Posted By Daniel W. Drezner Share

[WARNING:  THE FOLLOWING IS AN OPTIMISTIC GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY POST]

Note:  in my last blog post, I might have sounded juuuuust a wee bit pessimistic about the state of the global political economy.  That was my intent, but it wasn't necessarily how I actually felt.  My aim was to assemble as negative a brief as possible about the state of the global political economy.  The aim of this post is to argue that, despite all the recent bad news, the fundamentals of the global political economy are surprisingly sound.  I'm not actually as optimistic as the rest of this post suggests, either -- but I do lean more in this direction.  The fact that I'm blogging this from a zombie-proof vacation redoubt should in no way affect your evaluation of the following few paragraphs.  

So, when we last left off this debate, things were looking grim.  My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie echoes of the Great Depression.  Let's assume that the global economy persists in sputtering for a while, because that's what happens after major financial shocks.    Why won't these other bad things happen?  Why isn't it 1931? 

Let's start with the obvious -- it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931 played out.  The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying the Great Depression.  I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes. 

The legacy of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide much stronger cement for the current system.  In terms of publuc attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll about which economic system is best.  I'll just reproduce the key charts below: 

2007 poll results

2010 poll results

The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S. support for the global economy,  but a few other things stand out.  U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very high level.  In contrast, support for free markets has increased in other major powers, such as Germany and China.  On the whole, despite the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, public attitudes have not changed all that much.  While there might be populist demands to "do something," that something is not a return to autarky or anything so drastc. 

Another big difference is that multilateral economic institutions are much more robust now than they were in 1931.  On trade matters, even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of the World Trade Organization's corpus of trade-liberalizing measures are still working quite well.  Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-trade agreements but the surfeit of them.  The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of the 2008 financial crisis.  The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan to strengthen capital requirements for banks.  True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the status quo. 

As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems.  That is setting the bar rather high, however.  One could argue that the G-20's most useful function is reassurance.  Even if there are disagreements, communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse. 

Finally, a note about the possibility of riots and other general social unrest.  The working paper cited in my previous post noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances.  However, that paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19: 

[I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget cuts is generally lower. Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant. As we limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines. For full democracies with a complete range of civil rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant.

This is good news!!  The world has a hell of a lot more democratic governments now than it did in 1931.  What happened in London, in other words, might prove to be the exception more than the rule. 

So yes, the recent economic news might seem grim.  Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the 1930's.  And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen. 

 

GOOGLE EXPERT

4:44 PM ET

August 12, 2011

SEO Expert

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SEO Expert, SMS Gateway

 

MORGENTHAU

10:30 PM ET

August 12, 2011

The 800-pound gorilla in the room

Mr. Drezner,

I agree with much of the post. True, there is room for optimism, and that's mainly because of domestic support, multilateral institutional strength, democratic structures, and last but not least, Ben Bernanke.

But you fail to mention the main reason why we can sleep peacefully at night despite the fragile state of the global economy. And that's unipolarity, with the United States enjoying military and economic primacy since the end of the Cold War. As a realist would put it, "It's the structure, stupid!". The current structure of the international political system is unambiguously unipolar. Washington has no peer competitors. And that's why, from a security perspective, there is nothing especially worrisome about the current economic troubles. Both America and Europe were dealt an economic body blow during the last three years, but serious security repercussions in their relations with Russia and China are conspicuous by their absence.

The geopolitical landscape is probably the key to understanding why it's not 1931! The First World War had completed destroyed the European balance of power. It was the beginning of the end of the mighty British Empire. Former multinational empires - the Ottomans, the Romanovs and the Habsburgs - were swept away. New powers, mainly Japan and the United States, were not ready or willing to restore the prewar order. The Peace Conference in Versailles imposed punitive conditions on Germany, generating deep resentment among the whole population and sowing the seeds for the rise of the Nazis. France, deeply fearful of a German resurgence, was in no mood for generous gestures. The most powerful liberal democracies, Great Britain and France, continued to distrust each other, and this didn't help matters when facing the rise of communism and fascism. Last but not least, the depth of anti-Jewish sentiments played a critical role. It's not a coincidence that Credit Anstalt had been established by the Rothschilds. Another example is the beginning of the banking crisis in the United States in 1931, prompted by the failure of the Bank of United States, whose founder, Joseph Marcus, was a Jewish immigrant. (Btw, is it a mere coincidence that the current mess started because Lehman Brothers, founded by the Jewish family Lehman, wasn't bailed out?).

