Contagion in world politics

Posted By Daniel W. Drezner Wednesday, August 17, 2011 - 4:26 PM Share

There's been some interesting blog commentary on my debate with Anne-Marie Slaughter, and I encourage international relations theory geeks to check it out.  Over at the Monkey Cage, Henry Farrell makes an interesting intervention.  You should read the whole thing, but here's the part I found particularly provocative: 

Rather than seeing the international sphere as a space for inter-state power politics, or as a space for networked common action, we can think of it as a space for contagion.That is, think of it as a space where ever-multiplying and ever-ramifying sets of networked relationships across border serve not to enable problem-solving DIY diplomatists, but instead to transmit social influences in ways that are difficult to predict ex ante. This would mean taking seriously the kinds of complexity theory and network theory arguments that Anne-Marie mentions, but following them to a quite different set of conclusions than she does. 

The world that complexity theory and network theory depicts is one where actions have highly unpredictable consequences. This follows both from theoretical arguments about processes of contagion across large scale networks, and from empirical research conducted via e.g. experiments....

Just because the world has become more networked, it does not mean that states can either (a) easily use networks to pursue their policy goals, or (b) turn over responsibilities to networks that will self-organize around socially useful tasks and responsibilities. To the extent that networks’ politics are predictable, they will conform to the same kinds of (frequently unpleasant) politics as do states. That is, they will be characterized by power inequalities (sometimes gross), actors pursuing their self-interest while entirely blind to the needs of others, and the rest of the shebang. To the extent that networks’ politics unpredictable, they will be unlikely to be useful tools of policy.

This is a story with far fewer helpful policy lessons than either Dan’s or Anne-Marie’s. It points to plausible developments in world politics, without providing any very obvious tools to deal with them.

I need to process Henry's arguments more before making a fully thought-out response.  This is a blog, a two half-assed thoughts should suffice for now.  First, Henry gets at something that was implicit in the exchange between Anne-Marie and myself:  the notion that powerful actors possess considerable agency in world politics.  Slaughter and I might disagree about who those actors are, but we assumed that power = agency.  Farrell's point about contagion is that this presumption does not necessarily hold.  And the policy implications of that suggestion are rather jarring, to say the least. 

Second, however, my own theoretical predilections lead me to wonder whether powerful agents can halt/regulate/control the spread of contagion more .  The Arab Spring suggests such possibilities.  So far, the general unrest in the region has toppled a regime in Tunisia, partially toppled regimes in Egypt and Yemen, led to a civil war in Libya, and led to... something in Syria. 

This is not insignificant, but it's worth remembering that the wave of unrest was much larger than those countries.  Early protests in Iran went nowhere -- in no small part because the Iraniann state has gotten very, very good at cracking down.  Led by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf monarchies have by and large kept populist demands at bay, going so far as to invite Jordan and Morocco to join the Gulf Cooperation Council. 

I'm not trying to pull a Kevin Bacon here; the Arab Spring is Big Earthshaking Stuff.  My point, rather, is that not every contagion proceeds unimpeded -- there are counter-contagions as well.  When and how those counterwaves happen is worthy of consideration. 

 What do you think? 

EXPLORE:GLOBALIZATION, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, GREAT POWER POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
 

ZATHRAS

4:04 AM ET

August 18, 2011

I think Farrell

I think Farrell overgeneralizes from the Arab Spring, but then again I think nearly everyone overgeneralizes from the Arab Spring.

Countries with similar demographics and governments designed (in somewhat different ways) to monopolize most political and economic authority, but with otherwise very different characteristics, are experiencing very different kinds of changes that have a few common elements. Which could mean that most of them would have experienced these changes eventually whether Tunisia had happened or not, or could mean that they are experiencing them now because Tunisia happened when it did -- regardless, the confluence of circumstances is telling us some interesting things about Arab societies and states. We're taking a leap of faith if we assume it's necessarily telling us a great deal about the international system in general, or a great deal that's new, anyway.

Here's what is new, and I'm a little surprised it hasn't figured more prominently in this Internet discussion. The context of what we're seeing now in the international system is a marked decline in the influence of the American government. If it seems as if the United States is less able to influence international events, it seems to me that networked transnational actors and subtle changes in the nature of states' influence over their international relations must be well down the list of things we ought to be analyzing.

I understand the argument that this factor is something everyone is aware of, and therefore we need to be seeking understanding of all the other things affecting developments in states and societies. My response is simply that awareness and understanding are not the same thing. Understanding and action to restore something of what has been lost are not the same thing either, but that's another discussion. I fear that some in the academic world, seeking to avoid entanglement in the emotionally charged debate over domestic American politics, are glossing over a very significant period in the history of American foreign relations (namely, the last fifteeen years or so) in search of less risky subjects to study. There are plenty of these; I'm sure many of them are worthy. Of their paramount importance I am less easily persuaded.

 

BEAR BRAUMOELLER

8:39 PM ET

August 19, 2011

Early intervention?

For what it's worth, some large-N work has been done on this; Kurt Weyland's IO piece from 2009 suggested that Great Power influence on contagion was minimal, but that states learned (in a "bounded," i.e., riddled by heuristics, way) from the experience of states that went before them. So in principle, shaping the experiences of early states in a way that would provide appropriate lessons to later ones would be more effective than trying to influence the later course of events. By contrast, Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) argue that conflict contagion is overwhelmingly a function of shared ethnic ties, which is a factor that's less subject to any sort of interference or management.

 

BEAR BRAUMOELLER

8:47 PM ET

August 19, 2011

whoops

Just proofread that, Weyland was a case study. Of 1848, actually. Really interesting piece.

 

ROSCOE QUILIMACO

9:35 AM ET

August 30, 2011

on the contrary!

I think Farrell overgeneralizes from the Arab Spring jenna jameson but then again I think nearly everyone overgeneralizes from the Arab Spring. Countries with similar demographics and governments designed (in somewhat different ways) to monopolize most political and economic authority , but with otherwise very different characteristics, are experiencing very different kinds of changes that have a few common elements . Which could mean that most of them would have experienced these changes eventually whether Tunisia had happened or not , or could mean that they are experiencing them now because Tunisia happened when it did -- regardless , the confluence of circumstances is telling us some interesting things about Arab societies and states. We're taking a leap of faith if we assume it's necessarily telling us a great deal about the international system in general , or a great deal that's new, anyway .
Here's what is new, and I'm a little surprised it hasn't figured more prominently in this Internet discussion . The context of what we're seeing now in the international system is a marked decline in the influence of the American government . If it seems as if the United States is less able to influence international events, it seems to me that networked transnational actors and subtle changes in the nature of states' influence over their international relations must be well down the list of things we ought to be analyzing.
I understand the argument that this factor is something everyone is aware of, and therefore we need to be seeking understanding of all the other things affecting developments in states and societies. My response is simply that awareness and understanding are not the same thing. Understanding and action to restore something of what has been lost are not the same thing either, but that's another discussion. I fear that some in the academic world, seeking to avoid entanglement in the emotionally charged debate over domestic American politics, are glossing over a very significant period in the history of American foreign relations (namely, the last fifteeen years or so) in search of less risky subjects to study. There are plenty of these; I'm sure many of them are worthy. Of their paramount importance I am less easily persuaded.

 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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