I agree with the notion that helping Iran's democrats and not hyping up Iran's nuclear threat is the way to go but I disagree with his assessment that Iran is undergoing a second revolution.

I'd bet on realism, largely because I think it's highly questionable that we have the expertise to flip Iran; and this is not a criticism of the current administration, because the previous one had the same problem. There's just as good a chance, for example, that our attempts would be counter-productive and be used by the despots as anti-democratic propaganda. We just seem to lack the cold war expertise to infiltrate and use our own propaganda to promote our values. It's hard to isolate why we seem to lack this expertise that we once had, whether it's due simply to personnel, to a drop in America's standing, we were once able to marshal various aspects of our culture to promote our values, because we were largely convinced, outside academia, that our values were superior to communism. We seem to have lost that confidence and ability to use our culture in that way.

Keeping in mind how far Iran might be from developing a usable nuclear weapon, I think there's no question that the focus of the West ought to be on low-key support for democratization. Given theocratic Iran's history I doubt that possession of a nuclear weapon would seriously alter their basic conservatism.

As an aside on the entire matter: How do they think we could 'democratize' Iran? The United States doesn't have the funds, soldiers, or support of China and Russia (both of which would be vital) to do it. Asking the Sunni states for help would create a nationalist/Shi'a backlash certain to kill any opposition to the current regime. To the best of my knowledge there is no powerful enough armed opposition to be supported by the U.S without directly invading. Also the protesters have been very careful and loud in their denunciation of the current leaders, but NOT the system. One of their greatest heroes of the moment, Mr. Montazeri, was part of the system even if he did miss out on an opportunity to take control of the country in the 80s.

Back on the main topic: To start I think that while there will eventually be another Revolution, perhaps in ten to twenty years. I don't give the current system more than twenty years, but I also don't think it will realistically happen in just ten.
On the matter of whether or not a democratic Iran would be more agreeable on the nuclear issue, that really depends on how far Iran depends on outside support. Every new government after a revolution is weaker than history would make you think, and they often desperately seek outside support and recognition. Evidence of this is shown by the fact that once the former African colonies gained independence, they did not see the U.N as a tool of the West but something to quickly join.
Back on subject, Iran might see ending a nuclear program as an easy way to save money and win recognition, especially if it could be done in such a way as to portray the entire thing as another example of the former system's insanities. However, as I assume that another Revolution will not happen in under ten years, I think that the matter will have already been settled one way or another.
Lastly, we should not assume that simply because a nation is democratic, it is safe. A new government would probably see a need to play up its nationalist credentials, and while that might not mean more support for terrorist groups there will still probably be greater tension between Iran and Sunni states. In that scenario the United States will have the unenviable role of trying to play peacemaker among old allies and a new democracy.

The people of Iran massively support their nuclear program and have a long history of deeply resenting foreign powers (Russians, Imperial British) who similarly threatened, boycotted, bombed and invaded Iran in the past in order to deprive Iran of her rights (look up the Tobacco Concessions Protest in 1890 or the nationalization of oil in 1953) Politicians who caved into these foreign demands are reviled to this day. No Iranian government will give up its right to enrichment without losing all credibility. Believe it or not, Iranians love their country too.

Sitting around and opining that it'd be better to negotiate with a bunch of brutal dictators than a relatively free people, that is.

1. What is the likelihood of a second Iranian Revolution? Mousavizadeh seems to think it's a virtual certainty. I'm probably more optimistic than most Iran-watchers, and I'd give it a 50/50 shot at best.

Whether it's an outright revolution or a more gradual shift, it doesn't seem the regime has been able to bottle this up.

2. If a revolution took place, what is the likelihood that the new Iranian government would be more amenable on the nuclear issue? Again, Mousavizadeh seems to think this is a virtual certainty. Me, I'm not so sure.

Does it really matter? The reality of the situation is the current Iranian government has a 0% chance of giving up pursuit of nukes and we have a 0% chance of stopping them without taking the sort of actions we both can't afford, would be counterproductive on other fronts, and might not work any way.

I suspect that a legitimate government in Iran would still be suspicious of us and its neighbors and pursue safety through nukes. But a legitimate government would raise the probability from 0 to something greater, however small, and it would decrease the fears that they might use the weapons.

3. If a revolution took place, what would be the additional positive policy externalities? An implicit point in Mousavizadeh's essay is that on a whole array of other issues, a democratic Iran would be much more constructive. This is indeed possible -- I suspect support for, say, Hezbollah might dry up. That said, it is equally possible that a democratic Iran would freak out the non-Democratic Sunni states in the region just as much as a revolutionary theocracy has done in the past.

In the long-run, the US would be better off being aligned with Iran than the non-Democratic Sunni states in the region. From a perspective of regional balance, that's certainly a shift, but the benefits of aligning with a more culturally diverse, liberal, and cosmopolitan society (despite 30 years of theocracy) with similar regional interests (stable Iraq, Afghanistan) and less immediate and obvious antipathy with our other regional ally (Israel) are so obvious that it really goes without saying.