Wednesday, June 8, 2011 - 12:38 PM
Your humble blogger is headed to China for the next few days as part of a conference sponsored by the MacArthur Asia Security Initiative and the School of International Studies at Peking University, at which we will be discussing "What roles do power, history, ideas, and other legacies and factors play in shaping the American and Chinese approaches to sovereignty?" and "What is distinctive about the American and Chinese orientations and what are the implications of their preferences for the international order?" and "Could I please have an extra serving of tripe?" OK, that last one will just be a personal quest for yours truly, but you get the idea.
We will also be "Meeting with high-rank officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CPC" -- so with luck, I'll be able to post blog items that will impress Chinese readers more than, say, your average Tom Friedman column. Assuming, that is, that the interwebs are semi-friendly over there.
While I am praying for an upgrade on my flight to Beijing winging my way to the Middle Kingdom, go and contemplate Gideon Rachman's latest in the Financial Times. He points out that should China supplant the United States during this decade, it will be a very strange superpower indeed:
The ascent of China will change ideas of what it means to be a superpower. Over the course of the American century, the world has got used to the idea that the world’s largest economy was also the world’s most obviously affluent nation. The world’s biggest economy housed the world’s richest people.
As China emerges as an economic superpower, the connection between national and personal affluence is being broken. China is both richer and poorer than the western world. It is sitting on foreign reserves worth $3,000bn. And yet, measured at current exchange rates, the average American is about 10 times as wealthy as the average Chinese....
The power of China – combined with anxiety about the frightening public debts being built up in the US, the EU and Japan – will challenge western ideas about the relationship between democracy and economic success. Ever since the US became the world’s largest economy, towards the end of the 19th century, the most powerful economy in the world has been a democracy. But, if China remains a one-party state over the next decade, that will change. The confident western slogan that “freedom works” will come under challenge as authoritarianism becomes fashionable, once again.
What do you think? More tripe, or go for the chow fun instead?
Has anyone disproved these arguments yet?
http://media.ft.com/cms/b8268ffe-7572-11db-aea1-0000779e2340.pdf
Although China's per capita income will continue to trail the US for some time, China is already home to the second largest amount of billionaires and the world's largest or second largest (depending on the metric) market for luxury goods. So the connection between personal affluence and national affluence isn't really broken.
Moreover, the fact that billionaires coexist with high levels of poverty and underdevelopment and has major implications for assessments of the quality of economic growth under strict state direction. Rising levels of inequality can create deep-seated and public dissatisfaction despite the consistency of overall economic growth and absolute reduction in poverty and increase in welfare. One thing that recent studies of Chinese consumption show is that conspicuous consumption is strong there, so keeping up with the Joneses will probably be an increasing source of social tension. Other countries, when looking at the Chinese experience will probably (I hope) keep that in mind.
Can readers in Beijing attend the conference? Is it open to the public?
Power = Concentration of Resources
That is the point forgotten by many folks when they tend to compare per capita income or how childishly Obama talked about USA still being highest GDP country when measured in Dollars (not on PPP).
The kind of resources State can mobilize to laser focus on a particular issue, that amount is dramatically high and limits on per capital does not inhibit that. In other words, aggregate numbers - they start to make asymmetrical effects on the State Power and Society at large.
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
Read More
(4)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE