Posted By Daniel W. Drezner Share

With the passing of APSA and the dawning of Labor Day, it's time for people to go back to school and Think Deep Thoughts.  In the realm of international relations theory, Thanassis Cambanis' essay in the Sunday Boston Globe Ideas section is a great starter course for thinking about the way the world works.  His basic thesis:

Instead of a flurry of new thinking at the highest echelons of the foreign policy establishment, the major decisions of the past two administrations have been generated from the same tool kit of foreign policy ideas that have dominated the world for decades. Washington’s strategic debates - between neoconservatives and liberals, between interventionists and realists - are essentially struggles among ideas and strategies held over from the era when nation-states were the only significant actors on the world stage. As ideas, none of them were designed to deal effectively with a world in which states are grappling with powerful entities that operate beyond their control....

As yet, no major new theory has taken root in the most influential policy circles to explain how America should act in this kind of world, in which Wikileaks has made a mockery of the diplomatic pouch and Silicon Valley rivals Washington for cultural influence. But there are at least some signs that people in power are starting to try in earnest. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has openly integrated the search for a new paradigm into her policy making. In universities, think tanks, and the government, thinkers trying to grapple with this fluid world structure are finally getting attention in the circles where their ideas could shape policy.

Read the whole, provocative thing -- if you agree with Cambanis' arguments, then it certainly represents a data point in favor of Anne-Marie Slauighter's vision of how world politics operates

My onlytweak of Cambanis' essay is that he repeatedly stresses the need for a new generation of strategic concepts and international relations theories to guide U.S. grand strategy, and then lists as examples the following: 

Joseph Nye, a Harvard political scientist who served in the Carter and Clinton administrations and has advised Secretary of State Clinton, was one of the pioneers. In the 1990s, he coined the term “soft power,” arguing that sometimes the most effective way for America to promote its interests would be through influencing global health and the environment, or culture and education. His latest book, “The Future of Power,” counsels that America can preserve its influence if it reconceives its institutions and priorities to deal with a world where the energy is shifting from the West to the East, as well as from states to non-state actors. Michael Doyle at Columbia University, a seminal theorist whose idea of a “democratic peace” in the 1990s crucially inflected policy with the belief that democracies don’t fight each other, now talks about the notion of an age of the “empowered individual,” where lone actors can alter the trajectory of states and of history as never before. Stephen Walt, also at Harvard, argues that in the new era America simply needs to start by acknowledging its limits: that with less muscle and less extra money, the first step will be to streamline its goals in a way that so far politicians have been loath to do.

No offense to Joseph Nye, Michael Doyle, and Steve Walt -- these are Great Men of interntional relaions thought.  The notions that Cambanis lists here, however, are not "new" in any sense.  Which leads me to wonder whether Cambanis has defined the problem correctly.  Is it that international relations theory has gone stale... or is it simply that the wrong set of existing theories are in vogue today? 

What do you think? 

 

BLUE13326

11:46 PM ET

September 5, 2011

I don't understand the

I don't understand the distinction he is making between neoconservatives and liberals in foreign policy: It's my understanding that neoconservatives are, by definition, people who believe in conservative domestic policy and liberal interventionist foreign policy. And if you look in practice at the interventions of the past 3 administrations, they are quite similar regardless of the label: an appeal to higher ideals (i.e. responsibility to protect), and an unconcern with legality (although I guess on could argue that Bush and Obama were simply following Clinton's example on this), and a lack of planning for victory. Or maybe I'm just making the author's point on this.

Anyone who thinks the concept of 'soft power' started with Nye inthe 1990s should read the Justice Department's amicus brief in the Brown v Board of Ed case from the 1950s...

 

BALTIMORON

7:19 AM ET

September 6, 2011

Egghead on Crack

Is someone asking for a top-down solution in a polarized era? Did theory ever dictate what passes for foreign policy or strategy? Or, are you taking what the hacks gave you, and associating it with an academic label for convenience? I would argue, bluntly, that what the US says it is doing is what sells to whomever the pols and hacks consider important, be that party donors, constituents, or posterity.

 

DRLAKE777

3:04 PM ET

September 6, 2011

Maybe a little of both?

Are at least some of the main theoretical paradigms of IR of lessened usefulness for understanding contemporary international relations? I certainly think so, but there is a difference between less useful and not useful. Since I do think we are in a transitional period, and since the most senior current scholars have an edge when it comes to getting their ideas out there, I'm not surprised that what Cambanis calls new ideas are not particularly new.

 

YOHANES SULAIMAN

11:47 PM ET

September 6, 2011

Bringing the State's Political Elites Back In

The rise of non-state actors has always been exaggerated. While they are truly important, they cannot exist without the permission or the weaknesses of state.

In "permission," I mean, it is in the interest of the political elites within states to have non-state actors operating, in order to strengthen their bargaining position within the state. In "weaknesses," I mean that the power of state is so weak, that it cannot control the state effectively.

Thus a totalitarian state that does not allow political dissents will simply shut the non-state actors out.

Anyhow, I put my entire essay here at: http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2011/09/bringing-states-political-elites-back.html. Enjoy.

 

NIDAYEDE

7:41 AM ET

September 8, 2011

Are at least some of the main

Are at least some of the main theoretical paradigms of IR of lessened usefulness for understanding contemporary international relations? I certainly think so.pellet press

 

CARSON

3:06 PM ET

October 2, 2011

In "permission," I mean, it

In "permission," I mean, it is in the interest of the political elites within states to have non-state actors operating, in order to strengthen their best microwave bargaining position within the state. In "weaknesses," I mean that the power of state is so weak, that it cannot control the state effectively.

 

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

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