To put it mildy, the international political situation was not conducive for promoting economic cooperation. The Great War had disrupted the international financial and monetary system. The various waves of countries leaving the Gold Standard only exemplified the extent of the problems. Many countries, in particular France and the United States, kept violating "the rules of the game" in order to amass gold reserves. And the rush to keep gold and to make "beggar-thy-neighbour" policies is largely explained by geopolitical instability. Unfortunately, Great Britain was in no position to restore hegemonic stability. Pax Britannica was over.

Today, Pax Americana is far from over. No country has the wherewithal to threaten U.S. military and economic preeminence. In addition, the United States, despite being the epicentre of the current meltdown, helped containing the crisis in a way that Kindleberger would have been proud of.

If the current global economy is not in a dismal shape, that's because the United States, despite all its flaws and failures, keeps the system together.

 

BLUE13326

11:50 AM ET

August 13, 2011

I don't have the same

I don't have the same confidence in central banks as you do (cf. the ECB's role in the last financial collapse), but I think we're not going to fall off a cliff because US companies are lean and mean now and sitting on piles of cash, due to the last recession, and are waiting for an excuse to put that cash to work. Maybe they have to wait until the next president, but eventually that money will get put to work.

 

PQUINCY

3:07 PM ET

August 13, 2011

I hope you're right about central bankers...

Given both the media's and the markets' tendency to overcompensate, it's valuable to hear a recounting of the (real) reasons why a further collapse into deep depression, widespread social conflict, and global war is not that likely.

That said, I'm not as confident in central bankers as you are when you say "if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes." Really? Is demanding sharp fiscal austerity across the European economies -- not only of the feckless Greeks, but of Spain with its quite modest debt-to-GDP ratio and Italy with its current fiscal surplus -- really evidence that the mistakes of 1931 and 1937 are not being repeated? I don't mean to dismiss the threat of excess debt, simply pointing out that piling on pro-cyclical deflationary fiscal measures during a deflationary and de-leveraging recession is exactly what exacerbated the popping of the 1929 bubble. Moreover, the large remaining overhang of overvalued assets on bank balance sheets in Europe (sovereign debt) and the United States (mortgage debt) is a threat that current central bankers are addressing by self-defeating policies: on the one hand, low interest rates (allowing wider lending-borrowing spreads and thus bank recapitalization, along with potential inflation to erode the debt overhang), on the other hand fiscal austerity (leading to economic downturn, making debt overhangs more threatening, and promoting deflation rather than inflation).

Aside from that, however, the fact that there is not a hint of major-power war on the horizon, despite intense international economic tensions and imbalances, is surely a major difference that sets 2011 apart from 1931 or, even more, 1937. Meanwhile, the fact that the United States continues to spend like a drunken sailor on defense -- indeed, spending as if we were in a major war -- has a stimulative effect not so different from rearmament and then war in the late 1930s, but without (so far, and let us pray going forward) the same destructive effects.

 

DYAHWIE

1:33 AM ET

August 14, 2011

a newbie's question

Um, why can't I comment on the reputation reading list status but can comment in this article?
T_T

 

PULLER58

12:01 PM ET

August 15, 2011

Doesn't have to be 1931

Trying to frame issues in a historical context ignores the fact that a new version of an old problem is very possible. At this point, politics in the West is clearly in a sad state. Boneheadness permeates most political parties, and that means nothing of value will emerge. It can only get worse.

 

EGISTUBAGUS

12:12 PM ET

September 8, 2011

recent economic news might seem grim.

"The recent economic news might seem grim. Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the 1930's. And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen". are you sure about this?
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PRISCILA

2:33 PM ET

September 10, 2011

Today, Pax Americana is far

Today, Pax Americana is far from over. No country has the wherewithal to threaten U.S. military and economic preeminence. In addition, homeprojects the United States, despite being the epicenter of the current meltdown, helped containing the crisis in a way that Kindleberger would have been proud of.

 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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