What's the objective here? If it's the present Iranian government, committed to confrontation with the United States and its allies as part of its strategy to perpetuate its authority at him, deciding to come to the negotiating table and make a deal with this same group of countries to abandon its nuclear program, it's hard to see how sanctions get us there. It's hard to see how anything else gets us there, either.

If the objective is to influence Iran toward becoming something more like a normal country, with strong inhibitions against seeking confrontation with neighbors not having designs on its territory, sanctions might be a piece of that puzzle. But only a piece, and a small piece at that. The major development in Iranian politics during the last year was the unrest produced by the disputed election. This was a gift to everyone thinking in terms of a "normal country" objective; the Iranian opposition raised all sorts of issues against the present Iranian government that Iranians have good reason to care about, and that have nothing to do with us. They also offered the opportunity for American and other Western intelligence services to address the bane of our Iran policy for the last 30 years: lack of reliable sources of information as to what is going on inside the country and its government.

I'm not in a position to evaluate how the Obama administration has responded to that latter opportunity. In public, though, it responded to political unrest in Iran with tongued-tied hesitancy. It didn't want to be accused of meddling, but it couldn't say anything against the Green Movement, but couldn't speak up for a movement it didn't know much about...but, but, but. Every deer lying by the side of a Wisconsin road must have put itself through a similar course of reasoning in the recent past.

In the end, the Greens were suppressed, the Iranian government accused the Americans (and the British, which must have been a relief to Britons worried about their nation's prestige overseas) of meddling anyway, and we're mostly back where we started a year ago. We're still talking about sanctions in the context of what we want to happen with Iran's nuclear program, not about what we want to happen in Iran itself.

I grant that the intellectual well on this subject was tainted somewhat during the last administration, when some people in Washington argued seriously that regime change and a solution to the Iranian nuclear problem would both follow naturally from the dispatch of a few well-placed bombs. That this idiotic idea was fashionable then was not a good reason for the Obama administration to still be reacting to it last year, let alone to still be reacting to it now.

Will sanctions work? That question can't have a valid answer unless we know what "work" means. If we mean what the Obama administration has said publicly -- forcing Tehran to the negotiating table, or increasing pressure for its own sake -- the answer seems pretty clearly to be "no." If we mean something more specific, like cutting off revenue streams to businesses owned by the Iranian security services that are driving toward a nuclear capability, then the answer could be "maybe." In either case, the question only makes sense if we have a realistic idea of our policy objective. I'm not sure the Obama administration does at this point.

It's frustrating to see that even people who study the topic of sanctions can't offer insights that go beyond the conventional wisdom.

Let me make three points.

1) The instinctive reaction of IR scholars is to say that "sanctions don't work." But often the more important question is not whether sanctions work, but why we choose sanctions. Economic sanctions are only one of the many arrows in states' foreign policy quivers, which include, inter alia, military force and diplomacy. Regardless of whether they work, sanctions remain a policy option.

Among IR scholars, the standard response to the announcement of a new round of sanctions on Iran is skepticism, bordering on a disparaging stance. Only very few appreciate the hell of a work that is needed to put together a sanctions package. This time, for example, no observer had counted on Washington getting on board China and Russia.

The use of sanctions to influence Iran's behavior may turn out to be ineffective. But the fact is that in comparison with other policy alternatives (e.g. military option), sanctions now represent the best option from a cost-benefit perspective. The use of force, instead, entails hugh risks and costs.

2) Another important flaw in most analyses is the isolated view of sanctions. In fact, sanctions are often only one component of a foreign policy response, often coupled with diplomatic initiatives and sometimes with the threat of military force or even regime change. So any attempt at evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions should take into account this "holistic" aspect. The UN Security Council decided to go ahead with sanctions, but it hasn't give up the efforts of diplomatic outreach to Tehran.

3) Any attempt to evaluate sanctions and its contribution as part of a broader response should look at the stakes of the target states. Let's make no mistake: Iran is hell bent on acquiring nuclear weapons capability. It doesn't necessarily that Tehran will make nuclear weapons, but it seeks enough fissile material and delivery devices in order to have a "nuclear option" without having to conduct tests. If the Iranians are smart enough, they won't opt for overt nuclearization, for this is highly likely to trigger a chain reaction and force the Saudis and others to go nuclear, thereby equalizing their nuclear capability.

The crucial, albeit least understood, question is why Iran has nuclear ambitions. The fundamental answer is not security, but regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf if not the Middle East. Given their long history and proud civilization, Iranians naturally seem themselves as the master in the region. They are perfectly aware of the fact that the surrounding Arab countries remain wary of Iranian intentions. Nevertheless, they keep on making their bid for regional hegemony.

Inevitably, Iran resents the overwhelming U.S. presence and meddling in the region. Still, it went to great lenghts to make a political rapprochement with Washington. During the War in Afghanistan in its early days, for instance, U.S. policymakers were heavily dependent on information provided by Tehran.

But a normalization of US-Iranian relations couldn't be achieved, mainly because of Washington's refusal. The U.S. stance, in turn, was largely shaped by the stance of the Israelis. And that's the crucial point, one that is understood only by a very few people. What we are witnessing with Iran's nuclear ambitions is a struggle for mastery of the Middle East between Israel and Iran, allies during the Cold War and bitter rivals since the end of the East-West confrontation, with each competing for Washington's attention.

