Monday, August 22, 2011 - 8:50 AM
As I type this, most of Tripoli is now in the hands of Transitional National Council forces and supporters, two of Muammar Khaddafi's sons are in custody, and the backbone of Khaddafi's military has been broken. TNC forces do not control all of Libya, but they control an ever-increasing amount of it, including all of its oil infrastructuire. The whereabouts of Gaddafi, Khaddafy, and Qaddafi are still unknown, however.
So, six months after a spontaneous protest movement morphed into armed resistance and NATO got involved.... what does this all mean? With events on the ground still evolving, let me suggest the following list of tentative winners and losers from this operation:
WINNERS
1) The people of Libya. I think it's safe to say that an overwhelming majority of Libyans are pretty pleased that they're no longer living under the thumb of the Qaddafi family. Juan Cole has a pretty triumphalist post up about how this is playing out. He's a bit overoptimistic in places, but this point rings true -- appearances to the contrary, this was not a civil war:
It was not, if by that is meant a fight between two big groups within the body politic. There was nothing like the vicious sectarian civilian-on-civilian fighting in Baghdad in 2006. The revolution began as peaceful public protests, and only when the urban crowds were subjected to artillery, tank, mortar and cluster bomb barrages did the revolutionaries begin arming themselves. When fighting began, it was volunteer combatants representing their city quarters taking on trained regular army troops and mercenaries. That is a revolution, not a civil war. Only in a few small pockets of territory, such as Sirte and its environs, did pro-Qaddafi civilians oppose the revolutionaries, but it would be wrong to magnify a handful of skirmishes of that sort into a civil war. Qaddafi’s support was too limited, too thin, and too centered in the professional military, to allow us to speak of a civil war.
Brian Whitaker makes similar points in The Guardian. This fact does not necessarily mean that an armed insurgency won't persist, but even if it does, it would lack domestic political legitimacy.
2) NATO. Quick, was the 1999 Kosovo operation a NATO success or a failure? During the operation, it seemed like a failure, as a) everyone thought it was taking too long; and b) the operation expost the operational gaps between the U.S. and European forces. After Kosovo ended, however, it seemed like a victory... because it was.
This operation parallels the rhythms of the Kosovo intervention, but in many ways represents a bigger victory. The UK and France shouldered a greater share of the burden, there were no casualties in the alliance, and this operation directly led to regime change (whereas Kosovo had only an indirect effect on Serbia). As Blake Hounshell has observed, at the cost of $1 billion, Western involvement was totally worth it.
3) Air power advocates. Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers' New York Times account of the march into Tripoli suggests the ways in which NATO air power played a critical role in aiding TNC forces on the ground. Stepping back, one has to conclude that NATO's air power was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for Libya to play out the way it did. Despite some neoconservative calls for even heavier intervention, however, Western boots on the ground were not necessary.
4) Tunisia and Egypt. If TNC forces are able to consolidate their hold on Libya and restore some semblance of law and order, that means the return of more than 680,000 Libyan refugees. This would be good not just for Libya proper, but for the countries housing most of these refugees -- namely, Egypt and Tunisia. These countries are attempt their own transition into more representative regimes. Eliminating the socioeconomic pressure of displaced Libyans is an unalloyed good thing for the political development of Libya's neighbors.
5) President Obama. To quote Eli Lake: "President Birth Certificate has done what Reagan and W could not: end Gadhafi's reign and kill bin Laden." It's worth noting that oth operations took more than six months to play out. While he won't necessarily be this blunt about it, Obama can now credibly argue that patience + determinaion = badass military statecraft.
LOSERS
1) Other authoritarian despots, particularly in Africa. I don't want to overstate this -- I'm skeptical that the scenes from Tripoli will lead to spontaneous uprisings in Damascus and elsewhere. Still, this is the kind of event that will always make other despots nervous.
In the case of African authoritarians or quasi-authoritarians, the fall of Khaddafi also leads to the permanent end of a pipeline of cash from Libya to his friends in Africa.
2) U.S. cable news networks. Useless. Totally f$%*ing useless. Seriously, until FOX news started airing live footage from its SkyNews partner, I got vastly more information from my Twitter feed than any of the cable news nets. That's when they were even covering events in Tripoli -- I think it took MSNBC something like five hours to realize there was something worth covering. Yesterday's performance was just embarrassing.
3) Realists. The United States should never have intervened!! It's a civil war!!! Libya is an example of the militarization of American foreign policy!! The U.S. will be drawn into an expensive quagmire that is not a core national interest!! Air power alone will never work!! Many, many other realist cliches!!
Oops.
Readers are warmly welomed to provide realist rationalizations for why they are still right/will be proven right in the future in the comments.
