the leader of a sole superpower. Nobody else wants America to be the sole superpower, and, in fact, America cannot even afford to be the sole superpower. Yet America has no obvious partner with which to share its superpowerdom, and if America were to cease being a superpower, nothing and no one would take its place.
This might not be the end of the world—there are quite a few trouble spots that could do with a long period of benign neglect—and it might not last forever. Europe, when counted as a single entity, is still the world's largest economy. China, whatever else it might be, is still the world's fastest-growing economy. Sooner or later, the simple need to defend their economic interests might persuade one or both to start taking the outside world more seriously.
This does mean that the Obama administration has a problem, however: Having come to office promising to work with allies, it may soon discover that there are no allies with which to work.
One could argue that this is the downside of path dependence. The United States enjoys many perquisites of power because the U.S. has been the hegemonic power for so long that everyone else expects the U.S. to continue as the lone superpower.
The plus side of this convergence in expectations is that U.S. leadership of the international system is by and large accepted. Of course, leaders are useless without followers, so this is more about the appearance of power than power itself.
The down side of this arrangement is that the United States gets blamed when global public goods are not provided -- even if the United States is largely blameless.
Applebaum goes on to suggest that thw U.S. should reconsider the unilateralism of a few years ago. Actually, I wonder if the U.S. shouldn't go in the opposite direction. The current problem is one of free-riding -- rising powers assume the United States will shoulder a disproportionate burden in msnaging the international system. If the U.S. was prepared to weather the effects of non-cooperation, a retrenchment strategy eliminates the "moral hazard" issue that blunts the incentive for rising powers to share the burden.
Of course, I'm not convinced of this -- I'm just wondering. It is entirely possible that countries like China are perfectly prepared to shoulder a greater burden -- they just have a different set of preferences than the United States. Or, it could be both.
Question to readers: do you think the Obama administration should follow Applebaum's advice?
EXPLORE:INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GREAT POWER POLITICS, HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY, HEGEMONY, POWER TRANSITION
It sure is frustrating to have to bear the costs of leadership (and international peace maker/liberal enforcer) while consistently getting sniped at by every country under the sun.
It seems as if now we have the military might but not the $ to enforce the international regime we want. If you buy Nye's three-pronged power approach you can see Obama's strategy is to keep that 1st prong, hope the second rights itself eventually, and use persuasion skills to cover the $ gap.
I suppose this is the best overall strategy, but the problem there is you need to execute properly on specific mirco issues to keep enough people happy to be persuasive. Plus a good compromise leaves everyone unhappy. That's a problem.
The other idea is to charge countries with which we have security agreements (Saudis, Japan) more $ for our security services which would work if making the military a private enterprise wasn't the worst idea ever.
The ironic problem of being the United States, when we act we're criticized for it (I'm looking at you Somalia), when we don't act we're criticized for it (I'm looking at you Rwanda). With any luck the rise of other nations will allow us to remind them of their international baggage. I'd suggest that we accept the decline of unilateralism for no other reason than it will happen anyway, and get as good a deal as can be managed out of it.
Of course this is all premised on the argument, with a logic so twisted it is surely only possible in IR theory, that the leader by leading is, all things considered, somehow disadvantaged and 'put upon'. The leader is the leader because of an overwhelming advantage, not the inverse. This is especially true in what (despite the pessimism displayed here) is still a resolutely unipolar state system (albeit fraying around the edges in the form of increasing regionalism, perhaps). The U.S. remains spectacularly advantaged in more or less every respect, despite its undoubtedly spectacular recent fall. In fact, isn't it indicative of the U.S.'s extreme advantage that it has fallen as far as it has and still remains so overwhelmingly dominant? The vaguely multilateral moves made by the current administration would hardly be considered multilateralist if conducted by any other country - only by the U.S.'s existing standards could they be judged so.
That the U.S. (seemingly) feels so put upon is interesting in itself - is it not logical that an actor that makes the world in its own image (such as the U.S. has undoubtedly done to a large extent), after a time, will become blind to the extent to which that world has become similar to it (because, like one's own accent, one always takes for granted what is most familiar) and see only the differences, which in this context happens to be the disadvantages of its empowered leadership. Not every aspect of the world-made-in-it's-image will benefit the U.S. - perhaps, for instance, if the global financial system had been a little less to the U.S.'s liking previously then the financial crisis would not have been so severe - but a world-made-in-it's-image is surely preferable to the alternative - try asking people from any other country.