Whether the West's response including the sanctions package succeeds or not will largely (or even mainly) depend on the future of Israeli-Iranian relations. If Israel is willing to accomodate Iran's rising power, the current tension will defuse. But if Israel refuses to engage Tehran, then the Middle East faces a bumpy ahead, with serious repercussions, not least for the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Indeed, expect Tehran to scuttle any attempt to move forward the peace process, either through its allies Hezbollah and Hamas or through Syria.

In sum, people making an assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions are well-advised to have a more nuanced approach.

I don't disagree that smart sanctions probably won't make Tehran give up its nuke program simply because of the importance of the program to Iran. But I wouldn't throw out smart sanctions altogether as a tool of economic statecraft. When we got a hold of the North Korean regime's $ in the Macau bank, they came to the table, at least for the time being. They didn't care about the widespread sanctions in place; they cared when the regime's funds were cut off.

Also, there's much debate in literature on sanctions; if you believe Huffbauer, Schott, and Elliot's findings, you believe smart sanctions do work sometimes, but interestingly, HSE believe that if you're going to use them, you have to turn on the screws hard and fast for maximum leverage. And ironically, multilateral cooperation doesn't help the success of sanctions since they're watered down and difficult to coordinate. The administration is doing just the opposite.

The bottom line is if the target really values the behavior or outcome you're trying to change, sanctions by themselves probably won't work. The question becomes if smart sanctions, in concert with other tools of statecraft, are more apt to produce a change in the target's behavior. For example, are smart sanctions combined with US support to democracy promotion activities in Iran more apt to work than sanctions by themselves?

-River Jordan and the Mediterranean about how the people there want this land to be governed. A cautious assesment of the outcome of such a vote, will be that Israel as we kbow it, will cease to exist.

And that will be very benefivial for all freedom loving peoples. If we have had such a referendum in -- say -- 1975, thenin all likelyhood there wouldn't have been any 9/11, the primary motivation for which was US support for harsh Israeli policies in the occupied terrirories. The second major motivating factor was US troops continued stay on holy Saudi soil (Bin Ladens homeland) - despite promises given to King Fahd before the 1991 Gulf War, that they would be removed immediately after the war.

But here comes my point: If Israel had ceased to exist in 1975, very few would have had any interest in Iraq or Iran - incidentally Israels two greatest strategic foes on the surface of the Earth. And it is a fact, that none other than Israel had supreme interest in seing their two foes wear each other down in their 8 year long war in the 1980ies.

That war costed more than one million people their lives, and it has always seemed cruel to me, in this way to supply both sides with weapons, so that they could wear each other down. We must always remember who had the biggest interest in seing them two destoy each other. Always when looking for a motive look at the ones that is set to gain the most.

The US surely didn't gain much - on the contrary it made it look very cynical and part responsible for the dead of around 400.000 Iraqie children due to sanctions after the war. I assure you: If Israel had been vlosed in 1975,- no sanctions, and those Iraqie children would have been alive today.

It is a topic that I have a great interest in, and I will always go after those who proposes new sanctions - this time against that other foe of Israels - here after the first -- Iraq -- was destroyed in The Second Gulf War.

No doubt Mr. Drezner was supporting both the notion that Iran and Iraq should wear each other down i the war in the 80ies, then the sanction-regime and the so called "Dual containment", both wars, and now a new round of sanctions, instead of proposing the obvious:

It is time to rid the world of the Israeli Zionist regime, by holding a referendum in the land between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean , just like the Iranian President has proposed many times. It is the concerns of this miniscule country with an inhavitable surface area the size of Delaware and the adjacent Cecil County in -Maryland that is causing all the problems. Get to the root of the problem, grab the nettlle by its root and cut it off.

-Saddam, irrespective of Israel. Of course, you are supposed to say this are'nt you? But please remember that it was the US itself that proped up this individual with weapons and dollars, thereby giving him an incentive and an idea that he could get away with taking what he regarded as a lost Iraqie province.

In short Israel and its only ally on the surface of the Earth had behaved morally reprehensible by supporting first Iraq, then Iran.

n the end, the Greens were suppressed, the Iranian government accused the Americans (and the British, which must have been a relief to Britons worried about their nation's prestige overseas) of meddling anyway, and we're mostly back where we started a year ago. We're still talking about sanctions in the context of what we want to happen with Iran's nuclear program, not about what we want to happen in Iran itself.

I grant that the intellectual well on this subject was tainted somewhat during the last administration, when some people in Washington argued seriously that regime change and a solution to the Iranian nuclear problem would both follow naturally from the dispatch of a few well-placed bombs. That this idiotic idea was fashionable then was not a good reason for the Obama administration to still be reacting to it last year, let alone to still be reacting to it now.

Will sanctions work? That question can't have a valid answer unless we know what "work" means. If we mean what the Obama administration has said publicly -- forcing Tehran to the negotiating table, or increasing pressure for its own sake -- the answer seems pretty clearly to be "no." If we mean something more specific, like cutting off revenue streams to businesses owned by the replica omega Iranian security services that are driving toward a nuclear capability, then the answer could be "maybe." In either case, the question only makes sense if we have a realistic idea of our policy objective. I'm not sure the Obama administration does at this point.