Posted By Daniel W. Drezner Share

As Foreign Policy continues to add content, I have two fears.  First, at this rate, I'll have to stop reading off-site material just so I can stay up-to-date with all of Foreign Policy's stuff.  Second, I fear I might be reluctant to criticize FP content -- even though no one at FP has ever whispered such a thing. 

With all that said, I found Peter Beinart's Think Again essay about Reagan to be well worth reading.... well, except for two things. 

First, Beinart is too soft on Reagan when he talks about the latter being soft on terror.  Beinart mentions the withdrawal of U.S. Marines following the 1983 Hezbollah bombing in Beirut.  He then observes: 

In 1985, after a U.S. Navy diver was shot in the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, Reagan once again channeled John Wayne as he vowed, "America will never make any concessions to terrorists." But within months, he was not only making concessions, he was selling anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to Iranian "moderates" in the hope that they would use their influence to help free Americans taken hostage by Hezbollah in Beirut.

Beinart fails to mention that the Reagan administration essentially capitulated to the hostage-takers on the TWA flight.  Actually, they got the Israelis to capitulate for them

In what was widely perceived as an implicit, never explicit, quid pro quo, the hostages started being released by the hijackers, followed some days after by Israel starting to free some of its hundreds of Shiite prisoners. At the time, U.S. officials denied there was a deal and said Israel had already committed to releasing the prisoners.

The second problem is that Beinart elides the biggest reason why Reagan's actual legacy doesn't quite match Reagan's legacy in the eyes of conservatives:  the extent to which Reagan was constrained by his staff.  Whether true or not, the perception by conservatives at the time was that Ronald Reagan wanted to pursue a more hawkish foreign policy, but those damn moderates James Baker and George Schultz wouldn't let him.  Hence the birth of the phrase "let Reagan be Reagan!" 

Now, how much of this was just Michael Deaver's clever PR and how much of this is true remains an open question.  Nevertheless, this perception allows both neoconservatives and Tea Party activists to believe that their preferred foreign policy represents the "true Reagan." 

AFP/Getty Images

 

ZATHRAS

7:34 PM ET

June 8, 2010

Reagan Revisited

It's generally a mistake to evaluate comments by today's Republican politicians about Ronald Reagan's legacy at face value. This isn't just because some of them are profoundly ignorant of foreign and national security affairs today, let alone of America's history in this policy area. It's also because the substantive record is not what matters in Republican politics.

The lowest common denominator in Republican politics is twofold: a good Republican is one who appears as a strong leader and stands up to liberals and the media. Reagan qualified, in spades. So did Richard Nixon. So did George W. Bush. The reason these three very dissimilar men were all regarded as heroes by the core of the Republican Party -- in other words, by the Republicans who always vote in every election -- has everything to do with how they conducted themselves in domestic politics. Republican voters cared that Nixon resisted Communist aggression, that Reagan called for the Wall to come down, and that Bush sent the military everywhere, but what really excited them was that they confounded liberals.

Republicans who were seen as weak in this essential department (the elder Bush) or as too cooperative with liberals in Congress (Dole) or the media (McCain) had great difficulty retaining any enthusiasm among zealous conservative Republicans. This remains true today. The problem Republicans face is that Nixon and the younger Bush both left office under a very dark cloud, Nixon because of Watergate and Bush because he was a lousy President. Even in off-year, low-turnout elections, it's difficult to win if you're seen to model yourself after a President who left office with 25% public approval.

That leaves Reagan, who was popular when he left office and has remained so. Every now and then, during the last twenty years and probably during the next twenty, some commentator will score points for himself among other commentators with a "debunking" piece: "Ah ha! Reagan wasn't really so conservative (tough on terrorists, opposed to all taxes, aggressive about asserting American power). Take that, Sarah Palin!" Like Beinart's column, such commentary will consist of piling up points from the policy record, ignoring the reasons Reagan was so popular with conservatives in the first place and remains popular with them today.

