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Posted By Daniel W. Drezner
Tuesday, February 21, 2012 - 5:24 AM
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I know that Daniel Klaidman's Newsweek cover story on the Navy SEALs is supposed to make me feel all warm and safe because of the uber-competence of SEAL Team Six and President Obama's comfort with using them adroitly:
This is a Special Ops moment. The Navy SEALs, in particular, have never appeared so heroic and effective. They killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan last year, and just last month rescued two aid workers held hostage in Somalia. At a time when many Americans think their government is incompetent, the SEALs are public employees who often get the job done. They’re a morale booster, and they know it.
The thing is, one of Klaidman's more detailed anecdotes actually gives me great pause about the decision-making process within the Obama administration about the use of force:
The CIA and military had been hunting Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan for years. He was a suspect in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and had been directly implicated in other deadly terrorist attacks in East Africa, including a suicide bombing of an Israeli-owned resort in Mombasa. He was an important link between al Qaeda and its Somalia-based affiliate, and a potential wealth of information on how the jihadist networks operate. Killing him would have been a significant victory, but capturing him alive could have been even better.
After months of patiently watching him, American intelligence officers suddenly learned that Nabhan was preparing to travel along a remote desert road in southern Somalia....
McRaven told the group that Nabhan’s convoy would soon be setting out from the capital, Mogadishu, on its way to a meeting of Islamic militants in the coastal town of Baraawe. The square-jawed Texan and former Navy SEAL crisply laid out the “Concepts of Operation” that had been developed in anticipation of this moment. Several options were spelled out, along with the military hardware that would be required for each, as well as collateral-damage estimates:
The military could fire Tomahawk cruise missiles from a warship off the Somali coast. This was the least dangerous option in terms of U.S. casualties but not the most precise. (Missiles have gone astray, hitting civilians, and even when they strike their target, they don’t always take it out.) Such missile strikes had been a hallmark of the Bush administration. For all of its “dead or alive” rhetoric, the Bush White House was generally cautious when it came to antiterrorist operations in anarchic areas like Somalia. The second option was a helicopter-borne assault on Nabhan’s convoy. There was less chance of error there: small attack helicopters would allow the commandos to “look the target in the eye and make sure it was the right guy,” according to one military planner. The final option was a “snatch and grab,” a daring attempt to take Nabhan alive. From a purely tactical standpoint, this was the most attractive alternative. Intelligence from high-value targets was the coin of the realm in the terror wars. But it was also the riskiest option.
Unstated but hanging heavily over the group that evening was the memory of another attempted capture in Somalia. Many on the call had been in key national-security posts in October 1993 during the ill-fated attempt to capture a Somali warlord that became known as “Black Hawk Down,” after a book of the same name. That debacle left 18 dead Army Rangers on the streets of Mogadishu, and inspired al Qaeda leaders to think they could defeat the American superpower. As Daniel Benjamin, the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, said during the meeting: “Somalia, helicopters, capture. I just don’t like the sound of this.”
As everyone left the meeting late that evening, it was clear that the only viable plan was the lethal one (emphasis added).
The mission was a success, and I'm sure that there's more to this decision than is in Klaidman's story. That said, based on the story, this decison-making process seems flawed. The deciding factor appears to have been that the more aggressive option had echoes of the 1993 Black Hawk Down fiasco. Because the situations seemed analagous ("Somalia, helicopters") the worst-case outcome -- a botched raid -- also seemed likely.
Here's the thing though -- as analogies go, this one seems somewhat ill-suited. The most obvious difference was that this raid wasn't going to take place in a city but a remote desert road. It was extremely difficult and bloody for U.S. forces to battle their adversaries in the urban anarchy of Mogadishu. In the open, with no civilians to use as shields, I would think JSOC has the advantage. Even if the snatch-and-grab option was the riskiest option, it does not seem as risky as U.S. efforts to rescue the downed Black Hawk crew back in 1993. In this instance, the worst-case scenario would have been some JSOC soldiers killed -- but given the terrain, the lack of civilians and cover, and the likely firepower advantage held by the Americans, a Black Hawk Down II outcome sounds unlikely.
Despite these differences, analogical reasong triumphed. The mission succeeded in taking out Nabhan, but it sounds like the slightly riskier option would have yielded greater rewards.
Let me stress, yet again, that I'm not an expert on special ops. I'd welcome commenters explaining to me why I don't know what the hell I'm talking about. Still, based on this story, the guiding factor in this case appears to have been a poor analogy. I hope this is the exception and not the rule for the current administration.