4) KT McFarland. There has been a lot of stupid American punditry on Libya, but I think McFarland's FoxNews.com essay from last Friday takes the cake as the Dumbest Thing I've Read on Libya in the past month. Thankfully, it's also completely obsolete.
5) President Obama. [Wait, how is he a winner and a loser?!--ed.] On the one hand, Obama certainly wins by insulating himself against foreign policy criticism. On the other hand, foreign policy victories in the bank are quickly forgotten -- just look at the way in which bin Laden's death translated into a transitory blip for Obama's popularity.
In 2012, the only issue any voter cares about is the economy. A successful operation in Libya will mean less news coverage about Libya and even more coverage of the economy … which is not exactly Obama's strong suit at the moment.
The "this week" portion of the blog post title suggests tentativeness of these assessments (see also Peter Feaver and Steve Walt on this point). Nevertheless... am I missing anything?
Attacks on other governments made without Congressional sanction of any kind, indeed without formal consultation with Congress, are not great ideas just because they occasionally work out well for someone else. I understand how differently this matter looks to the pundit class.
Additionally, and from the standpoint of American interests in the region, the country that matters here is Egypt. In its zeal to respond to crises, further inspiring narratives and celebrate triumphs of the human spirit, the Obama administration made a decision to treat the Egyptian revolution as a mission accomplished situation last spring. It focused instead on Libya, a country less than 1/12 Egypt's size. In the meantime the Egyptian armed forces have moved in what seems to be a very determined manner to maintain a strong grip on their country's government and politics, a development that neither upholds American values nor ensures American interests.
Americans are not particularly good at recognizing the opportunity costs of commitment to the crisis of the moment. Qadhafi was, in a sense, an opportunity cost of Americans' long preoccupation with Southeast Asia in the late 1960s. I do not begrudge the Libyan people their liberation from his rule, but do wonder what opportunity costs the Obama administration has placed on our bill by choosing to make Qadhafi's fall its top priority in the Middle East for the last several months.
You're operating under the assumption that it is the United States' responsibility to be the intervening force of reason and democratization in Egypt. The installation of a new authoritarian regime in the ousting of an old one is not surprising. Moreover, it would be costly, ineffective, and delegitimizing to become deeply involved in the democratization of Egypt. Movements that are supported from afar in such a manner lose the nationally oriented zeal that allows coalitions to form that are large enough to overcome vested groups like the military.
Moreover, Libya (at least so far), is nothing like SE Asia in the 60s. There is no US military presence in Libya. None. Providing supplies and air support (and not even that much by comparison to France) is a completely different situation. Less than a year of logistical support to a civil war is even less involved than we were in Kosovo.
I generally agree with your listing of winners and losers. However, I'll disagree with the listing of Realists mostly because the situation remains unfinished. The capture of Tripoli, even the arrest or execution of Qaddafi, is not the final data point of the US or NATO involvement in Libya. I went into this in detail on Prof. Walt's blog post (he beat you to the punch), but my concerns going forward are that Western powers are going to have serious problems with lesson-learning and misperception that will hurt any of the positive value or "winners" that arose from the US' approach to Libya:
[Just going to cut and paste my three paragraphs, I hope you are not offended. Busy day at work.]
1) Who are the rebels? - The best any of us can really say with any confidence is that they aren't Qaddafi. We don't know what kind of government they'll want, what kind the people of Libya will want, and what that will look like to our Western populations and governments. It could be a couple of things: a newer, shinier, more intelligent and marginally liberalized authoritarian regime, it could be a democracy fundamentally founded in the ideas and beliefs of Islam (for better or worse), or it could be exactly what Americans and other westerners expect it to be. My belief is that the result will be one of the first two rather than the last one. There's no reason to believe that the rebels desire the very same institutions and philosophies of government that we seem to be projecting onto them. That seems familiar somehow...
2) What lessons does the foreign policy establishment draw? - Again, my belief is that there's certain narrow value to the United States that comes from ousting Qaddafi that comes in the form of a new friendlier economic partner that's tremendously oil-rich. However, will the US or other Great Powers in NATO be taught the lesson that what was done in Libya should be done everywhere? Even if the development of statecraft is a wild success in Libya, will that blind actors to the ability to discern the value of certain interventions over others?
I don't know the answer to these questions, but considering how much "Democratization" as a concept gets Western leaders salivating (and Democratic Peace Theory's adoration in circles in Washington), I'm skeptical that the US will be able to take the middle road and not bolster human intervention and state building as necessary central components of foreign policy.