 

BLUE13326

8:24 PM ET

June 8, 2010

It's fascinating that a

It's fascinating that a president who was derided during his tenure by the left as a moron and a warmonger and the most dangerous man on the planet has a legacy so big and is seen as so positive by so many Americans that the left are trying to claim him for themselves.

This says a lot I guess about something, but the essay was pretty uninteresting...

 

PAUL81

4:43 AM ET

June 9, 2010

Definitional problems

One problem is comparing hawks with doves during the cold war versus in today's post-9/11 world. Using typically "hawkish" policies to deter a conventional actor is one thing, but the same policies don't have much relevance to deterring terrorists (i.e. building up armaments, etc.)

Which dovetails (no pun intended) into another point: Beinart's article illustrates a common problem when one group (i.e. 'hawks') tries to communicate with another (i.e. 'doves'). Analysis of hawkish or dovish policies should be based on the effectiveness of the policy, not on whether you "like" or "dislike" it. Beinart's definition for hawkish policy is sending troops into battle. That is silly. Hawks (at least during the cold war) advocated robust defense spending in order to PREVENT sending troops into war. Sending soldiers into battle is by definition a failure of diplomatic policy. Some dovish policies had the same goals (such as realist ones of ratcheting down tension by cutting outsized nuclear armaments not being used for deterrence but for overkill).

But hawks and doves aren't (or at least should not be) hawks and doves simply because they like warfare or they don't. They are such because they believe the specific dovish or hawkish policy will be more effective in avoiding war.

Beinart's article is typical half-cocked wannabe historical revisionism. His definition of hawk vs. dove is useless, and the comparison between the two eras is not much better. Although, at least we can all agree that modern-day conservatives have NO IDEA what they are talking about when they take up the mantle of Reagan.

Beinart's misunderstanding of why hawks are hawks (or doves are doves) reminds me of a story I heard in grad school. Constructivist par excellence Alex Wendt asks Neorealist godfather Ken Waltz, "What's the point of Realism?" Wendt is as dumbfounded by Waltz's answer when Waltz says (as if it is patently obvious): "Why, for peace of course."

 

WHISKEYPAPA

10:08 AM ET

June 9, 2010

Reagan One of the Worst

Raegan was one of the worst presidents we've had, not one of the best. That he has a good reputation shows the depravity of the people, nothing more.

Reagan always took the easy way out. He never made a tough decision. Further, what he had his staff do was far worse than Watergate. His budget policies were ruinous. His was the prototype for the Bush 43 Administration.

Walt

 

ALMANZOR

3:06 PM ET

June 9, 2010

"Reagan was a cipher"

"These men were running the government," these men being the so-called Troika of Baker, Meese, and Deaver. This was Al Haig's opinion of Reagan.

Haig's estimation of Reagan should be taken with a grain of salt, considering that the latter fired the former. Though I am no Reagan expert, I never took this characterization seriously, until I read an Op Ed piece in the NY Times, the link for which I will include at the bottom of this post. The editorial was written by Richard Allen, one Reagan's National Security Advisers, in which he related how he had informed Reagan of Israel's destruction of Saddam's nuclear reactor at Osirak. Reagan's reaction was to ask Allen, "Why do you suppose they did that?" Allen then had to explain Israel's motive for this attack to the president.

At least to me, this would appear to be the most stupid question one could have possibly answered to such a report, one which would demonstrate a lack of understanding of foreign policy, or at least of the politics of the Middle East. I recognize that this was the era of the Cold War and not the GWOT, during which one could expect America's leadership to be more familiar with the politics of Moscow or Berlin than with those of Tel Aviv or Cairo, but still, what could be the possible reason ANY country would use its Air Force to destroy the nuclear reactor of another country?

