I think that you are a bit fanciful here. As I said in your other post, only 4 countries signing on the letter with U.S. Let's see: UK and France, ah, did they always complain about currency with China before? A history of EU's talk with China on exchange rate came into mind. Is there really anyone surprised by EU countries wanting China to appreciate?

Canada, ehhhh, isn't it another America just to the north of U.S. ?

SK, well, here is a new player, but hey 1) SK is the co-chair of this year G-20, so if U.S. cannot get SK to sign the letter, then it is really embarrassing for U.S. 2) SK relies on U.S. protection, so SK really has no choice but do what U.S wants it to do.

And the conference last December on climate change, which is obsessed now by some western observers, really does not matter now. Do you notice the losing credibility of scientists advocating for Climate Change, short of being called liars? I think that everybody wants to forget about this issue from their agenda right now, unless someone wants it to be a tool for protectionism.

Third, the Iran issue. Ah, did Prof. Drezner forget that Russia annouced that it would provide Iran with a nuclear reactor, when Clinton was in Mascow?

I think that Beijing's position is pretty clear: you want Iran at what price? You should think about this when you get Russian support with abandoning missile shield in Poland. You see that this is concession from China. I see that this is the beginning of the price negotiation.

My take in the last 6 months is that China has not played anything differently from previous positions. What changes is the perception of China's policy, which is heavily influenced by American and British media.

So US and UK media biases aside, do you refute that China is still beholden to the economies that purchase the stuff they make?

Thus, if the EU, South Korea, Canada, and US (who all happen to represent a large percentage of exports for China) sign off on the same thing, I think that would grab China's attention. So, yes they only represent 4/15th, but its still the largest consumers that are complaining. If they get out of the manufacturing/industrial type of economy then they will be less beholden to their trade partners, but until then they'd better listen before someone starts talking tariffs to account for the currency differences. These governments might think to themselves: Keep your currency purposely weak? We'll estimate its real value and apply tariffs to your goods!

Now, I'm not one to say its retribution, but I read this and couldn't help but think, "the game goes on," http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-chinese-drywall3-2010apr03,0,2652639.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fmostviewed+%28L.A.+Times+-+Most+Viewed+Stories%29

Professor Drezner, your post provokes thought about the fundamental nature of our relationship with China. The mainstream media love to shake the tree of Sino-American relations hoping something will fall out, but they seem to sway constantly between progressive boom and certain doom based on the prevailing political breeze. Not two months ago some were panicking about the Dalai Lama visit and arms sale to Taiwan as if it would fray all ties with the Middle Kingdom. Now that loose ends are coming together much more smoothly, I would still agree with most of Rachman’s assertions that some caution would help our honeymooning with China, especially considering their intimate relations with the Islamic Republic. Considering Iran is the third largest oil supplier to China (the second largest oil consumer in the world), and that both countries have similar history and attitudes with regard to the West, Beijing and Tehran have an ideologically durable and economically tangible relationship – more than enough to make Washington jealous. Though the Obama administration would like to reap the fruits of supposedly soon to ripen sanctions, there is, of course, concern that our new squeeze China might juice them down to a soft and toothless pulp, to save face with Iran and in part to protect the Iranian gas and oil refining industry (the same industry the Chinese energy group CNPC is so heavily invested in). However, if sanctions were crafted to specifically protect the industries key to China while staying tough on other groups and sectors, do you think that Beijing would endorse stiffer sanctions?

All things considered, I am not sure the adversarial relationship Rachman describes and a warming of relations need to be mutually exclusive. Comparisons to the Cold War in your article for Spectator you make a great point about a possible refrigeration of relations in the future, but even if Sino-American ties were put on ice, I still think the political climate could be workable. Nippy perhaps but, with the many challenges of the 21st century looming ahead, the Union and the People’s Republic will need to find a way to grow together in spite of the issues, and we can already see that kind of relationship germinating. The mainstream media would like to spin the thermostat on Sino-American affairs to all glad or all sad, but balance is key to any relationship, bilateral or otherwise. The fact that we can have disagreements with China while simultaneously working together on international issues hints at the maturing relationship the White House has previously claimed, and Hu Jintao’s attendance at the nuclear summit later this month hints the Chinese might think thaw too. Not that I am implying we will warm to each other completely anytime soon, but I see the potential for some very luke-warm relations in the future. Whether or not America and China will sit in that tree has yet to be seen, and the climb up is still shaking some leaves loose, but barring an unexpected gust, I would not be wholly surprised if we saw Uncle Sam and the Dragon sitting pretty up there sometime in the years to come.