Winners -- Most importantly the Libyan People
Congratulations to the Libyan people for ending this 41 year old oppressive, dictatorial regime. The world's thoughts and prayers are with them and we hope that from the ashes of this conflict have the seeds of future growth and prosperity been sewn. It has been a long struggle but it is nice to see that the bloodshed should be ending very soon. Hopefully the Libyan people can mobilize a new legitimate government quickly without too much corruption and violence.
Check out http://www.thinkonthat.com/archives/3929 for a write up and description of the entire conflict and it's timeline. I found it useful to get a good overview of the events leading up to the end of this regime. Cheers!
I think the Kosovo analogy is a good one...so far. Remember, though, the triumphalism when the US took Baghdad; the devil we knew may be preferable to the devil we don't know...
I guess the losers in Iraq were the Despots, not the civilians who say there were better off under Saddam.
I guess the losers in Afghanistan are the Despots, not the civilians slaughtered by the U.S.
I guess the losers in Pakistan are the Despots, not the innocent civilians being killed by U.S. drones every single day.
I guess when you are an ally of the U.S. you are allowed to commit crimes against humanity ad infinitum --> China, Egypt, Saudia Arabia the list goes on.
This publication is a sorry excuse for journalism.
Sure, I'll bite.
1. Just because something was successful doesn't mean it was worth the cost. True, the cost-benefit looks vastly better for Libya than Iraq, but it's not nothing either -- billions of dollars, some diplomatic capital, etc. If you're allowing realists to answer on their own terms, then whether the Libyan people live under Qadaffi or not isn't much of a benefit.
2. Libya is one of the easier cases for humanitarian intervention -- a lightly populated oil rich country, with the whole population on a seacoast and a stone's throw from NATO bases, neighbors who were on our side, and a tired old dictator with neither broad popular support nor "we're all in this together" links to specific tribes or groups, who never exactly had a reputation for competence, defended mostly by mercenaries. Even this was a bit messy. Tell me what the lessons are for getting rid of Assad....?
3. If the long-term implication is to convince the dictators of the world that striking bargains to give up pursuit of WMD/terrorism/whatever in exchange for being brought back in from the cold and presumably off the regime change list, then that is indeed a significant entry in the "cost" column.
4. Who said this is over? ME/NA experts and military officers from other countries in the region who I've talked to sure don't see it as a given that things go cleanly and smoothly from here. I'm not sure if you posted it or not, but from your Iraq War opinions I suspect your take in April of 2003 was also "Whadda you say now, you hand-wringing realists?". If we go by that track record, Dan, I wouldn't be quick to dismiss what Mearsheimer, Posen, and Walt have to say this time.
On point 3, should have been "convincing dictators that striking bargains [give up WMD/no regime change] IS A BAD IDEA, then...."
I think Germany should be in the list of losers. The Merkel gov't abstained from the vote on the UN resolution on the intervention in Libya. The success of NATO's operation makes the German government's decision look shortsighted, timid and violating solidarity toward's the NATO allies. It also won't have helped it's standing with the Libyan people or the TNC.
That whole bit bashing those who didn't support intervention, and claiming victory for idealism (?) long before the flag of victory should be flown; was a little pretentious. For a professor, you seem short-sighted. Also try to keep in mind that most realists were not arguing against the use of limited air-power and CIA assets...we were arguing against the use of ground forces, and or a massive engagement. Neither happened, BECAUSE the realists prevented it from happening (see Bob Gates). So while I appreciate your need for a victory lap, it is both too early, and too incomplete a moment to take one.
I think the ICC should be included in the list of winners. This is because its legitimacy/reputation will be bolstered- when Quaddafi's sons will be handed in to the Hague to face the consequences of their acts.
Just to pile on top of what other people have already said, there's still a chance that the end of Gaddafi rule will give way not to democracy and solid institution-building but years of factional strife, violence, economic crisis and, consequently, more intervention at ever higher ground presence and cost.
Nice post about Khadafi/Gaddafi/etc. But I am surprised that you did not include Sarkozy in your list. He made a gamble –make the French public forget his "oops" when it came to Tunisia and Egypt and improve his statesman stature in the view of the upcoming presidential election (Spring 2012). I am ready to bet that his PR will be all out, triumphalist, over the next few days…
"In 2012, the only issue any voter cares about is the economy.". True enough today, but remember in 2007 foreign policy was a big issue, not the economy.
To quote Rummy in a different context: "stuff happens". And it can change the relevance of having some foreign policy successes.
Anyone who has to figure out what is the correct-at-the-moment spelling of "Kadafy"...
patience + determinaion = badass military statecraft
All this for Obama?
He is still in the middle of his third war. Remember when Bush celebrated himself after the initial Afghan and Iraqi victories? Was that the same badass military statecraft?
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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