The declinism industry in America

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner Thursday, October 7, 2010 - 9:21 AM Share

My post yesterday on following Vizzini's advice U.S. retrenchment from Central Asia generated a bit of pushback. I should point out that my concern here is that the U.S. husbands its power resources with a bit more acumen. Sure, Central Asia has some strategic significance, but the thing is, every region in the globe has some strategic significance. If I'm rank-ordering U.S. strategic priorities, it would go as follows: 1) East Asia; 2) Latin America; 3) Europe; 4) Middle East; 5) South Asia; 6) Central Asia; 7) Africa (there's also a big gap between 4 and 5 on this list). Scarce resources devoted to Central Asia have to be siphoned from somewhere, and I don't want too much of a diversion from other strategic priorities.

That said, I want to clarify that I'm not saying that the U.S. is in terminal decline and therefore should engage in a systematic strategic retreat. David Bell makes an excellent point in The New Republic today -- there has been a perpetual declinism industry in the United States since the launch of Sputnik.

Twenty-two years ago, in a refreshingly clear-sighted article for Foreign Affairs, Harvard's Samuel P. Huntington noted that the theme of "America's decline" had in fact been a constant in American culture and politics since at least the late 1950s. It had come, he wrote, in several distinct waves: in reaction to the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik; to the Vietnam War; to the oil shock of 1973; to Soviet aggression in the late 1970s; and to the general unease that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Since Huntington wrote, we can add at least two more waves: in reaction to 9/11, and to the current "Great Recession."....

What the long history of American "declinism" -- as opposed to America's actual possible decline -- suggests is that these anxieties have an existence of their own that is quite distinct from the actual geopolitical position of our country; that they arise as much from something deeply rooted in the collective psyche of our chattering classes as from sober political and economic analyses.

For whatever reason, it is clear that for more than half a century, many of America's leading commentators have had a powerful impulse consistently to see the United States as a weak, "bred out" basket case that will fall to stronger rivals as inevitably as Rome fell to the barbarians, or France to Henry V at Agincourt.

On the foreign policy front, selective U.S. retrenchment doesn't imply terminal decline so much as a temporary realignment to ensure that American power and interest are matched up going forward.

Question to readers: does retrenchment presage resurgence?

EXPLORE:U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, ECONOMIC HISTORY, GREAT POWER POLITICS, HEGEMONY, UNITED STATES
 

GREGSANDERS

2:09 PM ET

October 7, 2010

Should we be providing hegemonic security in the Middle East?

Based on your ordering, which I don't dispute, the Middle East is the fourth most significant region to us strategically. However, even with withdrawal from Iraq, I think it is safe to say that we're still planning on going to significant expense to remain a hegemonic security provider in that region.

Based on that rank ordering, the cost (specific strategy aside) of providing hegemonic security in East Asia seems highly justifiable. I'd guess that in Latin America and Europe the cost of stability, post-Cold War, is comparatively low even accounting for Balkans Conflicts and the war on drugs.

So would you say further retrenchment in the Middle East below the level of our pre-9/11 engagement is appropriate? I think that would be consistent with your rank ordering, but not necessarily implied.

 

BLUE13326

5:08 PM ET

October 7, 2010

I disagree with your

I disagree with your rankings, but I guess it would depend on how you define strategic priorities; I would be tempted to put Europe right above Africa and put the Middle East above Latin America.
It really comes down to our financial state, and that has significantly deteriorate over the past four years, so I'm tempted to give the declinists more weight; I guess the best time period to analogize is to the 70s, and the real question is whether a Reagan will arrive to turn things around.

 

CUPPA

9:30 PM ET

October 7, 2010

I'd say yes

I think after the US reorganizes and gets back on its feet it will emerge stronger than ever before.

 

VMITCHELL

2:53 AM ET

October 8, 2010

Don't ever bet against the US

Many, many reasons to understand the extraordinary strengths of the US and for optimism in the future:

1) The US is the world's largest manufacturer, with a gross output of nearly $5 trillion ( >$2 trillion in GDP contribution) producing 20% of all the world's manufactured goods, a market share it has held for decades - Japan and the EU have had their shares decline precipitously, something rarely noted - also America produces one-third of all the world's high tech goods. (manufacturing jobs have been lost in less competitve industries, yet has remained strong in higher value industries)
2) The US spends 35-40% of the world's research and development money, guaranteeing future prosperity
3) At $15 trillion, it remains by far the largest economy in the world, 3x's larger than China
4) The US is deliberative, self-critical, and self correcting, and so unlike those in Europe and the Middle East incessantly criticizing the US, it is dynamic and fluid, changing as it needs to--identifying problems and rapidly fixing them
5) Its unmatched culture of leading universities, think-tanks, public debates, entrpreneurship, coupled with its domination of technology and science provides it with an extraordinary productivity and potential.
6) Despite what some may say, the US, without imposing, has the most attractive culture the world over; this is a reflection of the overt and subtle things about America and Americans which makes it so emulated and great.
7) The net worth of Americans even after the 'Great Recession' is some $60 trillion, a sum equivalent to the entire world's annual output (GDP).

 

EDSCIE

5:33 PM ET

October 20, 2010

VMitchell: Don't Ever Bet Against the US

“Don't Ever Bet Against the US”
I agree but it isn’t as sure a bet as it once was.

"Many, many reasons to understand the extraordinary strengths of the US and for optimism in the future:"

"4) The US is deliberative, self-critical, and self correcting, and so unlike those in Europe and the Middle East incessantly criticizing the US, it is dynamic and fluid, changing as it needs to--identifying problems and rapidly fixing them"

It is appropriate, I think, to question whether it is likely that the US as a nation and as individuals will continue the dynamism that maintains and grows the extraordinary strengths that you mention (including a sufficient level and quality of dynamism itself)?
Criticisms from others if deserved are welcome, if not, they don’t matter much. And in that connection, wouldn't it be more helpful for the US (and all nations) to look toward other nations (and regions and neighborhoods within regions) where the real strengths that we/they enjoy can be recognized maintained and grown-- hopeful that word of good examples will spread and that weaknesses will find it harder to survive and that their bad effects will be fewer and less grievous?

 

SCOOP

10:21 PM ET

October 28, 2010

The end of the America’s unipolar primacy? Not so fast

Posted by Robert Haddick on Small Wars Journal, October 26, 2010

"Understanding America’s Contested Primacy by Eric Edelman, a career United States Foreign Service Officer, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the second Bush term, and now Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), argues that for all of the significant challenges the United States faces over the medium term, no other power or alliance of powers is likely to displace the United States from its perch. Nor, according to Edelman, is a multipolar world likely to arrive anytime soon, a world which would find the United States one of several equals competing for political power while defending clashing spheres of influence. After thoroughly analyzing the positions and prospects of the United States and other competing powers, Edelman concludes that for all of America’s problems, all of the other pretenders to the throne have it even worse. Thus, although the U.S. will never again have it as easy as it did in the 1990s, neither is the world slipping back to another unstable multipolar pre-1914 era."

 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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