Of course, another way of looking at this would be to say 'leadership? what leadership?' - it can only be in a very narrow, realpolitik sense that one can say that the U.S. has provided international leadership in any positive sense recently. Witness the failures in Copenhagen, how little the U.S. position vis-à-vis climate change has actually moved - in fact, how little the U.S. position has actually changed on a whole swathe of issues.
Now, this should not suggest that I am dismissing the negatives of leadership out of hand. Clearly free-riding and such are problems for the actor concerned; however, I would strongly suggest that the negatives are vastly over-represented in public discourse and indeed in American IR theory generally.
The practical consequence of this thought would be that to move 'back' to unilateralism, as has been suggested, grossly underestimates the extent to which the U.S. remains the predominant power and, consequently, grossly overestimates the extent to which the U.S. has moved towards multilateralism at all. The choice, therefore, is not so much between uni- and multi-lateral politics as between (a:) a productive unilateral hegemony that is willing to - in part and with limitations - negotiate with lesser powers and make limited compromises for the common good and (b:) an unproductive unilateral hegemony that rules by diktat and consequently fails to reach agreements on the important issues of the day. Perhaps I am taking the distinction between uni- and multi-lateral a little too far, but I think the point stands. Multilateralism certainly implies an actor existing on at least a similar plane of existence other actors with regard to negotiating power.
The U.S., judged by the standards of any other state, remains overwhelmingly powerful. Personally, as a non-U.S. citizen, I welcome this and look forward to more of it. The usual reaction to such an attitude 'oh p**s off and live in China then' aside, I would welcome any further moves to multilateralism. I simply doubt whether the U.S.'s decline is such that this will become a possibility any time soon.
The search for an ally took a hit with the EU's seeming unwillingness to become a major player in foreign policy, as they chose two relative unknowns for the positions of EU President and High Rep. I think Dan may have a point in suggesting that at some point the US should say "Hey, we're not going take on this burden alone anymore. Pitch in, or problems won't get taken care of."
Why should the US be the country that worries about North Korea - a country that borders China - having nuclear weapons?
China and South Korea are the main countries that are effected by North Korea and they are the ones that have the economic leverage.
I think the US should spend less time dealing with countries that directly border China and Russia. We should worry more about Mexico.
Applebaum's premises are incorrect so the question is not framed well. Of course the US would love to retain its position as superpower; any state in the position of the dominant power in the international system will strive to maintain that position, thats a large part of US interest in maintaining domination over the energy producing regions of the world, and the main energy-trade routes whether pipeline or chokepoint. Its also silly to say the President doesnt want the US to be a superpower; on what basis is this founded? The US's power is not growing as fast as others, but to say it voluntarily will give up its role as superpower, or desires to, is lunacy.
If the U.S. was prepared to weather the effects of non-cooperation, a retrenchment strategy eliminates the "moral hazard" issue that blunts the incentive for rising powers to share the burden.
History from looking at the last hegemon (Great Britain) suggests that this is difficult to do - the various pathways of US power and the like around the world build up institutional and political support back home. It took a major war and the Great Depression to break the back of the fading British-led system of the 19th century, and that was after they had long since ceased to be the dominant economic and military power.
Yet America has no obvious partner with which to share its superpowerdom, and if America were to cease being a superpower, nothing and no one would take its place.
There's several states that probably wouldn't mind this. Russia's leadership has said, if I recall correctly, that their ideal would be a multi-polar world with no overly dominant power (which would have the side-effect of giving them greater freedom of action).
On point 1 agree. On point 2, not so much. Of course Russia would welcome a scenario where the U.S didn't have so much power, but I'm not sure that Russia would be able to move into the vacuum created.
. . . that's what the "superpower" concept is. It's particularly popular among government and military people who use the drug to distort their view of reality and then act on their muddled ideas.