Am I missing anything?
You are of course correct. It was a poor analogy in the extreme. However now politicians are loathe to commit troops to potential harm. Going after bin Laden was different. Bin Laden was far more notorious and a successful op translated into a huge political points making the risk more palatable.
The CIA and the military knew who Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan was, the American public didn't. This is what I think was the driving fear of the decision makers. They didn't want to have to explain US deaths trying to apprehend someone the American public was unfamiliar with.
If Americans were killed, the media and political opponents would be asking why Nabhan wasn't just disposed of with a drone. So the decision makers chose the 'safest' political option that left them the least potentially exposed politically.
Most Americans sick of war, blood, taxpayer money blown
Obama's popularity spiked after the bin Laden murder - but only briefly. If he is using the SEALs, or any military branch for the fireworks effect, he needs to consider who'll turn out at the polls in November, other than old, white, conservative dudes: minorities, women, gays, independents, youth. About 70% of Americans polled hate the Afghan War, especially as word is leaking about the deceitfulness of top military leadership. As I recall, a recent poll about the conflict in Iran indicates Americans are concerned about rising gasoline prices but don't believe it's worth starting a war over.
FYI: I am an ethnic Macedonian Orthodox Christian who is not overly fond Muslims ... the Turks for 500 years of historical reasons and Albanians for current political reasons ... but:
It was a few years ago, in the early years of W. Bush or could even have been in the late Clinton years, a wanted Al Qaeda type, in Yemen, was driving in an SUV with his fellow bad guys, along a sparsely populated section of the highway when a missile landed and blew him to 72 virgin heaven.
What struck ... and shocked me ...at that time ... was the total contempt the US had for Muslim Arabs, their governments and society.
The immediate knee jerk analogy that came to mind was what if these same people were driving along the White Cliffs of Dover, would the US have done the same?
Now, I know there a hundred questions, a hundred answers, a hundred excuses ... good student essay question by the way ... but, at that time I believe I had the answer to the question that vexed the "Western" chattering classes ... lo these many years.
Question: Why do they hate us?
Answer: Because the "West" in general, and the US in particular, has total contempt for Muslim Arabs, their governments and society.
Daniel, I think that I have correctly identified the problem ... the solution I leave to you.
The US would not have to bomb a terrorist driving along
The US would not have to bomb a terrorist driving along the "white cliffs of Dover" because the British do not harbor or abide terrorists. The British would have caught and incarcerated said terrorist becuase they are law abiding, human respecting people.
Yemen on the other hand is a different story. Yemen follows the Koran which insists on Dar El Islam (worldwide Islam). In order to achieve Dar El Islam, terrorism is sanctioned by the Koran. So when the US finds a known terrorist living in a country which would sanction the slaughter of "non-believers" the US has to employ missiles to handle said terrorist.
Why do they hate us?
Because we won't submit.
Submit? To who? Did any Arab occupy your country? Did any Arab attacked the US to enforce an arbitrary regime change? Are Arab troops in your country? Did any Arab order you to submit? No. You are the one who asks them to submit. So leave these empty slogans.
Islam means submission.
According to the Koran everyone in the world must submit.
Has an Arab ever attacked my country?
My family is Greek, we had 400 years of Turkish Muslim rule wherein we were denied education, basic human rights and even paid a child tax. During the invasion of Greece cities that didn't 'submit' were torched, there was mass murder and rape. So spare me the Arab/Muslim victimhood mentality.
Republicans do not want the US to adopt European governing values.
Do they also object to German governing values?
How would a Republican ... say ... Romney, Gingrich, Santorum, ... compare and contrast Germany and the US with regard to debt, trade imbalance, healthcare etc,
This is not a new Karl Rove talking point. See Jack London, "War of the Classes", 1905, Kindle Edition, Location 38.
Is it thinking by analogy or a case of fighting the last war? Either way, good point.
I think that ultimately, though the snatch and grab would have yielded the ideal outcome, a dead terrorist was also acceptable. More than that, it didn't require us to put soldiers in more danger than they need to be in. These operators are not risk adverse, but they do cost us millions and millions of dollars to train, and billions to equip. They are not easily replaced, and the loss of even one is felt deeply in such a small community. Politics aside, if you can kill a target without risking the lives of American soldiers and sailors, then why not? After all, it's not the job of our servicemen to die for their country, it's their job to make the other poor bastard die for his.