"These men were running the government." "Zathras" mentioned the parallels between Bush and Reagan, though he neglected to mention the fact that Bush essentially let Cheney and Rumsfeld determine his administration's foreign policy for the first few years of his presidency, which to me is the most striking similarity between the two presidents. That said, I think that his post goes a long way in explaining the appeal both of these politicians had to a specific demographic of the population, which he calls conservative Republicans, who are overwhelmingly white men, may or may not have a college degree, and are working in business or the private sector. These men saw Regan and W. as being "one of them," a guy they could go out and drink a beer with, who shared their values, and if you will forgive my cynicism, was not condescending to them. They were beloved because they were perceived as being tough on America's enemies and for standing up to the media and those "liberal smart-asses." The candidate who fits the bill today is the Sarah Palin, who rails against the "lamestream" media and opines that America "needs a commander-in-chief, not a law professor," yet would appear to know very little about foreign policy or governance in general. If Sarah Palin were ever elected to the presidency, which seems unlikely, she would doubtlessly be another cipher.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/opinion/07allen.html?scp=1&sq=osirak&st=cse

 

ZATHRAS

8:57 PM ET

June 9, 2010

Reagan and Bush

Ronald Reagan had many shortcomings as a foreign policy President. Yet he conducted a foreign policy toward the most important issues of the time -- those involving the future of the Soviet Union and the evolution of Europe -- of remarkable consistency and success.

There were always people, in his own administration and outside of it, who thought their ideas about foreign policy were better than his. What distinguished the failures among Reagan's advisers -- Haig and Allen were prominent among them -- from the successes like George Schultz, James Baker and Colin Powell, is that the latter adjusted themselves to Reagan's personality. They recognized his red lines and the things that were most important to him, knew when and how to keep him out of trouble, and never deluded themselves that they were President. Haig's conspicuous failure to do any of these things as Secretary of State was especially curious after his success in the far more toxic atmosphere of the Watergate-era Nixon White House.

The differences between Reagan's administration and that of the younger Bush were actually fairly dramatic. Reagan was ignorant of certain important facts; Bush neither knew nor cared. Reagan was serenely self-confident, sometimes to a fault; Bush's self-confidence was mostly a front. But the greatest difference was probably that while Bush talked a good game about the prerogatives of the Presidency, in practice he left large areas of policy to virtually unaccountable subordinates. With respect to terrorism and certain elements of domestic policy, the early Bush administration might as well have been the Cheney administration; it might as well have been the Rumsfeld administration when it came to planning and directing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his last years as President, the most important policy questions were decided by Henry Paulson, Bush's Treasury Secretary.

Reagan refused to even consider stepping aside temporarily after he'd been shot in the chest. For all the shortcomings of his executive style, and for all the really lamentable gaps in his knowledge, Reagan took the responsibilities of the Presidency very seriously. Bush, a Me Generation President, only wanted to look as if he did.

 

QPZMGR

3:22 AM ET

July 5, 2010

These men were running

These men were running the government." "Zathras" mentioned the parallels between Bush and Reagan, though he neglected to mention the fact that Bush essentially let Cheney and Rumsfeld determine his administration's foreign policy for the first few years of his presidency, which to me is the most striking similarity between the two presidents. That said, I think that his post goes a long way in explaining the appeal both of these politicians had to a specific demographic of the population, which he calls conservative Republicans, who are overwhelmingly white men, may or may not have a college degree, and are working in business or the private sector. These men saw Regan and W. as being "one of them," a guy they could go out and drink a beer with, who shared their values, and if you will forgive my cynicism, was not condescending to them. They were beloved because they were perceived as being tough on America's enemies and for standing up to the media replica omega and those "liberal smart-asses." The candidate who fits the bill today is the Sarah Palin, who rails against the "lamestream" media and opines that America "needs a commander-in-chief, not a law professor," yet would appear to know very little about foreign policy or governance in general. If Sarah Palin were ever elected to the presidency, which seems unlikely, she would doubtlessly be another cipher.

 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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