All those cool and deadly toys, all those swell PowerPoint shows, all those maps that show our might deployed around the world. O what a career I can build! How we can scare the natives! Make people bow!
The frequent result is that some poor kid from Iowa gets his brains blown out by a poor tribesman who isn't impressed. And we bomb a wedding and increase the hatred for the US. And we get to pour trillions down multiple rat holes, raher than solving our glaring economic and social problems.
Not recommending total pacifism or complete withdrawal from the world, just a truly drug-free America with clear vision, intelligent reflexes and realistic goals.
that's what the "superpower" concept is. It's particularly popular among government and military people who use the drug to distort their view of reality and then act on their muddled ideas.
It's just a way to describe the uniquely disproportionate economic and military power the US has in the current international arena. Even the British of the 19th century never reached that level, although for a long time they were a major economic force and the largest economy in the world.
There are plenty of other terms, but they all imply other things as well. I used "hegemon", but that implies a state that is dominant in the international system and actively seeks to use and promote that dominance.
the difference btw China and USA
USA faces these high costs because it wants to be omnipotent. It does not just want countries to have policies that benefit USA; it also wants countries to have policies that benefit themselves! USA wants them to be democratic, non-Islamic, developing etc.
China does not care about the regime type. It has never been hit by Islamists (even if it were, it would not engage in regime change around the world). China supports regimes that give it support in the UN or provide the natural resources it needs.
If USA retreated and China wanted to fill the vacuum China's approach would not be as costly.
Do we need to have an hegemonic power? Is the world really safer with only one superpower? What does superpower do to the third world countries? Our constitution was built on the basis that all men are created equal. When it comes to the third world, I feel that Superpower means more trouble to them. I believe that the Obama administration is heading to the right direction by restructuring the basis of dealing with other countries in a corporative way. I also believe that a multipolar world is safer than a unipolar world and I feel that the world is moving to that direction. Good luck to Obama.
It is an honour and a responsibility to be awarded the title 'Superpower'. It is an extension of the European Great Power concept. Thus, a superpower is a great power that is armed with nuclear weapons. A state that is conferred the title 'Superpower' shall command influence, fear and respect in diplomatic conferences and military conflict. Every state in the world aspires to be a superpower. More often this aspiration is limited to attaining the power and not retaining it, once the status is obtained.
We are confronted with Applebaum's cynical observation that the US, under the Obama administration is not interested in maintaining it's superpower status. I suppose this is quite right. The previous Democratic administration has acted in the same manner. Strategic issues are not addressed. Domestic issues are given more attention than it deserves. The rest of the world is taking advantage of this neglect. Al-Qaeda is building it's influence, the Taliban is rampaging through Afghanistan, the North Koreans went ahead with atomic bombs, and rogue regimes are given a free hand to thrive, in the name of non-interference. Applebaum's advice to the present administration is the reversal of this style of foreign policy and a reversion back to unilateralism.
Having said that, we should also be mindful of the fact that the US could not prevent it's own downfall and the rise of new powers in it's place. The present unilateralism is only temporary but must be harnessed until it reached it's natural end. Competing powers will emerge in due time but whether or not they will command such a reverence from the rest of the world remains to be seen. At present, the US is leader because the rest of the world wishes it to be so. Of course, this is with exceptions. Iran, North Korea and Cuba might think otherwise. China, with it's paternalistic and Confucian habits are often at odds with Western culture and the West. But they remain a de facto ally in East Asia when help is needed. Whatever it is, we are comfortable with US leadership in the meantime.
“America no longer wants to be the superpower.” Yes it does.
Applebaum writes, “Halfway through his presidency, George W. Bush found he had to drop unilateralism in favor of diplomacy. Now one wonders: At some point in his presidency, will Obama find he has to drop diplomacy in favor of unilateralism?”
First, we can’t put “George W. Bush” and “drop unilateralism in favor of diplomacy” together just because Bush didn’t unilaterally invade another country between 2004 and 2008. Second, yes, Obama will drop diplomacy in favor of unilateralism if he thinks the situation calls for it. They are both American presidents. The main difference in their approach reflects their respective levels of education. Obama is willing to think and talk things out because he is able to. Bush couldn’t so he didn’t.
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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