The thing you have to keep in mind with these types of missions is that the enemy always has a vote. It is one thing to do a snatch when you are hitting a target at night, at a fixed location, when they are at their most vulnerable. It is another thing to hit a moving convoy, in day light hours, in an area that you do not control, in a manner that does not kill your target. There are a lot of moving parts here that complicate this. The 2 simplest are how do you stop the convoy without killing the target? How do you differentiate the target to capture on the ground from the flunkies that you are going to kill?
Think about what happened with UBL. They tried to get him alive and still ended up killing him.
Once you start looking at the variables it becomes clear that a kill mission is probably the best option. Increasing the risk to attempt a snatch, while creating more valuable intel, would probably result in the target being dead anyway.
Can you please just do the appropriate thing and cite Khong and/or Neustadt and May?
Thanks
The Endless Dribbloe Of Foreign Policy
The internet is alive with chatter over the video testimony of Navy Seal Bill Brockbrader who shares with us that Navy Seals are encouraged to commit sex crimes so they may be blackmailed later into committing war crimes and this Daniel Drezner is so far up his policy alimentary canal he's unable to use a google search engine.
History will not be lenient with the Council On Foreign Relations.
Why the diplomats shouldn't always be in charge
The problem is Newsweek quoted a State Dept person who from the comment, knows squat about military operations. This was intended to be an isolated snatch and grab, not a continuous humanitarian operation where the locals got accustomed to US tactics. Tomahawks are a terrible idea--they would have had a low probability of kill on a moving target, assuming we could get positive identification on the target at the time.
The other 2 options are much better if you want to capture or kill the person. Although with the helo one, we'd have to examine the logistics, basing, weather conditions. Since Somalia is a coastal country, the US navy should have been able to use one of their ships to move assets into place.
To really understand the decision-making process, we'd have to know which course of action the Pentagon recommended since the military was the primary actor in this operation (probably the default middle one due to bureaucratic politics).
Also--why did the author state that Tomahawk missile strikes were the hallmark of the Bush administration? That was Clinton who used them in Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
A better framework when evaluating military operations is to ask what is the level of risk versus level of success in achieving X. X should also be ranked loosely in terms of national interest (critical, vital, important, etc). That would clarify the courses of action for decision-makers.
The SEALs as Obama's go to option is a product of both their flexibility in mision and their proven track record of success. This analogy is weak because it assumes that the military fails to learn its lessons, when in fact nothing could be further from the truth. Military lessons are often written in blood, so it seems rather implausible to me that military leaders and decision makers wouldn't draw relevant comparisons between scenarios as to at least learn from past mistakes.
I would also add that the articles numerous examples of calling on the SEALs illustrates their proficiency. The numerous special operations missions in addition to heavy exposure in two simultaneous wars, is only going to make the sword sharper. This is another critical factor that makes the Black Hawk Down analogy off the mark.
never fight a land war in Asia
The above was declared by Douglas MacArthur after the Korean war (1953). Nonetheless, the US military remarkably failed to draw the necessary conclusions by launching subsequent aggressive wars and were/are duly defeated in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
SEALs summoned when Obama wants to look macho?
Maybe I'm in the minority, but the Hollywood-style event staged to take out bin Laden is a black mark rather than a high point. Obama is trying to appeal to some "severely" conservative, aging white (mostly) men with his SEALs antics. The military population is about one percent, if O. is considering who votes. Numbers-wise, the president would see more of an advantage is appealing to gays.They're approximately 10 percent of the U.S. population.
Most Americans sick of war, blood, taxpayer money blown
Obama's popularity spiked after the bin Laden murder - but only briefly. If he is using the SEALs, or any military branch for the google reklam fireworks effect, he needs to consider who'll turn out at the polls in November, other than old, white, conservative dudes: minorities, women, gays, independents, youth. About 70% of Americans polled hate the Afghan War, especially as word is leaking about the deceitfulness google reklam of top military leadership. As I recall, a recent poll about the conflict in Iran indicates Americans are concerned about rising gasoline prices but don't believe it's worth starting a war over.
HA-HA-HA! I love your question! I, too, can see Mexico from my house in Texas and I'm no foreign policy expert. Seeing Mexico from my house doesn't make me qualified to be the next Comander in Chief, either. I am fluent in Spanish. Does that make me more qualified? NO! So even if Palin speaks Russian she's still not qualified nor would that make her a foreign policy expert. She probably doesn't even speak Russian and (ooooooh!) she's so close to Russia..
"Is rio orange war always comparateur forfait mobile inevitable ?"
MaximB
Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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